On 21 Jan 2013, at 20:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, January 21, 2013 12:01:50 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jan 2013, at 17:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
You are saying that you can prove that the only way a computer can
exist is if arithmetic is irreducible?
I did not say that. I was saying that you have to assume the numbers
and plus+times (or equivalent) to define pattern recognition,
computers, etc.
I don't see that pattern recognition requires numbers to be defined.
To the contrary, numbers are clearly patterns recognized by
different means.
If you take pattern recognition as primitive, you don't help me to
understand anything you say.
I don't have any choice but to take pattern recognition as primitive
- it is primitive.
Then I have no clue what you mean by "pattern recognition".
Okay, prove that.
Then everything around me does not make sense.
Why?
Because without computer in reality, I have one mystery more: how is
it that I can send you a mail?
The presence of a computer or network of computers doesn't mean that
everything else doesn't make sense. Computers have only been around
for a few decades.
Not at all. Computers exists in arithmetic, out of time and space.
Then they appear locally in many physical forms (in three bodies, in
quantum vacuum, in biological cells, eventually they appear in an
explicit hand-made form with Babbage machine, before Turing made the
mathematical discovery and show, with others, to be the result of
rather simple arithmetical relations.
You confuse the concept with some particular instantiation of them, I
think.
If you
believe you can derive them, then do it. But you proceed like a
literary philosophers, so I have doubt you can derive addition and
multiplication in the sense I would wait for.
I have done this many times already, but you aren't really hearing
or understanding. Arithmetic primitives depend on more primitive
sensory-motor experiences. Addition and multiplication are not
literal phenomena, rather they are analytical descriptions and
interpretations of phenomena which are either bodies in space,
experiences through time, or combinations and continuations
thereof. To get to addition, you need to have an experience of
counting, of memory, of discernment and augmentation, of solitary
coherence and multiplicity, of succession and sequence, of
presentation and representation...so many things... I have repeated
this several times, why do you act as if I have been silent on this
point?
Sorry but you are confusing the numbers I assume, to explain just
the working of a computer, with the human intuition of numbers, and
the human senses, which needs the whole biological evolution to be
explained. But you talk like if you start from human sense, which is
non sensical for me. Sorry.
I don't start from human sense at all. I start from the irreducible.
Perceptual participation = experience. The reason a computer works
is because a there is an experience in which a body participates in
a perception of not being able to occupy the same space as another
body, or of a body being able to modify its own sensory-motor
disposition based upon the capacity to perceive some sensory-motory
disposition of another body. This is why we can't build machines out
of gas or empty space or drawings on paper.
Body and experience is what I search an explanation for.
Bruno
> which is the universal primitive upon which both ideal and material
> realism depends. Because arithmetic is a private representation of
> other private representations, it has no public existence which is
> independent of sense,
Assuming what?
Assuming that we have not detected 'numbers' appearing out of thin
air?
?
> nor could any configuration of figures and functions give rise to
> any form of sense were they hypothetically able to exist
> independently of sense.
>
> Please don't hesitate to let me know what seems unclear about that.
In difficult interdisciplinary domain, actually even just in the
foundation of math, you can be clear only by working axiomatically or
semi-axiomatically, but this needs a kind of work that you have
already rejected in previous discussion, so I cannot insist on this.
It is just sad that your fuzzy theory makes you think that machine
cannot support thinking.
It's not sad if I'm right.
That is subjective. I think it is sad even if you are right, as it
makes the zombies possible.
Zombies are only possible if you extend an expectation of sentience
where it doesn't belong. Puppets and avatars are not only possible,
but they are everywhere, and understanding how layers of sense are
partitioned is essential to any theory of consciousness.
To me it's sad that we are seriously considering that machines
could generate thinking based on nothing but superficial
correspondences to behavior, especially when we know specifically
that behavior and consciousness are not directly correlated.
You are deadly wrong on this. The fact that machine could possibly
think is, for me, more related in the fact that they are mute on the
deep question than by any kind of behavior they can have.
To me the fact that they are mute on the deep questions is an
obvious tautology. If you ask something which can't think a question
which requires thinking, it is going to remain mute. It's really no
more complicated than that. You are reading deep wisdom into the
amputated noise of a Magic 8-Ball pushed beyond its design specs.
But for this you need to dig deeper in computer science than you
seem willing to be, so I am not sure I can really convince you. You
want stick on prejudices without opening the file.
From my perspective, you are dug in too deep into computer science
to see its limitations. Computing is important, but only for the
normalization of public realism. The raw experience of
participation, regardless of whether it is human participation or
that of a molecule, or even a disembodied dream has no particular
use for computation, and computation certainly and absolutely has no
use for experience or dreams.
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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