On Sunday, October 13, 2013 6:04:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 13 Oct 2013, at 08:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > Maybe this will help. Here are two criticisms of comp, and two hypotheses > which aim for a more mathematical treatment of PIP principles under MSR. > * > Presumption of repeatability* (PR) - By overlooking the possibility of > absolute uniqueness, > > > ? > 0, s(0), ... are unique. >
By absolute uniqueness I mean that something could be utterly inconceivable before its appearance, and unrepeatable in any way thereafter. Numbers cannot be created from scratch, they can only be recycled from the pool of combinatory possiblities. To be unique is to be immune from precedent or repetition - inherently non-emulable by definition. > > comp must conceive of all events as locally documented stereotypes of a > Platonic template rather than true originals. > > > "true original" is too much fuzzy. > I think it could not be more clear? An original which has no possible precedent. The number one would be a true original, but all other integers represent multiple copies of one. All rational numbers are partial copies of one. All prime numbers are still divisible by one, so not truly prime. A true original must be indivisible and unrepeatable, i.e. one can never be 'new' again, but the novelty. The first variable (lets call Alpha-X) is original, but all other variables duplicate the idea of Alpha-X (yellow is an idea which cannot be duplicated or divided). What I am trying to say is that to access awareness mathematically I suggest that we would have to begin with the opposite of cardinality rather than cardinality. Each moment is neither repeatable nor unrepeatable, quantifiable or unquantifiable. Transcardinality provides for a leaky primitive, or primitive of self-modulating leakiness. It is not digital or fluid, but intimations of waving and granularity are reflected back as echoes. > > This contradicts our intuitions > > > And? > And deserves to be investigated. Our intuitions should, by default, be treated as the most locally relevant branch of arithmetic truth. > > > > about the proprietary nature of identity > > > No, this is confirmed, nit contradicted. The first persons too are unique, > and non divisible, necessarily so from their perspective. > If you believe in comp maybe. That assumes that numbers can conjure non-numerical results. There is nothing that I can see that supports the idea that computation can generate new ontologies. > > > > and would seem to counterfactually predict a very low interest in > qualities such as individuality and originality, > > > Gratuitous opportunistic assertion. > How so? Why would 1p experience value novelty if it is just an outcropping of a machine that by definition can create only trivially 'new' combinations of copies? 456098209093457976534 is different from 45609420909345797353, but why does that difference seem insignificant to us, but the difference between a belt worn by Elvis and a copy of that belt to be demonstrably significant to many people. > > > and identification with trivial personal preferences. Of course, what we > see the precise opposite, as all celebrity it propelled by some suggestion > unrepeatability and the fine tuning of lifestyle choices is arguably the > most prolific and successful feature of consumerism. > > > That is not argument. Looks like propaganda to me. > That's not a counter-argument. Looks like you're defensive to me. > > > > *Presumption of finite simplicities* - Because comp provides uniqueness > only in the form of the relative scarcity of vastly complex numbers, it can > be said to allow for the possibility of novelty only in one direction; that > of more quantity. New qualities, by comp, must arise on the event horizons > of the UD, > > > Which is were we live here and now. > That would be true under comp, sure. > > > yet qualia inherently speaks in a language of rich simplicity instead of > cumbersome computables. > > > That is not an argument. > No, it's a factual observation. The smell of oranges is rich and simple without any experienced computation, other than in connecting the smell with the rest of our associations with oranges. > > > > With comp, there is no new 'one', but in reality, every human experience > is exactly that. > > Hypothesis: > > *Diagonalization of the unique* - Because computation lags behind > experience, no simulation of a brain can catch up to what a natural person > *can be*, > > > ? > > > > since the potential for their uniqueness is immeasurable and > unprecedented. Also, nothing can be copied before it is unique, > > > ? > > > so PIP flips the presumption of repeatability (PR) so that all novelty > exists as an absolutely new simplicity as well as a relatively new > complexity, such that the continuum of novelty extends in both directions. > > The false dichotomy posed by comp in which we are forced to choose between > the truth of Church-Turing and the existence of an infinitely low level of > substitution for human personhood is exposed because under PIP, computation > is a public repetition of what is irreducibly unrepeatable and private. > Computation can never get ahead of experience, because computation is an a > posteriori measurement of it. > > The computer model of what an athlete will do on the field that is based > on their past performance will always fail to account for the possibility > that the next performance will be the first time that athlete does > something that they never have done before. Natural identities are not only > self-diagonalizing, natural identity itself is self-diagonalization. The > emergence of the unique always cheats prediction, since all prediction > belongs to the measurements of an expired world which did not yet contain > the next novelty. > > > ? > > > > *Pushing UD* - My admittedly limited understanding of UDA gives me a > picture of the UD as a program which pulls the experienced universe behind > it as it extends the computed realm ahead of local appearances. It assumes > a priori arithmetic truth which simply 'is' which produces the future from > a fixed past. > > > ? > > > > All phenomena are built bottom up from generic, interchangeable bits. The > hypothesis under PIP is that awareness is pushing the UD, not being pulled > by it. Each new number is the residue of an unprecedented experience as it > decays from immeasurable private qualia into quantifiable public > reflections. Every measure requires a ruler. Some example which is > presented as an index for comparison. A "new Michael Jordan". A third world > war. The uniqueness comes first, and the computability follows - fudging > and filling as necessary, including ways which could be interpreted as > supernatural (retrocausational discontinuities, mysterious lucky > coincidences, etc). > > > ? > > Hmm... > > You write too well, and that does not help you. It looks like bad > politics. Your approach avoids the problems by deeming them as not solvable > at any level. > I don't deem them as unsolvable at any level, I understand why Comp's assumption of solving them is based on a couple of bad assumptions - namely 1. the universality of recursion, and 2. complexity-driven novelty. I propose solving them by reversing those two assumptions, so that 1. Recursion is assumed to be derived from primordial spontaneity rather than the other way around. 2. Novelty perpetually re-asserts simplicity at the same time as it expands complexity. This makes 3. The expanding event horizon of the UD is an a posteriori documentation into storage, not an active and fertile entropy attractor, which is a priori to recording or measure. 4. Comp untrue by virtue of diagonalization of immeasurable novelty against incompleteness. Sense out-incompletes arithmetic truth, and therefore leaves it frozen in stasis by comparison in every instant, and in eternity. Comp cannot animate anything except through the gullibility of the pathetic fallacy. (Harsh words if taken personally, but I'm not trying to provoke you Bruno, I'm trying to express the full import of this shift in thinking. The future of human understanding depends, ultimately, on our ability to graduate from the cul-de-sac of mechanisms to the more profound truth of animisms. Think about it? Craig > This kills at the start all possibility of progressing. *all* your > sentences needs a lot of clarification and justification. > > Bruno > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. 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