On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 3:44 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Monday, September 30, 2013 6:12:45 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: >> >> On Fri, Sep 27, 2013 at 7:49 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> > >> > >> > On Friday, September 27, 2013 8:00:11 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 9:28 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> >> >> wrote: >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > On Thursday, September 26, 2013 11:49:29 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 2:38 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> >> >> >> wrote: >> >> >> > >> >> >> > >> >> >> > On Thursday, September 26, 2013 6:17:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes >> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Hi Craig (and all), >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Now that I have a better understanding of your ideas, I would >> >> >> >> like >> >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> confront you with a thought experiment. Some of the stuff you say >> >> >> >> looks completely esoteric to me, so I imagine there are three >> >> >> >> possibilities: either you are significantly more intelligent than >> >> >> >> me >> >> >> >> or you're a bit crazy, or both. I'm not joking, I don't know. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> But I would like to focus on sensory participation as the >> >> >> >> fundamental >> >> >> >> stuff of reality and your claim that strong AI is impossible >> >> >> >> because >> >> >> >> the machines we build are just Frankensteins, in a sense. If I >> >> >> >> understand correctly, you still believe these machines have >> >> >> >> sensory >> >> >> >> participation just because they exist, but not in the sense that >> >> >> >> they >> >> >> >> could emulate our human experiences. They have the sensory >> >> >> >> participation level of the stuff they're made of and nothing >> >> >> >> else. >> >> >> >> Right? >> >> >> > >> >> >> > >> >> >> > Not exactly. My view is that there is only sensory participation >> >> >> > on >> >> >> > the >> >> >> > level of what has naturally evolved. >> >> >> >> >> >> This sounds a bit like vitalism. What's so special about natural >> >> >> evolution that can't be captured otherwise? >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > It's not about life or nature being special, it's about recognizing >> >> > that >> >> > nature is an expression of experience, and that experience can't be >> >> > substituted. >> >> >> >> Ok. How did you arrive at this belief? How can you believe this >> >> without proposing some mechanism by which it happens? Or do you >> >> propose such a thing? >> > >> > >> > Mechanisms are functions of time, but experience would be more primitive >> > than time in this view. To have a mechanism, there must already be some >> > experience of events, memory, expectation, etc. >> >> But we know that universal machines can be built with very little: >> simple cellular automata, arithmetics, balls colliding and so on. You >> can then argue that some substrate is necessary for this computation, > > > I don't think that I have to argue it, it's a fact that we cannot construct > universal machines out of uncontrollable materials. We can't use uncontained > gases or live hamsters to do our computations for us. When we build > machines, particular electronic computers, materials are refined to a > pristine degree. Impurities must be removed so that only the most reliable > and consistent qualities of matter are selected for.
Yes but if we are entities living as part of a computation that is not surprising. We have to carve a medium somehow to perform our own computations. It doesn't really tell you anything about the meta-level computation that might be taking place. >> but it is quite clear that what is necessary to have the possibility >> of a full blown human zombie is theoretically very little. This does >> not refute your main thesis, of course, but I think it does refute >> that experience of events, memory and expectations are necessary for >> mechanism. > > > The necessity of experience is easy to refute in theory, but if we do that, > we must at the same time justify the existence of experience on some > arbitrary level of description of matter, which I don't think can be done > convincingly. But you can doubt matter. What then? > We know that we can 'play possum' more easily than a dead > possum can become a zombie. This is not to suggest that inanimate objects > are pretending to be inanimate, but that it is the constraints of whatever > kinds of sensation we have access to which hide the scales on which > animation is taking place (too slow, too fast, too large, too small, too > unfamiliar = invisible or inanimate). > >> >> >> >Think of the mechanism by >> > which you change your attention or open your eyes. Sure, there are >> > mechanisms that we can point to in the body, but what mechanism do *you* >> > use >> > to control yourself? >> >> Ok, I know what you mean. Yes, I find this mysterious. > > > So if we scale down that mystery to every level of the universe (which we > would sort of have to since our self control involves billions of cells made > of nothing but molecules), then we have a model for what energy 'really' is > - primitive sensory-motive interaction. I don't see how that follows. >> >> > I submit that there is no button to push or crank to >> > turn. If there were, then you would already be controlling yourself to >> > use >> > them. No, at