On 16 Jan 2013, at 16:34, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 9:27 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 16 Jan 2013, at 07:15, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Jan 15, 2013 at 10:23 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 1/15/2013 8:12 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Jan 15, 2013 at 8:29 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 1/15/2013 5:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Jan 15, 2013 at 3:14 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 1/15/2013 7:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
Then why do we find ourselves in a world where everyone has only
life from their childhood to now?
All conscious states are experienced, even if everyone is truly
immortal it does't mean we always have access to or are
experiencing all our memories all the time. How much of your
current life are you recalling at any given moment?
To answer your question, we are either original biological
humans or someone else experiencing what it was like to be an
original biological human. When this life ends the
consciousness original biological humans ends, but it continues
as the someone else who experienced that original biological
human's life.
But as I understand your theory we are nothing but sequences of
experiences - so if the sequence continues (and I don't know how
you distinguish one continuation from a another)
I don't bother trying as I've realized it is futile. I've found
only two workable definitions of "you" which don't lead to
contradictions:
1) Each observer moment has its own unique experiencer.
2) All observer moments belong to the same experiencer.
The latter at least leads to useful decision theories (like why
bother getting out of bed in the morning), while the former seems
to lead to nihilism. I prefer the second one.
I love it how empirical contradiction is so easily dismissed.
The theory that you are everyone is not falsified by our
experience (the examples I gave above show that one don't need to
remember experiencing something in order to have experienced it or
to be experiencing it (as a duplicate)).
"To be experiencing it as a duplicate (but not remember)" is just
double-talk.
Assume if MWI were true. You would be experiencing those many
other worlds, but you (the Brent Meeker in this branch) can't
recall those experiences of those other worlds.
It just trashes the concept of person, which it pretends to explain.
Science has shown that the particular matter and material are not
important for personal identity.
That's a too quick and strong statement. It is just that science
provides evidence for comp, but we cannot know if it is true. I
guess you were just quick as I have no doubt you agree with this.
OK? Comp might be false, and particular matter might play a role.
I do agree with your point though.
Yes it was worded too strongly. What I meant is there is no
currently no widely supported theory of mind where the identity of
matter is important to the identity of a person.
I agree. Even Hamerov would agree, despite the low and quantum level.
Only Penrose, but probably also Searle, would disagree, I guess.
Perhaps Craig, and most believer in non comp.
Our understanding of cell metabolism is enough to show that we get a
mostly new brain (new atoms) every few months.
Yes. It takes about seven years for the bones, I think. But the brain
is the champion in metabolism, although quickly followed by stomach
and liver, I guess.
And QM also shows the indistinguishability of particles and atoms of
the same element.
That's a subtle argument which might need to be developed. Everett QM
usually assumes comp or some weakening of it.
So the evidence science has collected is quite strong on this point.
I agree. But in science we never know. Comp is extremely plausible
from the evidences, but the evidences can always be deceiving and so
we can only test (and pray :).
By some token, comp is hard to believe, but the advantage is that comp
can explain why some part of comp, still machine's accessible in
different senses, are just true, but unbelievable or unjustifiable by
machines.
Bruno
Jason
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