On 12 Oct 2013, at 00:12, LizR wrote:

On 12 October 2013 10:46, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:07:58AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> I don't think being uncountable makes it any easier unless they form
> a continuum, which I don't think they do.  I QM an underlying
> continuum (spacetime) is assumed, but not in Bruno's theory.
>

UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n}, where n is
the number of leading bits in common between x and y). ISTM, this
metric induces a natural measure over sets of program executions that
is rather continuum like - but maybe I'm missing something?

I always assumed the UD output bits - i.e. not a continuum, but a countable infinity of symbols - but maybe I'm missing something?

The first/third person distinction. I might add explanation later. It looks like even those who grasp the FPI forget to apply it. The invariance of UD-steps-delay plays a crucial role here. It entails that the consciousness differentiation on the UD* takes "zero second", and that is why we are confronted with continua.

Bruno




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