some point something has to directly control something by >> > feeling and doing. >> >> What if the thing that controls is being generated by the act of >> controlling? >> > I think that it is. The act is what I call motive. A bit more complicated > for an animal, since we can express motives mentally which only controls the > activity of our own nervous system directly. To control our body, we need > our nervous system to make our motives public to our voluntary muscles. The > motive must induce motor cooperation on a larger scale. Ok. >> >> > Whether we push it down to the microcosm or out to >> > statistical laws makes no difference - somewhere something has to sense >> > something directly or we cannot have experience. >> > >> > I wouldn't call it a belief, it's a hypothesis. I arrived at it by >> > having a >> > lot of conversations in my head about it over several years - writing >> > things >> > down, remembering them, dreaming about them, etc. >> >> Ok. I have nothings against this but I would say you have to be very >> cautious when relying on this type of approach. My position is that >> there is a lot of value in doing this, but you cannot ever claim a >> communicable discovery just by doing this. You can only find private >> truth. When you try to communicate private truth, you risk sounding >> like a lunatic. This is, in my view, what's so compelling about art. >> Under the banner of "art", you are allowed to try to communicate >> private truth and get a free pass from being considered a nutjob. > > > That makes sense, but what if you're not afraid of what others think though? I think this is a worthy goal of self-improvement if you will, but I doubt that it can be thoroughly achieved. Our biological program is very powerful. It becomes less powerful once we become aware of it, of course. > If the discovery that I was communicating had an impact on practical > matters, I would agree, but what I propose is only a change in how physics > is interpreted, not a contradiction of physical observation. I'm not > suggesting a perpetual motion machine, I'm presenting a hypothesis about how > the broad terms of the big picture could fit together. Maybe I have done > that to some extent and maybe I haven't, but given the nature of the subject > matter, which involves the integration of privacy into physics, the very > resistance to private authority may turn out to be part of the obstacle > which has kept us tethered to dualism and unacknowledged dualism (mechanism > and idealism both cast each other as 'illusion' or 'emergent properties'). On the other hand, there are good reasons to be very wary of private authority, namely all the evil brought to the world by religious leaders and their private authority. They create, as Carl Sagan puts it, a "demon haunted world". >> >> >> >> >> >> > A player piano can be made to play the notes of a song, but no >> >> > matter how many notes it plays, it will never know the significance >> >> > of >> >> > what >> >> > notes or music is. >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Since the machine did not organize >> >> >> > itself, there is no 'machine' any more than a book of >> >> >> > Shakespeare's >> >> >> > quotes >> >> >> > is a machine that is gradually turning into Shakespeare. >> >> >> >> >> >> But the books are not machines. Shakespeare possibly was. If he was, >> >> >> why can't he be emulated by another machine? >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > I was using the example of a book to show how different a symbol is >> >> > from >> >> > that which we imagine the symbol represents. If we want a more >> >> > machine-like >> >> > example, we can use a copy machine. The copier can reproduce the >> >> > works >> >> > of >> >> > any author mechanically, but does it appreciate or participate in the >> >> > content of what it is copying? >> >> >> >> Ok. Yes, of course. But consider this: when you read a book, your >> >> brain triggers in super-complex ways that constantly find patterns, >> >> correlate with previous informations, trigger emotions and so on. This >> >> clearly isn't happening with the copying machine. This would also not >> >> happen if I was forced to copy a book in Japanese by hand. So I don't >> >> think the comparison is fair. I'm not trying to argue that brain >> >> complexity generates consciousness, but I am inclined to believe that >> >> his complexity creates the necessary space for a human-like 1p. I >> >> don't see why this couldn't be equally done in a computer. >> > >> > >> > I that there is a correlation between the complexity of form+function >> > and >> > the richness of subjective experience but I don't think that it's the >> > form+function aspect which is head end.The more words you have in your >> > vocabulary, the more of an interesting story you can tell, but you still >> > need a reader to appreciate the meaning of the story. Without a reader, >> > it >> > makes no difference how complex the arrangement of words is. A computer >> > is >> > about breaking down patterns that it cannot read into even more >> > meaningless >> > bits and processing them from the bottom up. Consciousness benefits from >> > that kind of computation through the brain, but it also does the >> > opposite. >> > Consciousness is top down as well as bottom up. >> >> So one aspect generates the other. I can live with that. >> > > Ok, but it can be only the top down which generates 'aspects' in the first > place. Particles cannot arrange themselves into a whole unless there is an > implicit expectation of wholeness already present. Once you have