On Mon, Nov 4, 2013 at 10:45 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > On 04 Nov 2013, at 15:57, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Nov 4, 2013, at 2:06 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > > On 03 Nov 2013, at 18:51, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 2:30 AM, Bruno Marchal < <marc...@ulb.ac.be> > marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> On 03 Nov 2013, at 09:17, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 1:27 AM, Bruno Marchal < <marc...@ulb.ac.be> >> marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 02 Nov 2013, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal < <marc...@ulb.ac.be> >>> marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you have. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Are you referring to "Quantum Mechanics and Experience" (1992)? I do >>>> not have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the same). >>>> >>>> >>>> It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite unconvincing in >>>> his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> Bruno, >>> >>> I have just finished reading this book. I thank you for recommending it >>> as it helped me get some familiarity with the math and the notation. I >>> found the first 120 or so pages quite infuriating, for he would seeming get >>> so close to the idea of observers being in superpositions, (teasing and >>> dangling the idea), while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical. >>> >>> >>> Without any argument, I agree. >>> >>> >>> It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed make >>> sense, but almost immediately after page 123, and following a handwavy >>> dismissal of Everett returns to irrationality, until page 130 when he >>> introduces the many-minds theory. Strangely, he claims that he (Albert) >>> and Barry Loewer introduced the theory, with no mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh. >>> >>> While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers locality, he >>> never explains how many-minds is any better (or different than) >>> many-worlds. Also, I found it strange that he considered many-minds and >>> Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm requires additional assumptions beyond >>> the four quantum postulates, and also Bohm (lacing locality) is >>> incompatible with special relativity. >>> >>> >>> >>> It introduces very well QM and the measurement problem, but he is still, >>> like everybody, believing implicitly in some strong mind-body thesis, and >>> get irrational, somehow, I agree, in his defense of Bohm. >>> I would have also attributed the many-minds to Loewer. I know Zeh mainly >>> for his indexical analysis of time, which I think is correct, and certainly >>> close to both Many World and Many Mind. If you have some references on Zeh >>> and Many Mind ... >>> >> >> >> I found this paper by Zeh from 1970: >> >> On the interpretation of measurement in quantum theory", 1970, >> Foundations of Physics, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 69–76 >> >> In particular, he describes the essential idea of many minds and >> macroscopic superposition on page 74: >> <http://link.springer.com/static-content/lookinside/406/art%253A10.1007%252FBF00708656/005.png> >> http://link.springer.com/static-content/lookinside/406/art%253A10.1007%252FBF00708656/005.pngbut >> he also references Everett, so it isn't entirely clear to me if he is >> introducing anything new. >> >> >> >> From what I remember, Zeh is, in that paper, much closer to Everett >> than to the Albert-Loewer "many mind" theory. Note that the "many-mind" >> theory is very specific, and assumes a unique universe. >> > > But didn't they assume reality of the superposition? If the superposition > is real how can their only be one unique "universe"? > > > They assume the reality of the superposition, but consider that it applies > only to the subjectivity of the person, not to anything physical. Yes, it > is a dualism, and a very bizarre one. t does not make much sense to me. > > > > I see. That makes very little sense. What do they suppose happens when > an observer acts on their measurement in one of two ways? > > > The observer will live an experience among many, with a probability given > by QM. > > The other minds still exist, and with comp, should be conscious, but seem > to lost any body to act on. Also, if you and someone else measure > independent spin repetitively, your fellow becomes a zombie, his bodies > still "give" a part of the universal wave needed for the interference > terms, but the probability rule, as used here, guaranties that minds of the > others are no more correlated with your mind. So, with comp, the QM Many > Minds of Albert and Loewer entails both the seemingly existence of souls > lacking bodies and of bodies lacking soul (zombie). > I remember vaguely that they are more or less aware of the difficulties. > > > > > > > > > >> Observers' mind get mutiplied with probabilities which have to be >> postulated again, so it lost completely the appeal we can have for Everett. >> It transform "other people" into zombies, also. >> > > Is this a necessary consequence of many-minds or only inAlbert and > Loewer's formulation of it? > > > "may-mind" always refers to Albert Loewer's theory. I don't know any other > "many-mind" QM theory. It has nothing to do with the arithmetical > "many-dreams", where the computations are relatively entirely duplicated > "in extenso". > > > Oh. I had always thought of many minds as like a many worlds where > instead of splits there are supposed to be infinite minds which > differentiate upon measurement; > > > That is the natural many dream interpretation of QM which would follow in > case Comp