On 13 Feb 2013, at 20:46, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/13/2013 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Feb 2013, at 03:03, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/12/2013 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we
are making an
assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look
closely, a
proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing
but a group
of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we
are
arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no
given
condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent
upon what
the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with.
I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you
that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me
uncomfortable, post Popper.
I'm happy for Bp& p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B
semantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes to scientific
knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far.
But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify
Theatetus :(.
Intuitively Bp & p does not define knowledge.
Why? It obeys to the classical theory of knowledge (the modal logic
S4), and in the comp context, we get the more stronger logic
S4Grz1, and it works very well. It even makes the knower unnameable
and close to the Plotinus "universal soul" or "inner God".
As Edmund Gettier pointed out Bp, where B stands for 'believes' as
in non-mathematical discourse, can be accidental. Hence he argued
that the belief must be causally connected to the fact of the
proposition in order to count as knowledge.
We have already discussed this. Edmund Gettier seems to accept a
notion of knowledge which makes just no sense, neither in comp, nor
in platonism.
I don't know what notion of knowledge he accepts, but he rejects
accidental beliefs that happen to be true.
So we might agree. I don't see how any belief can be accidental in
comp, given that a (rational) belief is defined by what a machine can
assert for logical reason. That's the B part of Bp (& p).
The example he gives is Bob and Bill work together. Bob knows that
Bill has gone to pick up a new car he bought. He sees Bill drive a
new blue car into the parking lot and concludes that the car Bill
bought is blue. In fact it is blue, but it wasn't ready and so the
dealer gave Bill a blue loaner to drive that day. So does Bob know
that Bill bought a blue car, or does he only believe, truly that he
did?
He believes wrongly. That distinction is important for the study of
natural languages, but not for the theology and physics. I avoid that
problem by restricting myself to ideally correct machines, where the
important distonction is between Bp and Bp & p, with Bp implying p at
the meta-level (G*).
From my reflection about the dream-argument, it probably means that
Gettier believes that we can know things for sure
I don't think that follows that all. Even a causally connected
belief can be false. The problem is in explicating what constitutes
'causally connected' in complicated cases.
OK. In comp "causally" is a very high level feature, not something
which can be explained by the physical realm, which emerges from the
low levels. In the low level we don't need causality. Implication is
enough.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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