Amen to that, Brent!
On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 8:03 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > On 12/16/2013 4:41 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 17 December 2013 13:07, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> >> In a sense, one can be more certain about arithmetical reality than >> the physical reality. An evil demon could be responsible for our belief in >> atoms, and stars, and photons, etc., but it is may be impossible for that >> same demon to give us the experience of factoring 7 in to two integers >> besides 1 and 7. >> >> >> But that's because we made up 1 and 7 and the defintion of factoring. >> They're our language and that's why we have control of them. >> >> If it's just something we made up, where does the "unreasonable > effectiveness" come from? (Bearing in mind that most of the non-elementary > maths that has been found to apply to physics was "made up" with no idea > that it mighe turn out to have physical applications.) > > > I'm not sure your premise is true. Calculus was certainly invented to > apply to physics. Turing's machine was invented with the physical process > of computation in mind. Non-euclidean geometry of curved spaces was > invented before Einstein needed it, but it was motivated by considering > coordinates on curved surfaces like the Earth. Fourier invented his > transforms to solve heat transfer problems. Hilbert space was an extension > of vector space in countably infinite dimensions. So the 'unreasonable > effectiveness' may be an illusion based on a selection effect. I'm on the > math-fun mailing list too and I see an awful lot of math that has no > reasonable effectiveness. > > Another answer is that we're physical beings who evolved in a physical > world and that's why we think the way we do. That not only explains why we > have developed logic and mathematics to deal with the world, but also why > quantum mechanics seems so weird compared to Newtonian mechanics (we didn't > evolve to deal with electrons). There's a very nice, stimulating and short > book by William S. Cooper "The Evolution of Reason" which takes this idea > and develops it and even projects it into the future. > http://www.amazon.com/The-Evolution-Reason-Cambridge-Philosophy/dp/0521540259 > > Brent > "The duty of abstract mathematics, as I see it, is precisely to > expand our capacity for hypothesizing possible ontologies." > --- Norm Levitt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/1NWmK1IeadI/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
