On 2/14/2013 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Feb 2013, at 23:08, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/13/2013 2:46 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/13/2013 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Feb 2013, at 03:03, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/12/2013 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we
are making an
assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look
closely, a
proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing
but a group
of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we
are
arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no given
condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent
upon what
the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with.
I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you
that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me
uncomfortable, post Popper.
I'm happy for Bp& p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B
semantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes to scientific
knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far.
But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify
Theatetus :(.
Intuitively Bp & p does not define knowledge.
Why? It obeys to the classical theory of knowledge (the modal logic
S4), and in the comp context, we get the more stronger logic
S4Grz1, and it works very well. It even makes the knower unnameable
and close to the Plotinus "universal soul" or "inner God".
As Edmund Gettier pointed out Bp, where B stands for 'believes' as
in non-mathematical discourse, can be accidental. Hence he argued
that the belief must be causally connected to the fact of the
proposition in order to count as knowledge.
We have already discussed this. Edmund Gettier seems to accept a
notion of knowledge which makes just no sense, neither in comp, nor
in platonism.
From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem we read:
"A Gettier problem is any one of a category of thought experiments in
contemporary epistemology that seem to repudiate a definition of
knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). The category of problem
owes its name to a three-page paper published in 1963, by Edmund
Gettier, called "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?". In it, Gettier
proposed two scenarios where the three criteria (justification,
truth, and belief) seemed to be met, but where the majority of
readers would not have felt that the result was knowledge due to the
element of luck involved."
Bruno's notion involves betting, so luck is a factor! ;-)
Not with Bp & p. The betting is for observation, not knowledge.
Hi Bruno,
I don't understand the difference between knowledge and observation
when considering 1p. Knowledge isn't just recollection of facts, it is
always observation, event if purely internal experience of abstractions.
I am aware of that I have knowledge of, especially when I am thinking of
it.
The betting is handled with Bp & Dt & p. Somehow, we impose the
consistency: that is, for machine talking first person logic, the
existence of at least one reality (Dt).
(By Gödel's completeness theorem (not incompleteness !) we have that
Dt is true iff "B" has a model (a mathematical reality "satisfying"
his beliefs)). Bp & Dt (& p) makes p true in all the accessible
realities in the neighborhood, so the "p" has measure one, and the
corresponding logic is the logic of the "probability" one.
Bruno
--
Onward!
Stephen
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
