On 13 Oct 2013, at 15:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Sunday, October 13, 2013 6:04:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Oct 2013, at 08:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Maybe this will help. Here are two criticisms of comp, and two hypotheses which aim for a more mathematical treatment of PIP principles under MSR.

Presumption of repeatability (PR) - By overlooking the possibility of absolute uniqueness,

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0, s(0), ... are unique.

By absolute uniqueness I mean that something could be utterly inconceivable before its appearance, and unrepeatable in any way thereafter. Numbers cannot be created from scratch, they can only be recycled from the pool of combinatory possiblities. To be unique is to be immune from precedent or repetition - inherently non-emulable by definition.

Like the first person experience of here and now. That is non repeatable, as it supervenes on *all* its 3p repetition. So, thanks to comp and the FPI, I can make sense of what you say. But that is first person experience only.






comp must conceive of all events as locally documented stereotypes of a Platonic template rather than true originals.

"true original" is too much fuzzy.

I think it could not be more clear? An original which has no possible precedent. The number one would be a true original, but all other integers represent multiple copies of one. All rational numbers are partial copies of one. All prime numbers are still divisible by one, so not truly prime. A true original must be indivisible and unrepeatable, i.e. one can never be 'new' again, but the novelty.

OK, OK. In comp, it is probably given by the experiences themselves. Even in a rotating Gödelian universe with cylclic time, the first person experience don't repeat.



The first variable (lets call Alpha-X) is original, but all other variables duplicate the idea of Alpha-X (yellow is an idea which cannot be duplicated or divided). What I am trying to say is that to access awareness mathematically I suggest that we would have to begin with the opposite of cardinality rather than cardinality. Each moment is neither repeatable nor unrepeatable, quantifiable or unquantifiable. Transcardinality provides for a leaky primitive, or primitive of self-modulating leakiness. It is not digital or fluid, but intimations of waving and granularity are reflected back as echoes.

No problem. To be short that what the machines explains when you listen to them.






This contradicts our intuitions

And?

And deserves to be investigated. Our intuitions should, by default, be treated as the most locally relevant branch of arithmetic truth.

We start from intutions, yes, but then we face the counter-intuitive, a bit like we start from the self, but then meet the others.






about the proprietary nature of identity

No, this is confirmed, nit contradicted. The first persons too are unique, and non divisible, necessarily so from their perspective.

If you believe in comp maybe.

Believing in the classical theory of knowledge is enough.

Classical logic +
Kp -> p
K(p->q) -> (Kp -> Kq)
+ (for reflexive enough machine) Kp -> KKp

When Kp is defined by Bp & p (Theaetetus in arithmetic) we get such a theory (extended by the knowledge version of Löb's formula, the Grzegorczyk formula B(B(p->Bp)->p)->p. It entails an abstract asymmetry.





That assumes that numbers can conjure non-numerical results.

No. Comp assumes that. But arithmetic confirms. Beliefs predicate obeys modal laws.



There is nothing that I can see that supports the idea that computation can generate new ontologies.

That is not an argument for saying there are none.







and would seem to counterfactually predict a very low interest in qualities such as individuality and originality,

Gratuitous opportunistic assertion.

How so? Why would 1p experience value novelty if it is just an outcropping of a machine that by definition can create only trivially 'new' combinations of copies?

That is not the case. Machine looking inward, in the standard Gödel sense, get creative, and and only more surprised when digging deeper.



456098209093457976534 is different from 45609420909345797353, but why does that difference seem insignificant to us, but the difference between a belt worn by Elvis and a copy of that belt to be demonstrably significant to many people.

Sure.





and identification with trivial personal preferences. Of course, what we see the precise opposite, as all celebrity it propelled by some suggestion unrepeatability and the fine tuning of lifestyle choices is arguably the most prolific and successful feature of consumerism.

That is not argument. Looks like propaganda to me.

That's not a counter-argument. Looks like you're defensive to me.

Sure I am. I defend the right of my sun in law to get his steak.








Presumption of finite simplicities - Because comp provides uniqueness only in the form of the relative scarcity of vastly complex numbers, it can be said to allow for the possibility of novelty only in one direction; that of more quantity. New qualities, by comp, must arise on the event horizons of the UD,

Which is were we live here and now.

That would be true under comp, sure.



yet qualia inherently speaks in a language of rich simplicity instead of cumbersome computables.

That is not an argument.