this > multiplicity of relations between experiential unity and null-experienced > granularity, then there can be feed back from the bottom back to the top. > Without the top though, there can only be unrelated fragments in a timeless > (memoryless) void. It makes sense that the tail end is a flattened version > of the head, but not that the head is only a multiplicity of tails. > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > What we see as >> >> >> > machines are assemblies of parts which we use to automate >> >> >> > functions >> >> >> > according to our own human sense and motives - like a puppet. >> >> >> > There is sensation going on two levels: 1) the very local level, >> >> >> > and >> >> >> > 2) >> >> >> > at >> >> >> > the absolute level. On the 1) local level, all machines depend on >> >> >> > local >> >> >> > physical events. Whether they are driven by springs and gears, >> >> >> > boiling >> >> >> > water >> >> >> > in pipes, or subatomic collisions, Turing emulation rides on the >> >> >> > back >> >> >> > of >> >> >> > specific conditions which lock and unlock small parts of the >> >> >> > machine. >> >> >> > Those >> >> >> > smallest of those parts would be associated with some >> >> >> > sensory-motive >> >> >> > interaction - the coherence of molecular surfaces, thermodynamics, >> >> >> > electrodynamics, etc, have a very local, instantaneous, and >> >> >> > presumably >> >> >> > primitive sensory involvement. That could be very alien to us, as >> >> >> > it >> >> >> > is >> >> >> > both >> >> >> > very short term and very long term - maybe there is only a flash >> >> >> > of >> >> >> > feeling >> >> >> > at the moment of change, who knows? >> >> >> >> >> >> This part I can somewhat agree with. I do tend to believe that 1p >> >> >> experience is possibly not limited to living organisms. I think >> >> >> about >> >> >> it like you describe: "flashes of feeling" and "who knows" :) >> >> >> >> >> >> > On the 2) absolute level, there is the logical sensibility which >> >> >> > all >> >> >> > 1) >> >> >> > local events share - the least common denominator of body >> >> >> > interactions. >> >> >> > This >> >> >> > is the universal machine that Bruno champions. It's not sense >> >> >> > which >> >> >> > is >> >> >> > necessarily experienced directly, rather all local sense touches >> >> >> > on >> >> >> > this >> >> >> > universal measuring system *when it measures* something else. >> >> >> > >> >> >> > The problem with machines is that there is no sense in between the >> >> >> > momentary, memoryless, sensation of lock/unlock and the timeless, >> >> >> > placeless >> >> >> > sensibility of read/write or +/*. In a human experience, the 1) >> >> >> > has >> >> >> > evolved >> >> >> > over billions of years to occupy the continuum in between 1) and >> >> >> > 2), >> >> >> > with >> >> >> > implicit memories of feelings and experiences anchored in unique >> >> >> > local >> >> >> > contexts. Machines have no geography or ethnicity, no aesthetic >> >> >> > presence. >> >> >> >> >> >> Why do you believe we have evolved like that? What's the >> >> >> evolutionary >> >> >> pressure for that? Whatever evolution did, why can't we recreate it? >> >> >> Or do you. by evolution, mean something else/more than conventional >> >> >> neo-Darwinism? >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > By evolution I mean that the history of individual experiences plays >> >> > a >> >> > role >> >> > in accessing possibilities. Experience takes place in a spacetime >> >> > context >> >> > that may only occur one time. >> >> >> >> Ok. Why do you argue this is the case (that it may only occur one >> >> time)? >> > >> > >> > I'm not sure, but there are a number of clues that relate to a theme in >> > nature of superlative uniqueness. Everything from the Cambrian Explosion >> > to >> > the Industrial Revolution to 'stars' (celebrities) points to a >> > connection >> > between singularity and significance. For a universe which is so vast >> > and >> > based on so many generic repeating patterns, it seems suspicious that >> > there >> > would be so many instances where being 'first' is possible. >> >> Evolution + combinatorial explosion? >> > > Maybe, but I think its more than that. The celebration of firstness and > superlative quality seems disproportionate to statistical function. It seems > aesthetic. Ok. I tend to believe that evolution + MWI solves the issue issue you're alluding to, if I understand you correctly. >> >> > The nature of QM >> > measurements also carry this theme of unitarity and wavefunction >> > collapse >> > into thermodynamic irreversibility. The 'eventness' of the now seems >> > rooted >> > not in probability and inevitability but in the polar opposite - an >> > improbable, unreproducible, singling out. >> > >> >> >> >> > If we want to be billionaires, we might ask 'why can't we recreate >> >> > John >> >> > D. >> >> > Rockefeller?", as if there were some particular recipe which can be >> >> > extracted and applied to anyone. It's not like that though. There >> >> > were >> >> > real >> >> > events with a nation full of real people who did not yet have >> >> > electric >> >> > lights or cars for which Rockefeller was able to make money by >> >> > supplying >> >> > kerosene. Nobody needs much kerosene now, so that wouldn't work. >> >> >> >> Sure, but you could argue that if you abstract away the specificities >> >> of Rockefeller's environment, you could propose some general >> >> strategies for becoming a millionaire. E.g. identify a need, figure >> >> out a way to meet it better than what currently exists, become