On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for
God
to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has
different qualia. This is a proof of comp,
Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a
prothesis, only
because the qualia is an attribute of the "immaterial person", and
not of
the brain, body, or computer. Then the prosthesis will manifest
the person
if it emulates the correct level.
But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical
brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates
the behaviour but not the qualia?
The problem is that it would allow
one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore, the
qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain.
I agree.
Note that in that case the qualia is no more attributed to an
immaterial person, but to a piece of primary matter.
In that case, both comp and functionalism (in your sense, not in
Putnam's usual sense of functionalism which is a particular case of
comp) are wrong.
Then, it is almost obvious that an immaterial being cannot distinguish
between a primarily material incarnation, and an immaterial one, as it
would need some magic (non Turing emulable) ability to make the
difference. People agreeing with this do no more need the UDA step 8
(which is an attempt to make this more rigorous or clear).
I might criticize, as a devil's advocate, a little bit the partial-
zombie argument. Very often some people pretend that they feel less
conscious after some drink of vodka, but that they are still able to
behave normally. Of course those people are notoriously wrong. It is
just that alcohol augments a fake self-confidence feeling, which
typically is not verified (in the laboratory, or more sadly on the
roads). Also, they confuse "less conscious" with "blurred
consciousness", I think.
So I think we are in agreement.
(I usually use "functionalism" in Putnam's sense, but your's or
Chalmers' use is more logical, yet more rarely used in the community
of philosopher of mind, but that's a vocabulary issue).
Bruno
If not, even me, can do a brain prothesis that reproduce the
consciousness
of a sleeping dreaming person, ...
OK, I guess you mean the full I/O behavior, but for this, I am not
even sure
that my actual current brain can be enough, ... if only because "I"
from the
first person point of view is distributed in infinities of
computations, and
I cannot exclude that the qualia (certainly stable lasting qualia)
might
rely on that.
provided that brain physics
is computable, or functionalism if brain physics is not computable.
Non-comp functionalism may entail, for example, that the replacement
brain contain a hypercomputer.
OK.
Bruno
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Stathis Papaioannou
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