Hi Bruno Marchal
What I don't understand about comp is---- if there is a UTM that can calculate whatever is needed to emulate our behavior, how can comp ever be false (except possibly by those aspects hidden by Godel ) ? [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/13/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-13, 05:22:45 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On 12 Dec 2012, at 20:00, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 10:49:16 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > On 12 Dec 2012, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > > > On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Your servitor: > > > > > > 1) Arithmetic (comp) > > > > > > :) > > > > > > Bruno > > > > > > To which I add: > > > > > > 0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise > > > to comp. > > > > > > OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp. > > > > No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for > > granted. > > Not at all. The machine existence, and its relative running existence, > are theorem in the tiny arithmetic. > > Tiny compared to what though? Tiny in the sense of needing few K to be described. > As far as I'm concerned, the appearance of arithmetic truth from > nothing is an oceanic gulf - far greater than that of a sensory- > motor primitive, which has no possible explanation. First we cannot explain the numbers with less than the number (or Turing equivalent). So we have to assume them, if only to make sense of any theory in which you can define what you mean by sensory-motor. Then in arithmetic many things have no possible explanation. > Arithmetic is easily explained as one of the many types of experiences Keep in mind that "experiences" is what I want explain. > which allow us to refer to other experiences, but nothing in > arithmetic will ever point to the taste of a carrot or a feeling of > frustration. In your theory which deprived machine of having consciousness. > It may leave room for undefined, non-comp 1p content, but that's all > it is: room. Nothing points positively to realism and concrete > sensory participation, only simulations...but what simulates the > Turing machine itself? What props up the stability and erasure > capacities of it's tape? What allows numbers to detect numbers? > > > > > > > Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't > > necessary in the first place. > > By postulating what we want to explain. > > There is no more need to explain it than there is a need to explain > arithmetic truth. The difference is that we have no experience of > arithmetic truth outside of sense, but we are surrounded by sense > which persists in spite of having no arithmetic value. If you say so ... > > > > > > You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back. > > > > It isn't a problem, it is the fundamental symmetry of Universe. If > > you don't have a mind-body distinction, then you are in a non- > > ordinary state of consciousness which does not commute to other > > beings in public space. > > You take the problem, and then say it is the solution. > > The cosmos isn't a problem, it is the source of all problems and > solutions. Well, the cosmos is a problem with comp, and which makes comp interesting. > > That's the god- > of-the-gap mistake. > > No, it's the recognition of the superlative nature of cosmos - > beneath all gods and gaps, beneath all problems and solutions, is > sense itself. We don't even know if there is one. > > We have of course already discuss this. You are > just saying "don't search". > > You are welcome to search, I only say that I have already found the > only answer that can ever be universally true. Hmm... > > It looks *you* are talking everything for > granted at the start, in the theory. > > I take only sense for granted because sense cannot be broken down > into any more primitive elements. Everything else can be broken down > to sense. The CTM + classical theory of knowledge can explain that feeling. > > > > > > > > > With the CTM ( a > > better name for comp), that which perceives, understands, > participates > > and discovers comp is explained entirely (except 1% of its > > consciousness) by the only two laws: > > > > Kxy = x > > Sxyz = xz(yz) > > > > Laws? What are those? How do they govern? > > Kxy is a shorhand for ((K x) y), and you are told by the first > equation above that for all x and y, ((K x) y) = x. > > So ((K K) K) = K, or to use again the shorthand (which consists in > eleimnainating the left parentheses): > KKK = K. > > For the same reason > > KSK = S > KSS = S > K(S K) K = (S K) > etc. > > For example SKK is an identity operator: > > SKKx = Kx(Kx), by the second equation, = x, by the first equation. > > S and K behavior is ruled by the two axioms above, and gives already a > Turing universal language/system/machine. > > Axioms are philosophical. They don't make things happen. Systems > don't appear without some capacity to generate and participate in > them which exists first. You presume that there is such a thing a > Law, but when I ask what you mean by that, you give more details on > this specific proposition. I'm asking about the proposition itself > though? What Turing universal language allows S and K to 'behave', > or to exist or to relate to each other? Any one, if you don't like combinators. But we have to start from one universal system. The simplest one, conceptually, is arithmetic. > It's consistent within a particular frame of generalized truth but > it has no proprietary traction. It doesn't move eyeballs and cross > streets, it just equals or increments. Again, you make assertion which can all be sump up by "comp is false". It is your philosophical opinion, not a fact on which we can agree to start with. Of course I am a scientist who asks for a scientific theory, I might be too much demanding. > > > > > > How do these formulas become perception, understanding, > > participation, and discovery? > > By comp, it exist an SK- combinator which emulates my perception, > understanding, participation and discovery. How? By explorartion, > self- > reference, memorisation, ... that kind of things. Why qualia? Perhaps > by the fact that combinators, or numbers, machines, programs, when > looking inward, get unjustifiable bunch of information, including > unexpressible one. > > But this is what we are trying to explain. ? This is already explained. > It seems like after all of the mathematics we are no closer to > answering Why qualia than Plato was. On the contrary, we have a precise and testable theory of qualia. It is testable as it contains a theory of quanta and we can compare with the empiric quantum. > If you accept that qualia is fundamental and irreducible, then > everything else makes perfect sense, including mathematical figures > as reflections of sense-making rather than agents of subjectivity. I just don't have to take qualia as fundamental, and this in a theory which postulate only that my consciousness supervene on my brain computational activity. > > Today the number 12 will be undoubtedly be referenced by more people > and computers than at any other time in history. Will 12 care? If it > doesn't, then how could any number care about anything? 