a >> >> sociopath, etc etc. Even if this doesn't work, you can write a >> >> self-help book about it and become rich anyway :) >> >> >> >> I think this example is actually quite revealing of how we think >> >> differently. You resist a certain type of abstractions that many >> >> people are willing to accept. I think. >> > >> > >> > Right, I resist them intentionally because I don't think they match >> > reality. >> > Any formula for becoming a millionaire based on general strategies would >> > be >> > likely to cancel each other out statistically by failure and by >> > self-competition. >> >> Yes, but that doesn't invalidate the abstraction. If you buy a "get >> rich" book that actually contains ideas extracted from people who got >> rich, you are too late. > > > Right! There's another connection with being first and measurement relating > to public effects rather than private affects. > >> >> But if you get to learn from the person before >> the book is published, maybe not. The point being that the abstraction >> does not become irrelevant, it's just no longer enough because >> information propagation made a large number of agents less naif. It's >> a red queen scenario. > > > Sure, but what I'm saying is that the universe may not be a scenario. It is > made of unrepeatability that appears repeatable locally through perceptual > approximation. We can successfully model some things precisely, but that > success seems to be directly proportional to how distant what we are > modeling is from our native frame of reference. QM is the ultimate model of > the measurable, pushing all realism, even the unity of the universe itself, > into the margins of illusion. > >> >> > I think that every attempt at imitating nature or reverse >> > engineering it to a formula ultimately run into the same kinds of >> > problems - >> > aesthetic problems where they seem canned or dull. >> >> I tend to think that this stems from the fact that a lot of people are >> doing science and technology for the wrong reasons. They want the >> money and prestige and don't care about the sense of wonder. In fact, >> many bastards actively try to remove wonder from the process. Fuck >> them. We've all endured enough of this already through basic >> education. When pursuing a dream, a new apparently dry technicality >> can fill one with excitement. When studying for an exam, the same >> thing is dull and lifeless. > > > That's true too, but I'm talking more about the uncanny valley effect. Given > a sufficiently artistic simulation, we can hop across the valley, but not > because the simulation has become real. In my view, the beauty of a > perfectly executed illusion is a reflection of the skill and talent of the > artist. We are no more fooled by a well executed illusion on an Absolute > level, but intellectually, we are so impressed with the thoroughness of the > effort that we are won over. We have a different standard, so that a new way > of canning or freezing food tastes better to us, it is still only improved > relative to existing methods, not in comparison to fresh fish. There seems > to be too many examples where this is true and no counter-examples. Where > does mechanical simulation trump the original? A lot of people now prefer to live in artificial worlds (World of Warcraft, EVE online, whatever else) than on the real world. Literally, they want to spend as much time as possible on the virtual world and as little time as possible on the real one. This is generally considered sad by mainstream society, and I think it's sad too, but I have to recognise that I'm just letting my biological program do a status judgement. >> >> > Technologies like search >> > engines and predictive text seem to hit a wall beyond which they cannot >> > really deliver detailed understanding. >> >> I agree. My view is that this is because they are using statistical >> approaches instead of deep parsing. There was a recent discussion >> about this between Chomsky and Peter Norivg. I side with Chomsky. Now >> Google is right to rely on statistical approaches, because it's the >> low-hanging fruit. It gave us something incredibly useful very fast. >> But this approach won't give us the Enterprise computer or Data (a >> likeable philosophical zombie, or is he?). This becomes obvious with >> Siri: >> >> >> http://weknowmemes.com/2011/12/siri-im-bleeding-really-bad-can-you-call-me-an-ambulance/ >> >> (I'm sure they fixed this already, but it's just plugging holes in a >> sinking ship) > > > Exactly. > >> >> >> I am convinced that it is possible to program a computer to achieve >> detailed understanding, but this will require a completely different >> paradigm, namely looking at natural language itself as a Turing >> complete language running on a gigantic context of human knowledge. > > > Sure, I agree we can create a giant un-person to simulate much of our > understanding eventually, but we'll never get it to understand in the human > sense - it will never care about what information it is processing. That's > not a bad thing. If it were not the case, I don't see any reason why a > computer with true feeling and understanding would not immediately plan to > exterminate all life on the planet. I like to think about this too. >> >> >> > I have never found an automatic >> > system, even within IT, which really 'work' to a satisfying degree. >> >> I wouldn't phrase it like that but I know what you mean. > > > It's almost supernatural. Nothing is more unreliable than monitoring > systems. Nothing is more unhelpful in correcting errors than error messages. > Even in 2013, 90% of the problems in our global enterprise system can only > be resolved by rebooting the machine. There is a desire among server > manufacturers to de-emphasize that fact - to make power control more > virtualized, but that often causes the bottleneck to be moved down to the > next level. Instead of rebooting one server, the entire hardware node of 20 > server containers must be rebooted. Sooner or later, it always comes down to > turning the power off. Bit it's getting better and better. 