On 22 Oct 2013, at 20:56, Quentin Anciaux wrote to John Clark
(I comment both)
2013/10/22 John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>
On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 6:03 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 10/21/2013 9:16 AM, John Clark wrote:
>> Let me put it in this way: accepting that P(W) = P(M) =1/2,
with W and M describing the first person experiences of the
respective copies, do you accept that P(M) = P(W) = 1/2,
> No I don't accept that, not if P(W) is the probability that the
Washington Man will see Washington; the probability of that would
be 1 not 1/2. And if P(W) means the probability the Helsinki Man
will see Washington that would be 0 not 1/2 because the Helsinki
Man would have to be turned into something that is not the Helsinki
Man before the Helsinki Man can see a different city.
> Why? If he flew to Washington he would still be the Helsinki man.
OK, then if he flew to Moscow he would be the Helsinki man too, and
if he used a Star Trek style transporter instead of a airplane he
would still be the Helsinki Man, and if the transporter sent him to
both cities at the same time he would still be "The Helsinki Man".
So you tell me, using logic and your definition how many cities did
"The Helsinki Man" see?
> He's the Helsinki man because of the continuity of his memories,
just as you are still John Clark even though you've changed
locations since yesterday.
Fine. If that's what you mean by "The Helsinki Man" then in Bruno's
thought experiment with the duplication chamber and using the exact
same reasoning the probability The Helsinki Man will see Washington
is 100%
In the third person point of view on the first person points of view.
But the question bears on the first person point of view exclusively.
To answer the question asked, you have to put yourself in the shoes of
each copy, or at least read their personal diaries (by definition of
"first person points of view" used here).
and the probability The Helsinki Man will see Moscow is 100%.
Note, John, that you just go from P(W) = P(M) = 0, to the post you
sent before (and that I commented), to P(W) = P(M) = 1.
You do seem confused.
And yes yes I know, each copy will see only one city, but if the
definition of "The Helsinki Man" is the one you give above, "the
continuity of his memories", then it is irrelevant how many cities
each individual copy sees.
Except that the probability bears on the memories contained in all the
resulting personal diaries, and they will differ on the number of
cities. You can even define the first person indeterminacies by the
frequency of W and M in the personal reports, and elementary reasoning
shows that this lead to the binomial, and thus normal for large number
of duplications, distribution, confirming the P = 1/2, based on the
numerical identity of the codes sent to Washington and Moscow.
Errare humanum est, perseverare diabolicum.
John Clark seems stuck in his confusion between the third person view
on the first person views, and the first person points of view
themselves.
This indicates that he does not pursue the "step 3" thought experiment
in its entirety. After the duplication, considers himself being in
both place at once, but forget to take into account the fact that both
copies will feel to be in only one place, and that the question was
about that place.
Everett also reintroduces total third person determinacy by reducing
the experimental indeterminacy by multiplication/differentiation of
the observers, eliminating notably the notion of event without cause,
which is a plug in for "God/Universe-of-the-gap notions".
To be wrong is not a problem indeed. It is the fuel of learning.
To be wrong again and again and again ... is more problematical.
To be wrong, knowing being wrong, but denying it for private (unknown,
conscious/unconscious?) reason, is much more problematical.
Science and even Conscience is in the attempt of not doing the same
error twice.
I have no idea what is Clark's problem. He just confused
opportunistically 1p and 3p to make his point. (mixed with
depreciating rethoric).
He has never tried to read AUDA, also, but of course this needs some
mathematical logics. But, still, he talks like if that was not existing.
Yet, I have a sort of respect for John Clark, as he seems, at least,
to try to give a reason why *not* reading more than the two first
steps of UDA. That is quite unlike the usual opponents, who discard
any meeting and dialog, private or public, and does not even come at
the public defense of the thesis, mocking all academical practices.
John Clark does *not* act under my back (Well not only, at least). I
thank John for that, as it illustrates to the others the kind of
opponents the reasoning can meet.
Quentin, you are right that by not seeing the phenomenological
similarity between the comp self-multiplication and the QM self-
superposition, John Clark shows that he didn't realize the conceptual
gain of Everett on Copenhagen.
That is coherent with his belief in "event without cause". That's like
inventing a notion about which no one can ask "why", by definition,
like in fairy tale.
That might perhaps be related with his confessed atheism, which like
any authoritative religion keep building "don't ask" barriers when
reasoning leads to questioning the dogma (in this case the primitive
"aristotelian" matter and/or physicalism).
Well, I can't help to try to understand why someone can act so
irrationally, or unscientifically. Maybe John Clark is not aware that
the primitive existence of a physical reality is not a fact of
science, but a metaphysical assumption, and that in science we can
doubt all metaphysical assumptions, especially when tackling difficult
subjects like the (computationalist) mind-body relation.
Science is agnostic. It is only a lantern on some possible unknown.
Bruno
John K Clark
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