On 20 Oct 2013, at 21:03, John Mikes wrote:
Brent: I like to write insted of "we know" - "we THINK we know" and
it goes further: Bruno's "provable' - in many cases - applies
evidences (to 'prove') from conventional science (reductionist
figments) we still THINK we know.
Not when doing science. (pseudo-science and pseudo-religion only).
I don't think I use the term "T R U E" at all - in my agnosticism.
You still need some notion of possible truth, without which
'agnosticism" lost his meaning. This can lead to instrumentalism.
You had a remark lately to remind me that our 'imperfect' worldview
resulted in many many practical achievements so far. I did not
respond the missing adjective "almost" - meaning the many failures
and mishaps such achievements are involved with. We approach the
practical usability.
Another chapter includes math - the result of certain HUMAN logic -
in which 17 is defined as a 'prime'. A different logic may devise a
different math with different number-concept in which the equivalent
of 17 is NOT a prime.
You will need a theory with more forms of absolute to develop the idea
that 17 is prime is a human logic relative idea.
Bruno
I find it a mathematically impressed concept that the 'world' is
describable by numbers (arithmetic series) and not vice versa.
Nobody showed me so far a natural occurrence where arithmetic
connotations were detectable by non-arithmetic trains of thought.
JohnM
On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 6:16 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 10/19/2013 3:08 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Oct 08, 2013 at 08:17:17PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2013, at 11:51, Russell Standish wrote:
I understand Bp can be read as "I can prove p", and "Bp&p" as
"I know
p". But in the case, the difference between Bp and Bp&p is
entirely in
the verb, the pronoun "I" stays the same, AFAICT.
Correct. Only the perspective change. "Bp" is "Toto proves p", said
by Toto.
"Bp & p" is "Toto proves p" and p is true, as said by Toto (or not),
and the math shows that this behaves like a knowledge opertaor (but
not arithmetical predicate).
It's the same Toto in both cases... What's the point?
The difference is crucial. Bp obeys to the logic G, which does not
define a knower as we don't have Bp -> p.
At best, it defines a rational believer, or science. Not knowledge.
But differentiating W from M, is knowledge, even non communicable
knowledge. You can't explain to another, that you are the one in
Washington, as for the other, you are also in Moscow. Knowledge
logic invite us to define the first person by the knower. He is the
only one who can know that his pain is not fake, for example.
You've hinted at fixed points being relevant here for the concept of
I.
So to have an 'I', you need the statement []p->p to be a theorem?
and Bp&p as "he knows p", so the person order of
the pronoun is also not relevant.
Yes, you can read that in that way, but you get only the 3-view of
the 1-view.
Let us define [o]p by Bp & p
I am just pointing on the difference between B([o]p) and [o]([o]p).
???
B([o]p) is the statement made by the ideal rationalist believer (B)
on a first person point of view ([o]). Here [o]p can be seen as an
abbreviation for Bp & p.
In English, the first statement is that I believe I know something,
and the second is that I know I know somthing.
[o]([o]p is the first person statement ([o]) on a first person point
of view ([o]).
So, according to you, knowledge is a first person point of view. What
I still get stuck on is that we may know many things, but the only
things we can know we know are essentially private things things, such
as the fact that we are conscious, or what the colour red seems like
to us.
Bruno seems to equate "know" with "provable and true". So we know
that 17 is prime. In fact we *know* infinitely many theorems that
are provable, but which no one will ever prove - which seems like a
strange meaning of "know".
Brent
Are these all things you would say satisfy the proposition [o]([o]p)
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