On Oct 30, 2013, at 4:31 AM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
On 30 October 2013 19:03, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
My point was only that the traditional notions of personal identity:
saying this person is that one particular continuation of that
biological organism, or of that one brain, do not work. They fail
in cases of fusion, fission, duplication, radical change, amnesia,
etc. and must be rejected in favor of more consistent definitions of
personal identity.
That is exactly what comp does, and that is at least part of the
point of the teleportation thought experiments.
Read the sentence I wrote but stress the word "one".
It's not true with comp that a person's consciousness is constrained
to only one single path. So if consciousness is the deciding factor in
your theory of personal identity then a person cannot be constrained
to a single path either.
One of the results of comp is that personal identity is split into
steps, normally called observer moments (the length of these moments
isn't known), and that personal survival from moment to moment is
exactly the same as survival during a duplication experiment. In
comp, at least, a person is a series of discrete states,
Computationalism is more a theory of mind than of personal identity,
but since it allows end products of diverging paths to be
possibilities for the same conscious state, then any theory that says
a person is a series of experiences (conscious states) must conclude
that a person can diverge into a large number of different entities
rather quickly.
a "Capsule theory" of memory and identity rather like the
pigeonholes in Fred Hoyle's "October the First is too late".
Hoyle's idea was that there is only one person, underwhich it is
certainly not possible to say a person is only *one* single individual
(organism, brain, etc.).
To be clear I am saying there are two consistent and error-free
notions if personal identity:
a person == one observer moment
a person == all observer moments
What I thibk is not consistent is to say:
this person == these observer moments but not those observer moments
Jason
I'm sure Bruno will correct me if I have got anything wrong there.
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