On 02 Oct 2013, at 19:48, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> philosophically my low-tech experiment works just as well and is
just as uninformative as your hi-tech version.
> Not at all. In your low tech (using a coin), you get an
indeterminacy from coin throwing,
And the coin throw was random so you ended up in Moscow rather than
Washington for no reason at all, but that's OK because there is no
law of logic that demands every event have a cause.
The point is that in this case the randomness is know to be due to the
lack of precision in the data, or perhaps the quantum error addition.
Not something like the self-duplication.
> You agreed some post before, that anyone remembering having been
the Helsinki man can consider himself rightfully as the Helsinki man
Agreed? I'm the one who introduced the idea to this list!
Well I assumed you were agreeing with yourself.
And I was very surprised that I even had to talk about such a
rudimentary concept to a bunch of people who fancy themselves
philosophers.
> he has just been duplicated
Yes.
> and the 1p-indeterminacy comes from this.
Please note, if the following seems clunky it's because it contains
no pronouns, but a inelegant prose style is the price that must be
payed when writing philosophically about personal identity and
duplicating chambers:
What question about personal identity is indeterminate? There is a
100% chance that the Helsinki man will turn into the Moscow man
because the Helsinki Man saw Moscow, and a 100% chance the Helsinki
Man will turn into the Washington Man because the Helsinki Man saw
Washington, and a 100% chance that the first person view of the
Helsinki Man will be a view ONLY of Helsinki because otherwise the
first person view of the Helsinki Man would not be the first person
view of the Helsinki man.
And before Bruno Marchal rebuts this by saying John Clark is
confusing peas with some other sort of peas please clearly explain
exactly what question concerning personal identity has a
indeterminate answer. AND DO SO WITHOUT USING PERSONAL PRONOUNS WITH
NO CLEAR REFERENT!
I keep repeating that the indeterminacy is not related to personal
identity, and that the indeterminacy is not bearing on who personal
identity, given that with comp we know in advance that we are both
copies.
But we know in advance that each copies can only see one city, and not
both, and so the immediate result of the self-localization cannot be
predicted by the guy in Helsinki.
You are playing with words, to deny a simple and obvious fact.
>> if you change the meaning of the personal pronoun "I" you can
change the probability to 100% for both cities. But no matter what
"I" means it will always be the case that the man who sees Moscow
will be the Moscow man.
> Sure. But this does not help to predict. As you have admitted the
probabilistic equivalence with your low tech coin throwing
Who cares? I'm not interested in prediction
You are interested in something else, just stop saying that there is
flaw in a reasoning which *is* concerned with prediction.
and certainly not a prediction about which way a coin will fall, I'm
interested in the nature of personal identity,
That's another thread, and the UDA can bring light to that.
and correct predictions have zero effect on that, exactly the same
as incorrect predictions do.
> So please, read the step 4
I never read step 4 of any proof unless I thoroughly understand step
3.
I have no clue, and I think that nobody has any clue about what you
fail to understand. You oscillate between "not new and trivial", and
"wrong", like if you were stuck in a loop.
Bruno
John K Clark
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