15 years ago I would reboot my computer many times a day, now I do it once every 3 months or something like that. I also keep servers that I don't reboot for years at a time. >> >> > The >> > generic has no capacity to relate to the specific. >> > >> >> >> >> > In a similar way, the stories of living organisms may not be able to >> >> > be >> >> > told >> >> > except for through the particular vocabulary that it has reserved for >> >> > itself. We have not successfully built any living organisms from >> >> > scratch >> >> > yet, which is something worth noting, given that we have been trying >> >> > for >> >> > decades. >> >> >> >> This might suffer from the same problem as AI. It's not that we >> >> haven't been making progress, but every time something is achieved >> >> people will say, "oh, but that's not what I meant by >> >> intelligence/life". >> >> >> >> But I agree with you that results so far are disappointing. My belief >> >> is that there is a class of very complex algorithms that we are not >> >> smart enough to grasp. >> > >> > >> > I think that there may or may not be some breakthroughs waiting to >> > happen, >> > but I don't think they will help for long. Just as synthetic fabrics >> > were >> > popular when they first came out, people soon grew intolerant of their >> > aesthetics. New versions of fabrics came out later with improved >> > aesthetics, >> > and they have found a niche for certain functions, but they remain >> > different >> > from natural textiles, particularly where fine clothing is desired. >> >> But that's a different issue. That is the human desire for status. >> Once something becomes easily obtainable, it's no longer desirable. >> But if you are homeless in the cold, you would kill for a synthetic >> blanket and some microwave food. I predict the same thing will happen >> at some point with sex robots. They will do the trick, but nobody will >> be satisfied with them not matter how realistic. > > > I don't think that it is ever true that the microwave food or synthetic > blanket would be preferable to conventionally prepared food and natural > fiber blankets, given equal obtainability. I think that a young child who > had no concept of cost or origin to bias their preference would innately > prefer the genuine over the imitation. Most children seem to prefer McDonald's to "proper food", if given the option. >> >> > Because I think that awareness might be 'the opposite of the universe', >> > no >> > material form, energetic function, or informational model can represent >> > it >> > fully. An algorithm can only work if there is already some sense >> > experience >> > there which has the power to compare. >> >> I understand this position and am willing to entertain it. What I >> still don't understand -- and this was the original challenge in a way >> -- is why can't this awareness be accessed by a synthetic entity. I've >> read your claims that experience cannot be replaced, but that's where >> your ideas become hard to swallow for me. > > > It's only because the quality of experience is derived from a condensed > collection of experiences going back to the beginning of time. Each of us > are, in a sense, every experience of primates, mammals, organisms, > chemicals, etc. I agree with this, but maybe not in the same sense. It is a beautiful thought in any case. > A chemical experience like silicon can't leapfrog all of > biology and zoology to arrive at an anthropological experience just because > we give it a playing field that reminds us of a baseball diamond. There's no > skipping of experiences because there's no substitute for experience. Having > a four year old trace the writings of Shakespeare with a pencil is not the > same thing as writing Hamlet. > >> >> >> >> >> >> > We have also not found any sign of alternate biologies that exist >> >> > without water or hydrocarbons. >> >> >> >> I would propose that a plausible explanation for this is that the >> >> emergence of the initial building blocks of life is a very unlikely >> >> event, but the progression from these building blocks to more >> >> complexity is almost trivial by comparison. One of the reasons I have >> >> for this intuition is direct experience with playing with artificial >> >> evolution. >> > >> > >> > Sure, and that's the standard assumption I would say. I think that >> > because >> > the universe is a continuum between anthropomorphic and mechanemorphic >> > aesthetics, there will always be nearly-plausible explanations for the >> > big >> > picture. I don't think this is an accident. There is a balance, or law >> > of >> > conservation of mystery in which final certainty will always be elusive. >> >> Agreed, but again it's hard to swallow that the reason for this is >> aesthetics. >> > > No harder for me than particle-waves or incompleteness. Like Bruno's view of > machine self-delusion, it would make sense that we, as nested aesthetic > experiences, would devalue aesthetics. We are here to break down into > anesthetic bits, and recollect them again. The importance of that task makes > the quantitative and physical more significant to us locally