On Monday, January 28, 2013 12:34:32 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: > > On 1/28/2013 5:37 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Sunday, January 27, 2013 10:24:57 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> On 1/27/2013 7:13 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, January 27, 2013 10:06:37 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>> >>> On 1/27/2013 2:35 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote: >>> >>> Hey everyone, >>> >>> I've been following this group a lot. I read it everyday and enjoy all >>> of the wonderful stuff that comes up, even if some of it tends towards ad >>> hominem, argument from authority, and petitio principi. Hey, we're humans, >>> right? That means we get to make these fallacies, in good conscience or >>> bad. >>> >>> Anyway, I wondered about what anyone/everyone thought about the notion >>> of 'chosenness' as a way to understand where we are here in the world. It >>> seems to me that concepts like MWI, Bruno's comp/mech hypothesis and the >>> 'dreams of numbers' ideas of subjectivity, and even Leibniz's 'best of all >>> possible worlds' don't actually do something like flee away from our >>> everyday responsibility to accept the basic fact that we have been CHOSEN >>> -- and when I say this, please don't immediately put a bunch of theological >>> baggage on it. I'm not saying God chose this reality as opposed to another, >>> although this might be a convenient shorthand. But what I am saying is >>> that, out of all the staggering possibilities that we know exist with >>> regards to our universe, our galaxy, our solar system, our planet, our >>> society, and even our individual selves, things could have very easily >>> turned out to be different than they were. The fact that they have turned >>> out in just this way and not another indicates this kind of chosenness, and >>> along with it, comes a certain degree of responsibility, I guess? >>> >>> It seems to me that all the various 'everything' hypotheses (MWI, comp, >>> Leibniz, and others) try to apply the Copernican principle to its breaking >>> point. True enough, there is from a purely 3p point of view nothing special >>> about our cosmic situation re: our planet and our sun. BUT, from an >>> existential 1p point of view there is a huge privilege that we have, i.e. >>> we are sentient observers, who love, feel pain, feel desire, and long for >>> transcendence. >>> >>> >>> There's a desire to respect the Copernican principle (don't assume we're >>> 'special') but also to avoid randomness. This then leads to the hypothesis >>> that *everything* (in some sense) exists. That way you avoid randomness >>> without assuming that we're special. >>> >>> >>> Moreover, the 3p point of view is a pure abstraction, kind of like >>> eating the picture of a meal rather than the actual meal. How do we know >>> what any kind of 3p account of truth would be? What would it even look >>> like? A universe with no observers. A falling tree without a >>> hearer/listener. This, to me, is nonsense. >>> >>> Aren't things like MWI of quantum physics and comp hypothesis of >>> universal dovetailer trying to, at a fundamental and existential level, an >>> attempt to try to run away from the concreteness and absolute 'givenness' >>> (gift) of the world as we find it? And isn't our role, in creation, as >>> freely choosing beings (sorry, John Clark, free will is more than just a >>> noise) to choose what will make other people with us now and in the future >>> feel more love and less pain? And isn't this why we were chosen? >>> >>> >>> To say we're chosen is just another way to avoid randomness. >>> >> >> To say we are avoiding randomness is to assume that there is something >> other than randomness to be embraced. >> >> >> That's what being 'chosen' implies - that there is a 'choser', an >> alternative teleology to be embraced. >> > > There doesn't have to be just one chooser. The universe could be made of > choosers that can appear random when seen from a distant or incomplete > frame of reference. > > > But do they then make a random choice? >
No. It just seems random from the outside because outsiders only see a small part of what is going on. > And how do they effect this choice? > Through the active primitive of sense: efferent participation. > And where do they appear? > It's their behaviors which 'appear' to be random (or determined). I wasn't saying that anything unusual appears. It seems you are just spinning fairy tales. > See what I mean? You are only getting some of what I am trying to explain, so your view is that my explanation appears random or senseless. > > But in a universe where there were no choosers, how would it be possible > for anything to be 'embraced', let alone non-randomness? > > > Before QM, determinism was embraced by many thinkers. > Sure, because they use their free will (efferent participation) to do that. I am talking about the hypothetical universe which lacks free will and creative choosers. > > >> >> >> Why should anything that exists want to avoid randomness? >> >> >> Ask somebody else, I'm not avoiding it. >> > > I'm talking about in principle, ontologically, how is it possible for > anything to 'want to avoid randomness' if there is no ontological > alternative? > > > Why do you think there is no alternative? > I thought that is what you meant by 'To say we're chosen is just another way to avoid randomness.'. You are saying that the interpretation of conditions as 'chosen' is a psychological defense mechanism which generates a fantasy to avoid an unacceptable truth. You've introduced 'choice' which I assume you consider non-random. I think that choice is that which seems both non-random on the inside and seems automatic (involuntary) on the outside. Craig Brent > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
