On 1/29/2013 8:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Jan 2013, at 07:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/26/2013 9:53 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
I think what you are describing comes automatically with comp, as
any observer only knows their direct observations, which could be
created by any one of an infinite number of possible programs going
through the same state. Any one of these programs will have its own
consistent history, but unless analyzed or explored further, that
information is in a sense, undecided. It is like: "Before you
finish reading the second half of this sentence, the color of your
toothbrush could have been any possible color." However, now that
you have finished reading it, and performed a memory look up you
have changed the set of possible programs manifest your
consciousness. It is almost scary to think, when you aren't looking
or or imagining/recalling what your mother, your wife, your
children, they could look like or be almost anything (within some
constraints of what is compatible with your experience in the moment
you are not thinking of them). And it is only when we "stop and
think" we can for a time, lock down that possibility.
'You' are only a consistent history of experiences too, and so 'you'
could be almost anything also. But this fails to explain the
intersubjective agreement of observers: That you AND your wife agree
on what your children look like. So unless you are a solipist, just
dreaming your wife's agreement, an external reality becomes a good
hypothesis.
Good point. With comp the external reality is arithmetic or something
Turing equivalent.
Bruno
Hi,
ISTM, that unless one stipulates an entity separable from the
solipsistic person, denoted as "you" here, that can distinguish somehow
between the state of "just dreaming your wife's agreement" and "an
external reality " that these two states should be taken as identical,
or at least 1p isomorphic. The observer's default state is that of the
solipsist and then somehow it comes to believe that there is something
"real" outside of that which may or may not correspond to "what it can
dream of".
--
Onward!
Stephen
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