On Thursday, April 11, 2013 2:24:44 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 11 Apr 2013, at 17:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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> On Thursday, April 11, 2013 11:07:01 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>> On 10 Apr 2013, at 17:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>> On Saturday, April 6, 2013 6:49:45 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 06 Apr 2013, at 01:51, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>>> You already are aware of the relevant aspects of your brain function, 
>>> and aware of them in a way which is a million times more detailed than any 
>>> fMRI could ever be. 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> No, you bet on them. You are not aware of your brain, in any direct way. 
>>> Some antic believed consciousness comes from the liver. That consciousness 
>>> is related to a brain is a theory, there are only evidence, we cannot 
>>> experience any theory.
>>>
>>
>> By the same understanding that we know the brain is more likely to be the 
>> seat of consciousness than the liver,  we also know that whatever we 
>> experience personally is most available impersonally as brain activity. We 
>> can manipulate brain activity magnetically and experience a change in our 
>> consciousness, when the same is not true of any other organ. This does not 
>> mean that our experience is caused by the brain or that brain 
>> characteristics can be translated into conscious qualities, but the 
>> correlation shows us that what an fMRI reveals is the correlation of events 
>> between space-time body and sensory-motor self. Far from being a map, most 
>> of the private experience is utterly opposite and unrecognizable to any of 
>> the forms or functions on the 'other side.'
>>
>>
>> I was just saying that we are aware of our experience, then we built 
>>  theories. Some of those theories are instinctive, other are build during 
>> early childhood, and others are brought by long histories. We are not 
>> experiencing a brain. In fact we can't according to the usual theory that 
>> there are no sensory neurons in the brain.
>>
>
> If we are sitting inside of an airplane, it could be said that we don't 
> 'directly experience' the airplane, as we might not be able to tell the 
> difference, if we woke up there, between the seats on a plane and the seats 
> on a train. If a piece of the plane fell off though, then we would be able 
> to infer air travel. The same goes for the brain. We are only aware of it 
> when some unexpected experience is presented. Tinnitus, vertigo, visual 
> phosphenes, proprioceptive changes, phantom smells, etc. All of these give 
> us direct experiences of our own neurology which are beyond theory. It's 
> multi-layered, so that on one level we do hear a sound that sounds like it 
> is coming from outside of our body, but on another level we can test and 
> understand that it can't be.
>
>
> As much as it is quite plausible, the brain existence is theoretical. 
>
> Tinnitus, vertigo, visual phosphenes, proprioceptive changes, phantom 
> smells, etc. All of these give us *direct* experiences of tinnitus, 
> vertigo, visual phosphenes, proprioceptive changes, and phantom smells, and 
> provide only *indirect* evidence that, perhaps, there is a brain, in some 
> possible reality.
>

Each one of those however are experiences which expose the medium itself. 
Like a lens flare in photography, or pixelation in a video, the phenomena 
not only reveals a non-purposive sensory artifact, but the particular 
intrusive quality of the artifact actually reflects the art itself. This is 
what the neurological symptoms tell us - not that we have a brain and that 
it is real, but that there is more to our nature than to simply be a clear 
conduit to an objectively real universe. In this way, our senses provide us 
not only with simple truth, but also simple doubt which leads us to 
sophisticated truth, which then leads to sophisticated doubt, and finally a 
reconciled truth (multisense realism).


> Both inside and outside of the body, and the body themselves are 
> theoretical constructs, which might have, or not, some reality, primitive 
> or not.
>

I'm not so big on the power of the theoretical. To me theory is only as 
good as the access it provides to understanding.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
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> Craig
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>> Bruno
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>> Craig
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>>> Bruno
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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