than exploring > the nature of what we already are (aesthetic). > >> >> > Even the interpretation of that balance, as coincidence which is >> > meaningless >> > or meaningful is part of the balance. Ultimately though, I don't think >> > that >> > such a continuum of perspectives would be possible under the strict >> > mechanemorphic read. The likelihood of life existing at all is not >> > necessarily greater than zero. Life, order, and awareness may not be a >> > matter of probability, it may be probability itself which is a >> > projection of >> > that which is infinitely improbable. >> > >> >> >> >> > The finality of death is another feature that >> >> > suggests a difference between organisms and machines. The whole idea >> >> > that >> >> > any particular experience or object can exist in isolation from the >> >> > totality >> >> > is just an assumption. >> >> >> >> Ok. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So let's talk about seeds. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> We now know how a human being grows from a seed that we pretty >> >> >> >> much >> >> >> >> understand. We might not be able to model all the complexity >> >> >> >> involved >> >> >> >> in networks of gene expression, protein folding and so on, but we >> >> >> >> understand the building blocks. We understand them to a point >> >> >> >> where >> >> >> >> we >> >> >> >> can actually engineer the outcome to a degree. It is now 2013 and >> >> >> >> we >> >> >> >> are, in a sense, living in the future. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So we can now take a fertilised egg and tweak it somehow. When >> >> >> >> done >> >> >> >> successfully, a human being will grow out of it. Doing this with >> >> >> >> human >> >> >> >> eggs is considered unethical, but I believe it is technically >> >> >> >> possible. So a human being grows out of this egg. Is he/she >> >> >> >> normal? >> >> >> > >> >> >> > >> >> >> > I don't know that there is normal. All that we can do is see >> >> >> > whether >> >> >> > people >> >> >> > who have had various procedures done to their cell-bodies seem >> >> >> > healthy >> >> >> > to >> >> >> > themselves and others. >> >> >> >> >> >> So it appears you're open to the possibility that this is fine, and >> >> >> that a human being like you and me was produced. >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > Sure, humans can be cloned, incubated in a test tube, etc. It's >> >> > interesting >> >> > to not though that every person, even a clone, is an individual. >> >> > Unlike >> >> > machines, you can't replace one with another, even if they look very >> >> > similar >> >> > to each other. >> >> >> >> How do you know that? We don't have the technology to do that >> >> experiment >> >> yet. >> > >> > >> > Just going by identical twins. Even brain-conjoined identical twins who >> > share the same body and DNA are different individuals. >> >> This is a very interesting case to study, but still not a copy. > > > Right, but it's not clear that 'copies' are primitively real. Copies may be > a confirmation bias of measurement methods. Even if they weren't, even with > entangled particles, they still exist in two separate positions, so that > they aren't Absolutely identical. It is possible to see one without seeing > the other. Bruno's UDA eventually removes the requirement for a copy being primitively real. That's one of the things that impressed me about the argument. I think your position requires that you find a way to refute the UDA. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> What if someone actually designs the entire DNA string and grows >> >> >> >> a >> >> >> >> human being out of it? Still normal? >> >> >> > >> >> >> > >> >> >> > Same thing. Probably, but it depends on how the mother's body >> >> >> > responds >> >> >> > to it >> >> >> > as it develops. >> >> >> >> >> >> So you don't believe this is possible: >> >> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_uterus ? >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > It seems possible, but I don't think anyone will know for sure until >> >> > we >> >> > try >> >> > it. >> >> >> >> Ok. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If not, why? >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > Different organisms have different requirements. Even if we can get >> >> > all >> >> > of >> >> > the chemical requirements right, we don't know what sensitivities >> >> > might >> >> > be >> >> > involved. As we see, baby monkeys will choose the wireframe mother >> >> > with >> >> > the >> >> > fur attached to it rather than the bare wire. Can we be sure that >> >> > being >> >> > enveloped by another organism is not in intrinsic requirement for >> >> > mammals to >> >> > be healthy? >> >> >> >> It's more than likely that this is the case, but a very plausible >> >> model for why this is the case is epigenetics. >> > >> > >> > Yes, epigenetics is another clue, as is ephaptic >> > coupling.http://www.nature.com/neuro/journal/v14/n2/abs/nn.2727.html >> >> Nice! Thank you for the link. > > > Sure thing! > >> >> >> > The more we look at the microbiology, the more we will find what can >> > only be >> > sensitivity on cellular and molecular levels. >> >> Can you give a specific example? > > > I'm thinking of quorum sensing, the (presumed) quantum nature of > photosynthesis, the recent studies of communication among plants, etc. Ok, I will have to learn more about that. I know about the presumed quantum nature of photosynthesis but just by reading about it in pop-science level publications. