On 04 Oct 2013, at 19:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, October 4, 2013 10:39:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Oct 2013, at 19:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:26:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
>
> On 02 Oct 2013, at 06:56, Pierz wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal
>> wrote:
> Then the reasoning shows (at a meta-level, made possible with the
> assumption used) how consciousness and beliefs (more or less
> deluded) in physical realities develop in arithmetic.
>
> Are 'beliefs in' physical realities the same as experiencing the
> realism of public physics though? For instance, I believe that if I
> should avoid driving recklessly in the same way as I would in a
> driving game as I would in my actual car. Because my belief that the
> consequences of a real life collision are more severe than a game
> collision, I would drive more conservatively in real life. That's
> all ok, but a belief about consequences would not generate realistic
> qualia. If someone held a gun to my head while I play the racing
> game, the game would not become any more realistic. I always feel
> like there is an equivalence between belief and qualia which is
> being implied here that is not the case. It's along the lines of
> assuming that a hypnotic state can fully replace reality. If that
> were the case, of course, everybody would be lining up to get
> hypnotized.There is some permeability there, but I think it's
> simplistic to imply that the aggregate of all qualia arises purely
> from the arbitrary tokenization of beliefs.
Unless the tokenization is made explicit, and then your nuance should
be catured by the nuance between (Bp & Dt, inteeligible matter) and
(Bp & Dt & p, sensible matter).
Can't you just add an "& p" flag to your token? It need not be
sensible or intelligible, just consistent.
Consistent = ~[] f = <>t = Dt. It is in the "& Dt".
But "& p" is needed to get the "sensibility", or the "connection with
God (truth). It is what makes some dream being true, in some sense.
>
>
> But that's the mathematical (arithmetical) part. In UDA it is just
> shown that if comp is true (an hypothesis on consciousness) then
> physics is a branch of arithmetic. More precisely a branch of the
> ideally self-referentially correct machine's theology. (always in
> the Greek sense).
>
> There is no pretense that comp is true, but if it is true, the
> correct "QM" cannot postulate the wave, it has to derive the wave
> from the numbers. That's what UDA shows: a problem. AUDA (the
> machine's interview) provides the only path (by Gödel, Löb, Solovay)
> capable of relating the truth and all machine's points of view.
>
> There will be many ways to extract physics from the numbers, but
> interviewing the self-introspecting universal machine is the only
> way to get not just the laws of physics, but also why it can hurt,
> and why a part of that seems to be necessarily not functional.
>
> I don't think that an interview with anyone can explain why they can
> hurt, unless you have already naturalized an expectation of pain. In
> other words, if we don't presume that universal machine experiences
> anything, there is no need to invent qualia or experience to justify
> any mathematical relation. If mathematically all that you need is
> non-functional, secret kinds of variable labels to represent machine
> states, I don't see why we should assume they are qualitative. If
> anything, the unity of arithmetic truth would demand a single
> sensory channel that constitutes all possible I/O.
But then you get zombies, which make no sense with comp.
Because comp is blind to authenticity, which works perfectly: Zombie-
hood make no sense to zombies.
?
But you are
right, I have to attribute consciousness to all universal machines, at
the start. That consciousness will be a computer science theoretical
semantical fixed point, that is something that the machine can "know",
but cannot prove ("know" in a larger sense than the Theaetetus'
notion, it is more an unconscious bet than a belief or proof). (Cf
also Helmholtz, and the idea that perception is a form of
extrapolation).
It seems to me that treating consciousness as a zero dimensional point
?
intersecting two logical sets (known data and unprovable data) is
accurate from the point of view of Comp, but that's only because
Comp is by definition blind to qualia.
It is not. The arithmetical definition (the Bp & Dt & p) recovers
qualia theories (notably the Bell's quantum logic) right where we can
expect it.
If you are blind, you can define sight as a capacity that you know
you are lacking, but you can't prove it (since you can't literally
see what you are missing).
OK. But you beg the question of why a machine needs to be blind (or
needs to be unable to instantiate a non blind person).
The Comp perspective can't account for feeling for what it actually
is (a direct aesthetic appreciation),
In the case of ideally correct machine, it is provided by the non
constructive connection with truth, and a weakening of the provability
condition.
it can only describe what kinds of things happen as a consequence of
unprovable knowledge.
Yes, but the description is given by the machine. She can make sense
that she might be taken for a zombie, and that she is not.
Pansensitivity (P) proposes that sensation is a universal property.
I am open to something quite close to that, which is that all
universal system (purely immaterial being) already have some (quite
"altered") conscious state.
Primordial Pansensitivity (PP) proposes that because sensation is
primitive, mechanism is derived from insensitivity.
You derive the simple (mechanism- from the mystery (sensation). This
does not satisfy me.
Whether it is mechanism that assumes form without sensibility
(materialism) or function without sensation (Comp),
Comp assumes sensations, to eventually derive an explanation of why
numbers develop sensations.
Comp assume both matter and sensation.
But comp does not imply that they are primitive, and in the course of
the reasoning we can understand why machine develop "true talk" about
them, suggesting that we should not take some machine as zombie.
they both can only view feeling as a black box/epiphenomenon/illusion.
Sensations and consciousness cannot be illusion.
Only the interpretations of sensations and the content of
consciousness can be illusions.
Under PP, both Materialism and Comp make sense as partial negative
images of P, so that PP is the only continuum or capacity needed to
explain feeling and doing (sense-motive), objective forms and
functions (mass-energy), and informative positions and dispositions
(space-time).
PP says that the appearance of forms and functions are, from an
absolute perspective, sensory-motive experiences which have been
alienated through time and across space.
Primordial Identity Pansensitivity (PIP) adds to the Ouroboran
Monism of PP, (sense twisted within itself = private experience vs
public bodies) by suggesting that PP is not only irreducible, but it
is irreducibility itself.
PIP suggests that distance is a kind of insensitivity, is so that
all other primitive possibilities which are grounded in mechanism,
such as information or energy, are reductionist in a way which
oversignifies the distanced perspective, while anthropomorphic
primitives such as love or divinity are holistic in a way which
oversignifies the local perspective. Local and distant are assumed
to be Cartesian opposites, but PIP maps locality and distance as the
same in terms of being two opposite branches of insensitivity. Both
the holistic and reductionist views ignore the production of
distance which they both rely on for their perspective, both take
perspective itself, perception, and relativity for granted.
On the contrary, those things are shown to be derivable (unavoidable)
once a machine introspect itself. Most definitions I am using are
coherent with your phenomenology, so you should love comp, really.
Then we recover matter too, making the comp hypothesis testable, which
is the main point.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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