On Monday, January 21, 2013 2:05:08 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > On 1/21/2013 8:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > If you don't take arithmetic as primitive, I can prove that you cannot > > derive both addition and multiplication, nor the existence of > > computer. Then everything around me does not make sense. If you > > believe you can derive them, then do it. But you proceed like a > > literary philosophers, so I have doubt you can derive addition and > > multiplication in the sense I would wait for. > Dear Bruno, > > Is this statement correctly written? How is it coherent that I need > to derive from arithmetic that which is already in arithmetic? It seems > to me that the physical activity of counting is the source of derivation > of arithmetics! Of cource we cannot just consider the activity of a > single entity but that of many entities, each counting in their own ways > and developing communication methods between themselves. > Materialism fails since it cannot explain how it is possible for > material things to have representations of things, intensionality, such > as numbers. Numbers fail, as a ground of ontology, as they can not > transform themselves and remain the same. Matter is exactly that which > can transform and remain the same! >
Right on. I can agree with all of that. I mean if we wanted to get technical I would split the physics of counting into the private motive experience quantitative reasoning from the sensory experiences of figures or forms upon which we project our representations, but yeah numbers need a substrate. I call that substrate physical, but not material as it experiential/intentional rather than substantial/extended. Craig -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/6fS3FKpP2zkJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
