On 15 Jun 2013, at 22:29, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:
It would be nice if it somehow was programable (I think) since we
could make things better, as well as destroy everything.
We are not programmable by us, but comp just say that we are Turing
emulable at some level (and we cannot know-for-sure what that level is).
But what is new about that? Do you thus, give this person any
creedence then, or not really?
http://www.onbeing.org/program/uncovering-codes-reality/feature/symbols-power-adinkras-and-nature-reality/1460
Sincerely,
I am a machine ===> whatever is not me is not a machine.
This is not obvious to prove. It does not follow from simple logic,
but from the FPI (first person indeterminacy).
See UDA 1-7, perhaps.
Don't confuse the thesis that "we" are machine (comp), and that the
physical universe is a machine, as they are incompatible. Now if the
universe is a machine, we are machine, but that is impossible (by UDA)
so the physical universe cannot be a machine (with or without comp).
Bruno
Mitch
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sat, Jun 15, 2013 2:48 pm
Subject: Re: In Defense of Penrose. That everybody --including
materialists, empiricists and rationalists--is a Platonist
On 15 Jun 2013, at 16:33, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:
I wonder if a more precise way of stating this is to say, that like
Platonism, there must be an underlying programming to the cosmos.
That would cover the Idealism central feature.
Arithmetical realism entails the the experienceable cosmos *cannot*
be programmed, as it emerges from a sort of competitions between all
"digital approximations" of it.
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: chris peck <chris_peck...@hotmail.com>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sat, Jun 15, 2013 3:40 am
Subject: RE: In Defense of Penrose. That everybody --including
materialists, empiricists and rationalists--is a Platonist
Hi Rog
As you have described them a materialist could not be a
"combination of both" rationalism and empiricism, because you have
them as diametrically opposed. If "reason alone" is the source of
knowledge, then experience isn't and can't be combined to be.
Besides, Materialism is an ontological theory and doesn't give much
of a hoot about how knowledge is aquired.
More to the point neither rationalism nor empiricism are branches
of intuitionism. The moment of inspiration Penrose attributes to
the mind connecting with a realm of ideas is neither an act of
reason nor sensory experience. Moreover, If logic is to be
"deductive" then, by definition, conclusions must never follow from
unexplainable leaps of intuition. If they do they have not been
logically deduced, have they? And infact that is Penrose's point :
leaps of intuition can not be modelled computationally. logic,
ofcourse, can be. since, allegedly, minds can grope for and master
facts beyond the scope of deduction, they must be qualitatively
different from computer programs which can only deduce things
logically.
You really seem to have things back to front in this post.
Regards
--- Original Message ---
From: "Roger Clough" <rclo...@verizon.net>
Sent: 15 June 2013 1:47 AM
To: "- Roger Clough" <rclo...@verizon.net>
Subject: In Defense of Penrose. That everybody --including
materialists, empiricists and rationalists--is a Platonist
In Defense of Penrose. That everybody --including materialists,
empiricists and rationalists--is a Platonist
Empiricism is the doctrine that all knowledge is derived from sense
experience.
Rationalism is the doctrine that reason alone is a source of
knowledge and is independent of experience.
Materialism is a combination of both philosophies.
These may sound like completely diffierent doctrines, but my point
here is that
all of these pursuits ultimately rely on intuition.
They afre both subbranches of intjuitionism.
Why ? Concerning rationalism, even deductive logic requires
intuition to arrive at a conclusilon.
Concering empiricism, it is fairly obvious to see that experience
alone cannot provide us any conclusion. If you dpoubt that,
consider Peirce's three categories, in which Secondness is
the category of intuion, leading us from an experience to a fact.
So Penrose's recent excursion into Platonism should be taken more
seriously,
for ultimately his criticizers, the empiricists and the
rationalists, are both Platonists.
Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 6/14/2013
See my Leibniz site at
http://team.academia.edu/RogerClough
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