12 is too little to care of everything. But relatively to a universal numbers, many numbers will care (in CTM). Of course when I say that a number cares, I mean the person associated to the coupling of that numbers with its most probable universal numbers "running" it. > > > > > > I know what sense is, because everything that I can experience makes > > some kind of sense with in some sensory experience or is itself a > > sensory experience. > > OK. But if we can use the directly obvious at the metalevel, does not > mean we can't explain that very use from a simpler level. > > Except the explanations from the simpler level supervenes on an even > simpler level, which ultimately can only begin with some capacity to > be and do - sense and motive. Locally, yes. But again this can be explained without assuming sense in the ontology. > A universal machine needs to be made of parts which have sensory- > motor characteristics: stability, succession, detection, multiple > interpretations, reading and writing, lots of things. I don't think so. You assume the two things that comp explains as illusory: primitive experience (sense) and primitive matter. I have already explained that you need actual infinities to attach the primitive experience to the primitive matter (and this follows from UDA if you assume comp). > > > > > 'Two Laws' is an idea which makes intellectual sense but has no > > presence or effect without a participant who is in some way subject > > to that presence or effect. Being present and subject to an effect > > is sense. > > I can't agree more. I appreciate your intuition on the first person. > What you say here is the base of defining knowledge of p by a belief > in p in case p is true. Kp = Bp & p, with p arithmetical, and B too. > So any particular knowlegde will be arithmetical, despite Kp is not > definable in one strike, in arithmetic. This entails that no machine > can know who she "really" is. She can only give a 3p description of > herself or a summary of it (like an identity card). > > I can agree with that I think, although I'm not so much focused on > knowledge and belief, because those are more experiences of > verification and representation rather than initial presentation. > > > > > > > > > or if you prefer: > > > > x + 0 = x > > x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 > > > > x *0 = 0 > > x*(y + 1) = x*y + x > > > > By adding the perceiver, we put marmalade on the (red) pill, an > > unnecessary magic. > > > > The perceiver does not have to be added, it is impossible to remove. > > > Keep is mind that I am a scientist, or if you prefer, I am simple > minded. I expect a theory to be given by what we assume. The theorems > will show what is emerging from what we have assumed. If you do not > add the perceiver, then tell me precisely what you assume, and how you > derive the perceiver from it. > > I assume only a single experiential capacity which subdivides itself > and does not subdivide itself. The individual perceiver is what > remains through isolation - the presence of absence. This isolation > is what we call space and time (or alienation, Tsimtsum, etc), which > is really about scale modulation, the enfolding of sense within > sense. Computation are the rules for establishing this isolation, so > in a real sense it is just as primary as experience itself, however > the natural orientation should always foreground the head end - the > perceiver, and background information/arithemtic/spacetime, if we > are talking about realism and not abstraction. In abstraction, we > can talk about turning the universe upside down and making energy or > communications, semiotics, arithmetic, mana, prana, or whatever > primary and learn all kinds of interesting things, but ultimately we > won't ever be able to find consciousness there. Consciousness is > always beneath all of it - functions and substances are only kinds > of experiences, but experience has no substance and serves no > function. ? Experience has no function? With comp consciousness has a function, like self-speeding up oneself relatively to possible universal numbers in the neighborhood (with consciousness modeled by bet in self- consistency). > > > In such complex subject, it is very useful to put ALL the cards on the > table. That is why I assume a bit of logic, the natural numbers, > addition and multiplication, and then, using comp at the metalevel, I > show that we need nothing more, and that adding anything more is a > sort of treachery, which can deprive the natural quanta/qualia > distinction to get derived from self-reference. > > Self-reference is a Red Herring to me. If I say "I" does that mean > the author of the words or the sentence is talking about itself? > There is nothing in the letter "I" which can answer that, but our > intuition should tell us that the sentence is not really talking > about itself, and that in fact sentences themselves can't really > talk about anything. They can, by the use of the Dx = "xx" trick. > > > > > > You are looking at a blackboard in the sky and deciding that it is a > > doorway to a world in which actual experience comes from the idea of > > counting. Counting is an experience. Computing requires computers. > > Computers require sense. > > > > I continue to be, > > Craig > > You continue to be a good phenomenologist and a bad metaphysician, > imo. > > Hehe. I don't want to be a metaphysician though, I want to > physicalize meta. > > I would not care so much if you didn't become a consciousness- > eliminativist with respect to material and immaterial machines. > > I'm ok with machines opening up new experiences for us, but I don't > think that we are opening up new experiences for them. We differ on this. > If we were, they wouldn't care anyhow, and that is part of what > makes 'them' machines. It's not discrimination to expose the truth > about awareness. I'm very happy to have silicon sisters working with > me or above me, but I have a solid understanding of why they can > only work and never play. It's not a deficiency on their part, it's > an over-simplification on our part about the qualitative nature of > consciousness and its roots in totality and the single history of > (our) universe. Of course we differ on this. I try hard to make people listening to the machines, but today it asks for a non trivial,investment in computer science. I can't force you to study the math, but I can't help if you don't. All this can be understood even by a disbeliever in CTM. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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