Well, its just an idea that fascinates me. Reading Gerhard t'Hooft in the 
1990's sort of set it all in motion. Also Raphael Bousso, in their analysis oh 
the universe as hologram, etc. Are we the chuck of matter, or the reflection in 
the mirror? That kind of thing.


-----Original Message-----
From: Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>
To: spudboy100 <spudboy...@aol.com>; everything-list 
<everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sat, Sep 14, 2013 12:09 pm
Subject: Re: Re: Leibniz, Idealism and Parapsychology


Hi spudboy100 

Sure. 
  
 
Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]
See my Leibniz site at
http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From:  spudboy100  
Receiver:  everything-list,rclough  
Time: 2013-09-14, 10:01:02 
Subject: Re: Leibniz, Idealism and Parapsychology 




>One idea I have been kicking around, is viewing through physics, that yes mind 
is bran, brain is mind, but not totally. More, precisely, the notion that the 
data, the pattern identity, the mind, the soul, personality, memory (whatever 
we 
wish to call it) is analogous to a computer network, where data and 
information, 
all information, gets written to some sort of media, a long, ways, off. Think 
of 
this as a read-write function of a storage area network. All server farms have 
remote sites to preserve data, for "disaster recovery." All large companies 
have 
this, and so do governments as well. I am guessing that this is a feature of 
the 
cosmos-or really, just, hoping that it is so. 
> 
>Mitch 
> 
>-----Original Message----- 
>From: Roger Clough  
>To: - Roger Clough  
>Sent: Sat, Sep 14, 2013 8:47 am 
>Subject: Leibniz, Idealism and Parapsychology 
> 
> 
> 
>Leibniz, Idealism and Parapsychology 
>  
>  
>Since it is often based on laboratory experiments, parapsychology has a 
scientific basis. But these results  
>are smeared by proponents of the cult of materialism, which cannot accept the 
view that there is such a 
>thing as a mind (a Self). That alone makes materialism a joke. Materialism 
originated with the Enlightenment  
>primarily as a reaction against religion, replacing it with reason, as well as 
a misinterpretation or reinterpretation  
>of Descartes, by claiming that mind can interact with the body, which 
>Descartes 
maintained were two different  
>substances, by instead claiming that both mind and body are matter. That mind 
is matter is nonsensical. Leibniz  
>took the other tack, that of Idealism, in which both brain and mind were Mind, 
which has the philosophical support  
>of Kant and Plato. But the metaphysics of Leibniz are difficult especially in 
the face of the bad and  
>completely non-Cartesian philosophy materialisam because materialism, while it 
doesn't work for mind, DOES work very well for  
>Newtonian mechanics. Hence conventional science these days is swolidly 
materialistic and Leibniz's  
>platonism is liost to history. I will be posting more on this, but to begin 
with you might want to visit my Leibniz site,   
> 
>http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough  
> 
> 
> 
>Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]  
>See my Leibniz site at  
>http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough 
> 
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