On 31 Jan 2013, at 09:38, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
The block universe is the physical universe. So we are not part of it,
for it does not allow subjectivity, which is nonphysical. Or
mathematics or comp, which are also nonphysical.
But you have to explain the relation between both, like getting a
consciousnes change when taking an aspirin, of why fear generates
change in matter, like building bombs.
In fact, comp makes the block-physical universe into the (limit)
border of the block-mindscape.
Of course here I sum up shortly what is really described by (modal
logical) equations.
Bruno
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-01-30, 12:45:53
Subject: Re: Lessons from the Block Universe
On 29 Jan 2013, at 15:04, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> A block universe does not allow for consciousness.
With comp consciousness does not allow any (aristotelian) universes.
There is comp block mindscape, and the universe(s) = the border of the
mindscape as seen from inside.
> The fact the we all possess consciousness, so we think,
> means that our universe is not completely blocked,
From inside.
> although the deviations from "block" may be minor
> and inconsequential regarding the Omega Point.
The comp mind-body problems can be restated by the fact that with
comp, there is an infinity of omega points, and the physics of here
and now should be retrieved from some sum or integral on all omega
points.
By using the self-reference logics we got all the nuances we need (3p,
1p, 1p-plural, communicable, sharable, observable, etc.).
Bruno
> Richard.
>
> On Mon, Jan 28, 2013 at 11:18 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
> wrote:
>> Here's an essay that is suggestive of Bruno's distinction between
>> what is
>> provable and what is true (knowable) but unprovable. Maybe this is
>> a place
>> where COMP could contribute to the understanding of QM.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Lessons from the Block Universe
>>
>>
>> Ken Wharton
>> Department of Physics and Astronomy
>> San Jos� State University
>>
>>
>>
>>
http://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Wharton_Wharton_Essay.pdf?phpMyAdmin=0c371ccdae9b5ff3071bae814fb4f9e9
>>
>>
>> In Liouville mechanics, states of incomplete
>> knowledge exhibit phenomena analogous to those exhibited
>> by pure quantum states. Among these are the existence
>> of a no-cloning theorem for such states [21, 23],
>> the impossibility of discriminating such states with certainty
>> [21, 24], the lack of exponential divergence of such
>> states (in the space of epistemic states) under chaotic
>> evolution [25], and, for correlated states, many of the
>> features of entanglement [26]. On the other hand, states
>> of complete knowledge do not exhibit these phenomena.
>> This suggests that one would obtain a better analogy
>> with quantum theory if states of complete knowledge
>> were somehow impossible to achieve, that is, if somehow
>> maximal knowledge was always incomplete knowledge
>> [21, 22, 27]. This idea is borne out by the results
>> of this paper. In fact, the toy theory suggests that the
>> restriction on knowledge should take a particular form,
>> namely, that one抯 knowledge be quantitatively equal to
>> one抯 ignorance in a state of maximal knowledge.
>>
>> It is important to bear in mind that one cannot derive
>> quantum theory from the toy theory, nor from any
>> simple modification thereof. The problem is that the
>> toy theory is a theory of incomplete knowledge about
>> local and noncontextual hidden variables, and it is well
>> known that quantum theory cannot be understood in this
>> way [28, 30, 31]. This prompts the obvious question: if
>> a quantum state is a state of knowledge, and it is not
>> knowledge of local and noncontextual hidden variables,
>> then what is it knowledge about? We do not at present
>> have a good answer to this question.
>>
>>
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