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> What if we simulate the growth of the organism from a string of >> >> >> >> virtual DNA and then just assemble the outcome at some stage? >> >> >> >> Still >> >> >> >> normal? >> >> >> > >> >> >> > >> >> >> > Virtual DNA is a cartoon, with a recording of our expectations >> >> >> > attached >> >> >> > to >> >> >> > it. Is a digital picture of a person 'normal'? If we photoshop it >> >> >> > a >> >> >> > little >> >> >> > bit, is it still normal? The problem is the expectation that >> >> >> > virtual >> >> >> > anything is the same as real simply because it reminds us of >> >> >> > something >> >> >> > real. >> >> >> > Of course it reminds us of what is real, we have designed it >> >> >> > specifically to >> >> >> > fool us in every way that we care about. >> >> >> >> >> >> Wait a moment. What I suggest here is that we simulate DNA and then >> >> >> morphogenesis as precisely as we can. Then, through some sci-fi-ish >> >> >> device we actually 3D print the resulting organism with the normal >> >> >> molecules that a human being is made of. The cartoon generated the >> >> >> real thing. No? >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > Not necessarily. It may not work like that. If you 3D printed >> >> > additional >> >> > brain cells from a person who is already alive, then sure, they would >> >> > be >> >> > able to integrate the transplant. If you tried to 3D print an adult >> >> > body, my >> >> > guess is that it would not live very long or gain consciousness. >> >> > That's >> >> > because I think that it is the experience that is actually the >> >> > absolutely >> >> > real physical entity, and the body is only a thin cross-section >> >> > (although >> >> > it's a really wide cross-section in that it touches on the common >> >> > level >> >> > of >> >> > every other experience). >> >> >> >> Alright. So ok, there's no way to falsify that claim. As I asked >> >> before, why do you believe in this though? >> > >> > >> > I don't know that I 'believe' in it, but it makes more sense to me than >> > other explanations, all of which seem to have pretty large holes in >> > them. >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> What if now we do away with DNA altogether and use some other >> >> >> >> Turing >> >> >> >> complete self-modifying system? >> >> >> > >> >> >> > >> >> >> > Then we have a cool cartoon that reminds us of biology. That's if >> >> >> > we >> >> >> > have it >> >> >> > rendered to a graphic display. If not then we have a warm box full >> >> >> > of >> >> >> > tiny >> >> >> > switches that we can imagine are doing something other than >> >> >> > switching >> >> >> > on >> >> >> > and >> >> >> > off. >> >> >> >> >> >> Alright, so what is the property that DNA has that other mediums >> >> >> can't >> >> >> capture? >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > For one thing, it allows Ribosomes to make protein. DNA is an actual >> >> > thing >> >> > that exists independently as a molecular body with a history that >> >> > goes >> >> > back >> >> > to the beginning of time, and may possibly extend indefinitely. A >> >> > model >> >> > of >> >> > DNA can be nothing but a picture or a program. It's not real. It has >> >> > no >> >> > history beyond it's initial rendering. >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> Do you accept that DNA describes a Turing emulable program? >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > No. DNA is not a description, it is an actual presence. Turing >> >> > emulations >> >> > are descriptions which can be used to program something which is >> >> > actually >> >> > present. If you copied the transcription pattern of DNA onto ping >> >> > pong >> >> > balls >> >> > instead of organic molecules, there wouldn't be any proteins or cells >> >> > being >> >> > generated. >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> Or do you believe there is something inherently non-computational in >> >> >> DNA? >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > I think that everything that is actually present (experiences or >> >> > bodies) >> >> > if >> >> > fundamentally non-computable. It is only the measurement which is >> >> > computable. There is no computation that can produce a single >> >> > particle >> >> > or >> >> > experience by itself. >> >> > >> >> >> If you agree that DNA is Turing emulable, I don't see how you >> >> >> cannot be prepared to accept the equivalent phenomena happening on >> >> >> some other medium. >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > Nothing real is Turing emulable. If it were, we wouldn't need 3D >> >> > printers, >> >> > we would simply find the code to will objects into being. >> >> >> >> Once we create a sufficiently good neural-machine interface we might >> >> be able to move to a reality were Turing emulable is enough. This is >> >> just an interface problem, in my view. >> > >> > >> > I hope so. I'm not down on porting our brain to give us access to each >> > other's worlds and designer experience, I just don't think that we will >> > be >> > able to completely replace the wetware. It seems better that way anyhow, >> > otherwise AI scientists would be guilty of atrocities in their labs as >> > they >> > develop and abandon experimental versions of a human-like brain. >> >> I always feel a bit weird when I look at a computer I no longer use. >> > > That sounds nice. How do you avoid it? I pretend that there will be some DIY project in the future where I will put them to use. So I avoid it by self-delusion essentially :) Best, Telmo. > Thanks, > Craig > >> >> >> Best, >> Telmo. >> >> > Thanks, >> > Craig >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> Cheers, >> >> Telmo. >> >> >> >> > Emulation itself >> >> > is really a figurative term. It's useful for folk engineering, but >> >> > each >> >> > moment or event is, from an absolute perspective, unrepeatable. >> >> > Emulation is >> >> > always an approximation to a certain substitution level, and with >> >> > awareness, >> >> > there can be no substitution level because I think that awareness is >> >> > authenticity itself. >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> What if we never build the outcome but just let it live inside a >> >> >> >> simulation? We can even visit this simulation with appropriate >> >> >> >> hardware: http://www.oculusvr.com/. What now? