On 10/2/2013 7:03 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 3:43 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 7:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
However, on reflection, this is not what one should deduce from the
logic as set out. The logical structure of each subjective moment is
defined as encoding its relative past and anticipated future states
(an assumption that seems consistent with our understanding of brain
function, for example).
But then it seems one needs the physical, or at least the subconscious. If
one conceives a "subjective moment" as just what one is conscious of in "a
moment" it doesn't encode very much of the past. And in the digital
simulation paradigm the computational state doesn't encode any of it. So I
think each conscious "moment" must have considerable extent in (physical)
time so as to overlap and provide continuity.
But then comp is false, OK? As with comp the present first person moment can
be encoded, and indeed sent on Mars, etc.
Of course physical time need not correspond in any simple way to
computational steps.
OK. With this remark, comp remains consistent, indeed. That last remark is
quite interesting, and a key to grasp comp and its relation to physics. I
think.
Could time arise from recursivity? A very caricatural example:
f(x) = x :: f(x + 1)
So f(0) would go through the steps:
(0)
(0 1)
(0 1 2)
...
If (in a caricatural way) we associated each step with a moment, each
step would contain a memory of the past, although the function I wrote
is just some static mathematical object I dug up from Platonia.
Furthermore, these moments would appear to be relates in a causality
sequence: (0) -> (0 1) -> (0 1 2) and so on. What do you think?
They form a sequence of states which overlap and so have an inherent order. But that
can't be the right model for conscious states because they don't contain all past
conscious states; in general their content is very sparse relative memory.
Brent
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