On 25 Mar 2013, at 14:02, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, March 25, 2013 6:26:00 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Mar 2013, at 20:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, March 24, 2013 1:44:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Mar 2013, at 12:53, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, March 24, 2013 7:13:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Mar 2013, at 18:44, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, March 21, 2013 1:28:24 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Mar 2013, at 19:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/03/130320115111.htm
"We are examining the activity in the cerebral cortex as a
whole. The brain is a non-stop, always-active system. When we
perceive something, the information does not end up in a
specific part of our brain. Rather, it is added to the brain's
existing activity. If we measure the electrochemical activity of
the whole cortex, we find wave-like patterns. This shows that
brain activity is not local but rather that activity constantly
moves from one part of the brain to another."
Please, don't confuse the very particular neuro-philosophy with
the much weaker assumption of computationalism.
Wave-like pattern are typically computable functions.
(I mentioned this when saying that I would say yes to a doctor
only if he copies my glial cells at the right chemical level).
There are just no evidence for non computable activities acting
in a relevant way in the biological organism, or actually even in
the physical universe.
You could point on the the wave packet reduction, but it does not
make much sense by itself.
Right, I'm not arguing this as evidence of non-comp. Even if
there was non-comp activity in the brain, nothing that we could
use to detect it would be able to find anything since we would
only know how to use an exrternal detection instrument
computationally. Mainly I posted this to show the direction that
the scientific evidence is leading us does not support any kind
of narrow folk-neuroscience of point to point chain-reactions.
Good.
Not looking very charitable to the bottom-up, neuron machine view.
Ideas don't need charity but in this case it is totally
charitable, even with neurophilosophy, given that in your
example, those waves still seem neuron driven.
How do you know that it seem neuron driven rather than whole
brain driven?
In neurophilosophy, they are used to global complex and
distributed brain activity, but still implemented in term of local
computable rules obeyed by neurons.
If you look at a city traffic pattern, you will see local
computable rules obeyed by cars, but that doesn't mean there
aren't non-computable agendas being pursued by the drivers.
Indeed.
But that is what you get at the Turing universal threshold. If you
look at the computer's functioning, you will see local computable
rules obeyed by the gates, but that doesn't mean there aren't non-
computable agendas being pursued by genuine person supported by
those computations.
Absolutely, but does it mean that it has to be a genuine person? To
me it makes sense that the natural development of persons may be
restricted to experiences which are represented publicly in
zoological terms. The zoological format is not the cause of the
experience but it is the minimum vessel with the proper scale of
sensitivity for that quality of experience to be supported. Trying
to generate the same thing from the bottom up may not be feasible,
because the zoological format arises organically, whereas an AI
system skips zoology, biology, and chemistry entirely and assumes a
universally low format.
It is does not. Self-reference leads machine to develop multi-
variated leves of "formatting".
Why would it, and how could it?
You must study bit of computer science.
I might find it convenient to invent an entirely new spectrum of
colors to keep track of my file folders, but that doesn't mean that
this new spectrum can just be 'developed' out of thin air.
You must not ask a machine something that you can't do yourself, to
compare it to yourself.
Consciousness does not seem to be compatible with low level
unconscious origins to me. Looking at language, the rules of
spelling and grammar do not drive the creation of new words. A word
cannot be forced into common usage just because it is introduced
into a culture. There is no rule in language which has a function
of creating new words, nor could any rule like that possibly work.
You ignore completely the notion of creative set or universal
machine. You talk like if we could have a complete theory about
them, but we can't, provably so if we are Turing emulable.
You just communicate your feeling where the machine already can
explain why their feeling can be misleading on this subject.
Any particular feeling can be misleading only relative to some other
felt expectation and felt realization.
I am OK with this. All content of consciousness can be doubted, except
one ...
The existence of feeling itself can't be misleading though.
... yes. That one. Consciousness is the fixed point of the doubt.
