2013/2/21 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> > > On 20 Feb 2013, at 22:38, Alberto G. Corona wrote: > > if comp and the null hypothesis (everithing exist) is accepted, then a > infinity of copies of you are now being kicked by a wild horse while being > eaten by bugs in an ocean of acid. > > > > That's correct. > > > > So it does not matter what just a single copy of you is doing whatever ;) > > > That does not follow, because what a single copy does will influence the > relative proportion of its consistent extensions. > > It may be under QM....
> You can take the lift, the stairs or jump out of the window. In all case > you will survive. But with the lift and stairs, you have a high probability > to feel nice and healthy when getting at the ground floor. If you jump out > of the window, you might have a high probability to find yourself in a very > painful situation, in some hospital. This can be argued in both QM, or > directly in comp. > > If your were right, it would make no sense to derive the physical laws > from comp, and we would not been Turing emulable. Comp would be just false, > by leading to too much white rabbits. > But the observed lawful behaviour of the (local) universe according with QM, for example, does not coerce the null hypothesis to such consistency. It may be possible a consistent universe at time <T and after that a rogue universe where I suffer painful tortures, white rabbits appear by breaking some causality laws but not challenging the continuation of life and intelligence, at least for some time, so that anyone can observe it. Then a mormal universe at T2 can proceed normally. I guess it would be perfectly computable and mathematical (although with a higher Kolmogorov complexity). What avoid that explosion of possibilities?. That is the unreasonable dogmatic, but effective, assumption that puzzled Einstein, that any reality is simple because it is what it is observed locally. And, if they exist, Do we should care for these other realities? It is all this unobserved realities a scientific endavour or it is simply extrapolations as a result of an aestethical or ideological drive? I suppose that questions like these appear here from time to time. Bruno > > > > > > > > 2013/2/13 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> > >> >> On 13 Feb 2013, at 04:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Consider the following thought experiment, called "The Duplicators": >>>> >>>> At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens will >>>> tell >>>> you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct some >>>> experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These >>>> aliens >>>> possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability to >>>> scan >>>> and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use this >>>> technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which they >>>> call >>>> you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed >>>> back >>>> to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them "What about the pain >>>> experiments?" and >>>> they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read >>>> the >>>> pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and >>>> subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans >>>> call >>>> torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You >>>> consider >>>> this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate >>>> rather than you. >>>> >>>> Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called "The >>>> Restorers": >>>> >>>> At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the aliens >>>> with >>>> the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a >>>> restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all other >>>> physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The aliens >>>> will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to >>>> conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to >>>> them. >>>> They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours, conducting >>>> test >>>> after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the torture >>>> and >>>> all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are finished, >>>> you >>>> are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture began. >>>> The >>>> aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back to >>>> your >>>> home by 5:00 PM. You ask them "What about the pain experiments?" and >>>> they >>>> hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the >>>> pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created and >>>> subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what humans >>>> call >>>> torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You >>>> consider >>>> this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your duplicate >>>> rather than you. >>>> >>>> My questions for the list: >>>> >>>> 1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case >>>> of >>>> the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why not. >>>> >>>> 2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in >>>> the >>>> case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please >>>> explain. >>>> >>>> 3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one you >>>> would >>>> prefer? If you have a preference, please provide some justification. >>>> >>> >>> The two experiments are equivalent. Rationally, you should not have a >>> preference for either - though both are bad in that you experience >>> pain but then forget it. >>> >> >> OK, same answer (assuming comp). >> >> If we assume non-comp, then the answer will be dependent on the theory of >> mind that we might propose. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >>> -- >>> Stathis Papaioannou >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to >>> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >>> . >>> To post to this group, send email to >>> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<everything-list@googlegroups.com> >>> . >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>> . >>> For more options, visit >>> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >>> . >>> >>> >>> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to >> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >> . >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<everything-list@googlegroups.com> >> . >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >> . >> For more options, visit >> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >> . >> >> >> > > > -- > Alberto. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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