On 22 Feb 2013, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2013/2/21 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
On 20 Feb 2013, at 22:38, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
if comp and the null hypothesis (everithing exist) is accepted,
then a infinity of copies of you are now being kicked by a wild
horse while being eaten by bugs in an ocean of acid.
That's correct.
So it does not matter what just a single copy of you is doing
whatever ;)
That does not follow, because what a single copy does will influence
the relative proportion of its consistent extensions.
It may be under QM....
Plausibly. That makes my statement even more solid.
You can take the lift, the stairs or jump out of the window. In all
case you will survive. But with the lift and stairs, you have a high
probability to feel nice and healthy when getting at the ground
floor. If you jump out of the window, you might have a high
probability to find yourself in a very painful situation, in some
hospital. This can be argued in both QM, or directly in comp.
If your were right, it would make no sense to derive the physical
laws from comp, and we would not been Turing emulable. Comp would be
just false, by leading to too much white rabbits.
But the observed lawful behaviour of the (local) universe
according with QM, for example, does not coerce the null
hypothesis to such consistency.
It is comp that coerce for the "null" or "everything" hypothesis.
And with comp the everything given by the additive and multiplicative
number structure is already enough and not completeable for the
ontology (and the epistemology is richer, and QM belongs or should
belong to it).
Keep in mind I do not assume QM, nor non-QM.
In some context, I can talk like if QM was indeed the correct
consequence of comp, but that remains to be seen.
I tend to think that QM is very plausible, because you can derive it
from very small set of experience (like rotational two slits
experience, four slits experience (Deutch), five Stern Gerlach
experience (Swinger). But with comp, we have to derive the whole SWE,
including the linearity, the real and complex numbers, the dimensional
geometries, which are assumed to interpret those experiences.
It may be possible a consistent universe at time <T and after that
a rogue universe where I suffer painful tortures, white rabbits
appear by breaking some causality laws but not challenging the
continuation of life and intelligence, at least for some time, so
that anyone can observe it. Then a mormal universe at T2 can proceed
normally.
We have to compute the "comp-probability", or the "QM-probability" of
this happening. If the comp-probability of white rabbits is big, then
comp can be considered as empirically refuted. The QM-probability of
white rabbit is shown rare, by the Born rule or Gleason's theorem, or
by Feynman phase randomization.
I guess it would be perfectly computable and mathematical (although
with a higher Kolmogorov complexity).
Computable is not enough. It has to be computable *and* having the
right relative measure. Computable makes it exists, but it can still
be relatively rare with respect to all computations going through your
actual brain states (at the substitution levels).
By the invariance of the first person experience for the computation
delay, we cannot use Kolmogorov complexity to solve the measure
problem, at least not directly (that would beg the measure problem).
What avoid that explosion of possibilities?.
Nothing.
On the contrary: it is the explosion of possibilities which makes us
hope that some "normal" histories can emerge statistically.
That is the unreasonable dogmatic, but effective, assumption that
puzzled Einstein, that any reality is simple because it is what it
is observed locally.
And, if they exist, Do we should care for these other realities?
We should not care too much for the non-normal realities, except when
we die, or take drugs, or sleep. When we die, a priori with comp, we
survive in the most normal consistent extension, with respect to our
actual state. It makes violent death a bit more frightening, at first
sight.
We should definitely care about our local "normal" realities, as they
define our most probable futures, for us and our children.
It is all this unobserved realities a scientific endavour or it is
simply extrapolations as a result of an aestethical or ideological
drive?
It is a consequence of the assumption that we can survive with
digital brain. The existence of the many computations is a theorem of
elementary arithmetic, with comp (and thus Church's thesis) assumed or
understood at the meta-level.
I suppose that questions like these appear here from time to time.
No problem with questions.
Only problem with answers :)
Bruno
2013/2/13 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
On 13 Feb 2013, at 04:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Jason Resch
<jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
Consider the following thought experiment, called "The Duplicators":
At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. The aliens
will tell
you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to conduct
some
experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown to them. These
aliens
possess technology far in advance of our own. They have the ability
to scan
and replicate objects down to the atomic level and the aliens use
this
technology to create an atom-for-atom duplicate of yourself, which
they call
you2. The aliens thank you for your assistance and return you
unharmed back
to your home by 5:00 PM. You ask them "What about the pain
experiments?" and
they hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You
read the
pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created
and
subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what
humans call
torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthanized. You
consider
this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your
duplicate
rather than you.
Now consider the slightly different thought experiment, called "The
Restorers":
At 1:00 PM tomorrow, you will be abducted by aliens. Unlike the
aliens with
the duplication technology (the duplicators), these aliens possess a
restorative technology. They can perfectly erase memories and all
other
physical traces to perfectly restore you to a previous state. The
aliens
will tell you not to worry, that you won't be harmed but they wish to
conduct some experiments on the subject of pain, which is unknown
to them.
They then proceed to brutually torture you for many hours,
conducting test
after test on pain. Afterwards, they erase your memory of the
torture and
all traces of injury and stress from your body. When they are
finished, you
are atom-for-atom identical to how you were before the torture
began. The
aliens thank you for your assistance and return you unharmed back
to your
home by 5:00 PM. You ask them "What about the pain experiments?"
and they
hand you an informational pamphlet and quickly fly off. You read the
pamphlet which explains that a duplicate of you (you2) was created
and
subjected to some rather terrible pain experiments, akin to what
humans call
torture and at the end of the experiment you2 was euthenized. You
consider
this awful, but are nonetheless glad that they tortured your
duplicate
rather than you.
My questions for the list:
1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the
case of
the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why
not.
2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture
in the
case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please
explain.
3. If you could choose which aliens would abduct you, is there one
you would
prefer? If you have a preference, please provide some justification.
The two experiments are equivalent. Rationally, you should not have a
preference for either - though both are bad in that you experience
pain but then forget it.
OK, same answer (assuming comp).
If we assume non-comp, then the answer will be dependent on the
theory of mind that we might propose.
Bruno
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