derives QM, with our substitution level defined by the Heisenberg > Uncertainty. > > > > this is how other sites seen to describe it. I see from your description > it is quite unlike the many dreams imof arithmetic. > > > You mean the Albert Loewer theory? Yes, it is very different. > Albert-Loewer still illustrates well the hardness of the 1p/3p relation in > QM, when wanting to keep some physical reality unique. It looks to me like > getting a Bohmian version of QM, with "one world", but without using a > guiding potential (but using ad hoc probability rules and strange 1p/3p > relations, definitely not mechanical). > > It looks like Zeh had more to say in 1999, this theory seems much closer to many dreams: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-minds_interpretation#Continuous_infinity_of_minds and http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9908084 Continuous infinity of minds [edit<https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Many-minds_interpretation&action=edit§ion=3> ] In Everett's conception the mind of an observer is split by the measuring process as a consequence of the decoherence<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decoherence> induced by measurement. In many-minds each physical observer has a postulated associated continuous infinity of minds. The decoherence of the measuring event (observation) causes the infinity of minds associated with each observer to become categorized into distinct yet infinite subsets, each subset associated with each distinct outcome of the observation. No minds are split, in the many-minds view, because it is assumed that they are all already always distinct. The idea of many-minds was suggested early on by Zeh in 1995. He argues that in a decohering no-collapse universe one can avoid the necessity of distinct macrorealms ("parallel worlds" in MWI<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation>terminology) by introducing a new psycho-physical parallelism, in which individual minds supervene <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supervene> on each non-interfering component in the physical state. Zeh indeed suggests that, given decoherence, this is the most natural interpretation of quantum mechanics. The main difference between the many-minds and many-worlds interpretations then lies in the definition of the preferred quantity. The many-minds interpretation suggests that to solve the measurement problem, there is no need to secure a definite macrorealm: the only thing that's required is appearance of such. A bit more precisely: the idea is that the preferred quantity is whatever physical quantity, defined on brains (or brains and parts of their environments), has definite-valued states (eigenstates<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eigenstate>) that underpin such appearances, i.e. underpin the states of belief in, or sensory experience of, the familiar macroscopic realm. It sounds like under Zeh's many-minds, the difference between it and Everett is a world would be any/all the systems that are psychologically indistinguishable from each other, from the view of some mind. Jason > Bruno > > > > > Jason > > > Bruno > > > > > > Jason > > >> Albert-Loewer "many-minds" theory seems to me less sensical than Bohm or >> even Copenhagen. It unites all the defects of all QM-interpretations in one >> theory, imo, and this without mentioning that it needs non-comp. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> Jason >> >> >> >>> They all miss, of course, the many "dreams" internal interpretation of >>> ... elementary arithmetic. It will take time before people awaken from the >>> Aristotelian naturalism. Most scientists are not even aware of its >>> conjectural status. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to <everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to <everything-list@googlegroups.com> >>> everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at <http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list> >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit <https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >>> https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to <everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to <everything-list@googlegroups.com> >> everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at <http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list> >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit <https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >> https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to <everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to <everything-list@googlegroups.com> >> everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at <http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list> >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit <https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >> https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to <everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com> > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to <everything-list@googlegroups.com> > everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at <http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list> > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit <https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> > https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at <http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list> > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit <https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> > https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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