Bruno, I tried to control my mouse for a long time.... The M guy is NOT the Y guy, when he remembers having been the Y guy. Yes, you said it many times, but NOW again! Has this list no consequential resolution? Some people seem to have inexhaustible patience!
"It" was in the past and in the meantime lots happened to 'M" that probably did (not? or quite differently?) happen to 'Y' and you are not that youngster who went to school, no matter how identical you 'feel' to be. That argument (taking thousands times more on this list than it deserves) is false: it leaves out the CHANGING of the world we LIVE IN (considered usually as time???) So I try to stay in the reality where 'panta rhei'. ...and I am not identical to the guy I WAS. (Some accused people use such arguments as well in court, but that is another table.) John M On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:31 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 06 Oct 2013, at 19:03, meekerdb wrote: > > On 10/6/2013 12:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 05 Oct 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote: > > On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 12:28 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > > you have agreed that all "bruno marchal" are the original one (a case >> where Leibniz identity rule fails, >> > > If you're talking about Leibniz Identity of indiscernibles it most > certainly has NOT failed. > > > I was talking on the rule: > > a = b > a = c > entails that b = c > > The M-guy is the H-guy (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy) > The W-guy is the H-guy (the W-guy remembers having been the H-guy) > But the M-guy is not the W-guy (in the sense that the M-guy will not > remember having been the W-guy, and reciprocally). > > The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks, already answered, and > which, btw, can be done for the quantum indeterminacy, as many people > showed to you. Each time we talk about the prediction the "he" refer to the > guy in Helsinki before the duplication, after the duplication, we mention > if we talk of the guy in M or in W, or of both, and look at their > individual confirmation or refutation of their prediction done in Helsinki. > We just look at diaries, and I have made those things clear, but you talk > like if you don't try to understand. > > There is nothing controversial, and you fake misunderstanding of the > most easy part of the reasoning. > Not sure what is your agenda, but it is clear that you are not interested > in learning. > > > Well there is still *some* controversy; mainly about how the > indeterminancy is to be interpreted as a probability. There's some good > discussion here, > http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret > especially the last comment by Ron Maimon. > > > I was talking on the arithmetical FPI, or even just the local probability > for duplication protocol. This has nothing to do with QM, except when using > the MWI as a confirmation of the mùany dreams. > > Having said that I don't agree with the preferred base problem. That > problem comes from the fact that our computations can make sense only in > the base where we have evolved abilities to make some distinction. The > difficulty is for physicists believing in worlds, but there are only > knowledge states of observer/dreamers. > > But I insist, here, what I said was not controversial is that in the WM > duplication thought experience, *with the precise protocol given*, we have > an indeterminacy, indeed even a P = 1/2 situation. The quantum case is > notoriously more difficult (due indeed to the lack of definition of > "world"), but it seems to me that Everett use both Gleason theorem + a sort > of FPI (more or less implicitly). > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