Universal machine looking inward are lead to that constructive and
creative doubt.
I don't know what you are saying that I am ignoring.
That universal machine are more weird entities that you and me can
suspect.
I don't deny that machines could be unintentionally creative, but it
isn't the same thing that we experience. We care, machines don't.
Well, as you know I assume that we are machines, so by definition,
whatever I or you can do, some machines can do it (us).
I study the consequence of that hypothesis, and I object only to you
argument that such an hypothesis is obviously false.
I don't know if it is true or false, nor if that would be a good news
or a bad news. Some consequences are fascinating, and it leads to an
elegant scheme of (incomplete of course) TOE (like elementary
arithmetic).
If you could control the behavior of language use from the bottom
up however, you could simulate that such a rule would work, just by
programming people to utter it with increasing frequency. This
would satisfy any third person test for the effectiveness of the
rule, but of course would be completely meaningless.
Don't confuse machine and language.
Interesting... aren't they both made of the same thing in Comp? Is
there a separate arithmetic truth which creates machines and one
which creates languages?
Language is when machine talks, but the machine's mindscape is much
vaster than any of their possible language and theories.
What would it look like if the brain as a whole were driving the
neurons?
Either it would be like saying that a high level program can have
a feedback on some of its low level implementations, which is not
a problem at all, as this already exist, in both biology and
computer science, or it would be like saying that a brain can
break the physical laws, or the arithmetical laws and it would be
like pseudo-philosophy.
What about the relation between high level arithmetic laws - like
the ones which allow for 1p subjectivity in UM, LM, etc and the
programs which support them?
To eat or to be eaten relatively to the most probable universal
neighbors. The relations can be complicated.
Their being complicated is what I would expect from high level laws
- but how is it that low level processes wind up being influenced
by them? How does the law that says dumb code can begin to think
for itself come to be followed by dumb code?
?
How do low level processes know that they are subject to the
commands of the high level processes?
Usually, they don't know. But then some can observe and infer, and
build theories/questions.
Not between the high level program and the low level program, but
between the X-Level truths and laws and all local functions?
Above the substitution level, only god knows, but you can bet and
theorize locally, and, below the substitution level, you get the
full arithmetical mess, the union on all sigma_i formula, well
beyond the computable. It is not easy, but there are mathematical
lanterns, and deep symmetries, and deep self-referential insight.
It is a reality that the universal machines cannot avoid.
It is the advantage of comp, you can translate the problem in
arithmetic, but it is not necessarily a "simple", sigma_1, problem.
There is a no universal panacea capable of satisfying all universal
machines at once, nothing is easy.
You have to look inward, eventually.
I won't be able to understand that, but it seems to me that if
exotic capabilities like 1p awareness can be made up of dumb
programmatic elements, then the top-down influence of potential
intelligence must be equally important as the bottom-up blind
stacking of logical operators. It seems like you want it both ways
- that the higher order arithmetic magic of UMs are both separate
from the primitive machines of today, but the potential for magic
is inherent and inevitable strictly from inferences of the lowest
arithmetic truths.
Not at all, they are beyond. You still think about arithmetic like
if incompleteness wasn't discovered.
I see incompleteness as a limitation on the ontology of arithmetic,
but you see it as an invitation to omnipotence.
I see it as pointing on the fundamental difference between truth and
what is observable, guessable, sharable, communicable, etc.
Incompleteness concerns our limitation, already just in front of the
arithmetical facts.
I don't understand why. Lots of things are incomplete, but we don't
assume that it means they are the ground of being. Why not language?
That seems much more incomplete and creative than arithmetic.
Language are mode of expression. You *can* see machines as languages,
but it can confuse the beginners. The important distinction is between
truth and communicable.
We are indeed question ourselves. A brain, or a universal number, is
just an encapsulation of a question that the arithmetical reality asks
to itself, somehow. We are divine hypotheses, not answers.
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
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