No, it's a factual observation. The smell of oranges is rich and simple without any experienced computation,

Of course, we cannot experience computations. We would need some sensor nerves in the brain, but that is not the case. We experience happenings and scenarios, in complex sheaf of computational histories.



other than in connecting the smell with the rest of our associations with oranges.




With comp, there is no new 'one', but in reality, every human experience is exactly that.

Hypothesis:

Diagonalization of the unique - Because computation lags behind experience, no simulation of a brain can catch up to what a natural person can be,

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since the potential for their uniqueness is immeasurable and unprecedented. Also, nothing can be copied before it is unique,

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so PIP flips the presumption of repeatability (PR) so that all novelty exists as an absolutely new simplicity as well as a relatively new complexity, such that the continuum of novelty extends in both directions.

The false dichotomy posed by comp in which we are forced to choose between the truth of Church-Turing and the existence of an infinitely low level of substitution for human personhood is exposed because under PIP, computation is a public repetition of what is irreducibly unrepeatable and private. Computation can never get ahead of experience, because computation is an a posteriori measurement of it.

The computer model of what an athlete will do on the field that is based on their past performance will always fail to account for the possibility that the next performance will be the first time that athlete does something that they never have done before. Natural identities are not only self-diagonalizing, natural identity itself is self-diagonalization. The emergence of the unique always cheats prediction, since all prediction belongs to the measurements of an expired world which did not yet contain the next novelty.

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Pushing UD - My admittedly limited understanding of UDA gives me a picture of the UD as a program which pulls the experienced universe behind it as it extends the computed realm ahead of local appearances. It assumes a priori arithmetic truth which simply 'is' which produces the future from a fixed past.

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All phenomena are built bottom up from generic, interchangeable bits. The hypothesis under PIP is that awareness is pushing the UD, not being pulled by it. Each new number is the residue of an unprecedented experience as it decays from immeasurable private qualia into quantifiable public reflections. Every measure requires a ruler. Some example which is presented as an index for comparison. A "new Michael Jordan". A third world war. The uniqueness comes first, and the computability follows - fudging and filling as necessary, including ways which could be interpreted as supernatural (retrocausational discontinuities, mysterious lucky coincidences, etc).

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Hmm...

You write too well, and that does not help you. It looks like bad politics. Your approach avoids the problems by deeming them as not solvable at any level.

I don't deem them as unsolvable at any level, I understand why Comp's assumption of solving them is based on a couple of bad assumptions - namely

1.  the universality of recursion,

You mean Church thesis. This is a very solid hypothesis.



and
2.  complexity-driven novelty.

Hmm...




I propose solving them by reversing those two assumptions, so that

1. Recursion is assumed to be derived from primordial spontaneity

But primordial spontaneity are complex notion. You explain the simple (learnable in high school) from the abstruse and complex. You are the one driven by complexity here.



rather than the other way around.
2. Novelty perpetually re-asserts simplicity at the same time as it expands complexity.

No problem with this, but again this is not a problem for a computationalist.



This makes

3. The expanding event horizon of the UD is an a posteriori documentation into storage, not an active and fertile entropy attractor, which is a priori to recording or measure.

4. Comp untrue by virtue of diagonalization of immeasurable novelty against incompleteness. Sense out-incompletes arithmetic truth, and therefore leaves it frozen in stasis by comparison in every instant, and in eternity. Comp cannot animate anything except through the gullibility of the pathetic fallacy. (Harsh words if taken personally, but I'm not trying to provoke you Bruno, I'm trying to express the full import of this shift in thinking. The future of human understanding depends, ultimately, on our ability to graduate from the cul-de-sac of mechanisms to the more profound truth of animisms.

Think about it?


I found a youtube video, and will try to research for it, a rather nice explanation, by a robotist engineer, who was also also a naïve japanese animist, of why animism implies comp.

He was interviewed aside of one of its creation, a chatty woman-like androids, and the journalist ask him if he was not afraid that the general public might believe that such mechanical woman is truly thinking and conscious.

He answered that he was pleased by that reaction, and not astonished, because, for the japanese, there is just no doubt that computers and robots are conscious, because they already believe that all machine (including doors and houses) are conscious, even pebble.

If that comp is pathetic fallacy, then animism is even more pathetic.

If you defend animism, then it is will seem two times more vexing for my sun in law to be said not enjoying the steak.

It is almost like saying anything can be conscious, except the (person incarnated in the) computers.

Bruno




Craig


This kills at the start all possibility of progressing. *all* your sentences needs a lot of clarification and justification.

Bruno





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