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> > We're entertaining ourselves is all. >> >> >> >> >> >> Ok, the bump was before this one so let's leave it aside for now. >> >> >> >> >> >> > We'll know when we have created >> >> >> > artificial biology when it tries to escape and exterminate us. >> >> >> >> >> >> I actually am inclined to agree here, but possibly for different >> >> >> reasons. >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > Ok >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> In your view, at what point does this break? And why? >> >> >> > >> >> >> > >> >> >> > It's broken from the start. >> >> >> >> >> >> No, you're contradicting yourself. Read what you wrote. I believe >> >> >> you >> >> >> were ok with DNA manipulation and possibly ok with DNA synthesis. >> >> >> Our >> >> >> divergence appears to really start with virtual DNA. >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > I mean it's broken from the start in the sense of considering real >> >> > phenomena >> >> > to substituted for disembodied information. DNA manipulation and >> >> > synthesis >> >> > is only making some changes to actual DNA. There's nothing >> >> > non-biological or >> >> > non-physical going on. When it comes to using other materials you >> >> > would >> >> > have >> >> > to see how the physical and biological environment accepted it. Even >> >> > ordinary transplants of human to human organs often suffer rejection. >> >> > When >> >> > it comes to immaterial, 'virtual DNA', I don't think that there is >> >> > any >> >> > intersection with reality until we use physical and biological >> >> > systems >> >> > to >> >> > realize it. >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The trash can that says THANK YOU on the lid >> >> >> > whenever you put the tray in doesn't get smarter if you had a >> >> >> > second >> >> >> > lid >> >> >> > that said NO THANK YOU if a sensor detected too large of an >> >> >> > object. >> >> >> > There is >> >> >> > nothing there which is present on the human level to share our >> >> >> > awareness >> >> >> > of >> >> >> > the situation. Adding billions of tiny lids doesn't improve the >> >> >> > capacity >> >> >> > of >> >> >> > them to feel or experience. We are mistaking the effect of what we >> >> >> > are >> >> >> > (the >> >> >> > brain) for the cause of what we are (nested experiences, some of >> >> >> > which >> >> >> > seem >> >> >> > like the brain). By taking the public end of the thing (forms and >> >> >> > functions) >> >> >> > and assuming that Santa Claus will provide the private end of the >> >> >> > thing >> >> >> > (aesthetic appreciation and participation...sense and motive), we >> >> >> > are >> >> >> > approaching it the wrong way around. It is like trying to build >> >> >> > Shakespeare >> >> >> > out of rules for grammar and spelling. You might be able to give >> >> >> > yourself a >> >> >> > feeling of Shakespeare, but there is no 16th century playwright >> >> >> > there. >> >> >> >> >> >> Ok, ok. One step at a time :) Please explain to me what's wrong with >> >> >> virtual DNA first. >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > As soon as you want to touch a ribosome, you need something that is >> >> > not >> >> > virtual anymore. At that point, it depends on how different the >> >> > product >> >> > you >> >> > are using is from natural DNA and how well the particular cell it is >> >> > being >> >> > inserted into tolerates it. >> >> > >> >> > Thanks! >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Thanks Craig! >> >> >> Telmo. >> >> >> >> >> >> > Thanks, >> >> >> > Craig >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> >> >> Telmo. >> >> >> > >> >> >> > -- >> >> >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> >> >> > Groups >> >> >> > "Everything List" group. >> >> >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >> >> >> > send >> >> >> > an >> >> >> > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> >> >> > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> >> >> > Visit this group at >> >> >> > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> >> >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> > >> >> > -- >> >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> >> > Groups >> >> > "Everything List" group. >> >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >> >> > send >> >> > an >> >> > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> >> > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> >> > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > >> > -- >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> > Groups >> > "Everything List" group. >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >> > an >> > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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