On 12/16/2013 6:17 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 6:07 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 12/16/2013 2:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 3:14 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 12/16/2013 12:40 PM, LizR wrote:
On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum worlds,
although Everett didn't write about multiple worlds. Everett only
considered one world and wrote about the "relative state" of the
observer
and the observed system. In some ways this is more fundamental
because in
principle the "different worlds" of MWI can interfere with one another.
That they usually don't is a statistical result.
("Many worlds" is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description, like
Big
Bang (better than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better than Very Faintly
Glowing
Region of Infinite Gravity :)
I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen. Deterministic
theories
just push the problem back in time. Ultimately there is either an
uncaused
event or an infinite past. So there is not great intellectual
virtue in
rejecting uncaused events. Quantum mechanics is an interesting
intermediate case. It has randomness, but randomness that is
strictly
limited and limited in such a way that it produces the classical
world at
a statistical level.
The problem is pushed back onto whatever is considered fundamental. If
there
is an original event, it is only uncaused if it doesn't emerge
naturally from
(for example) the equations that are believed to describe the universe.
One
can say the same about an infinite past.
Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the
computations
of a universal dovetailer. The whole idea of "everythingism" was
inspired
by QM, but QM itself doesn't entail that everything happens. If you
measure a variable you only get eigenvalues of that variable - not
every
possible value. If you measure it again you get the same
eigenvalue again
- not any value.
I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren't events,
and that
they simply exist within arithmetic as a logically necessary
consequence of
its existence. Did I get that wrong?
I wouldn't say "wrong". It depends on whether you think "There exists a
successor of 2." implies that 3 exists. Personally I think it is a
confusion to
say that a logical formula is satisfied by X is the same as saying X
exists in
the ontological sense.
On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of such
indeterminacy, without adding any further assumptions.
Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a
further
assumption.
Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-duplication)
arises from
the equations? So one has self-duplication as a consequence, to the same
extent that one has it within ones own personal past? Or have I
misunderstood
that too?
(Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have to make
all the
time anyway?)
Occam favors it. Your belief in "3)" substitutes a very simple
explanation by a call to a form of built-in-non-explainable magic.
No more magic than a UD.
Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?)
It's hypothetically generating all possible worlds, but where is it?
It's in
Platonia. It's "the word made flesh." Sounds a lot more magical than
"that
atom decayed by potential tunneling just like the equations say."
In a sense, one can be more certain about arithmetical reality than the
physical
reality. An evil demon could be responsible for our belief in atoms, and
stars, and
photons, etc., but it is may be impossible for that same demon to give us
the
experience of factoring 7 in to two integers besides 1 and 7.
But that's because we made up 1 and 7 and the defintion of factoring.
Their our
language and that's why we have control of them.
That's what Hilbert thought, but Godel showed he was wrong.
So while Descartes could doubt physical reality, he could not doubt the
"unreality
of arithmetically impossible experiences".
I don't think Descartes could doubt physical reality.
He did. It could have all be an illusion or a dream, as in the Matrix. There is no
proof that your perceptions correspond to reality any more than the reality necessary to
create your perceptions.
Proof is for mathematicians - and they are only relative to axioms. My point is not that
Descarte couldn't say he doubted reality, but that he couldn't act on that doubt; he
couldn't really doubt it because that makes the concept of "reality" meaningless.
Even Bruno rejects solipism and that's just doubting the reality of other
people. I
find it pretty easy to doubt that you can always add one more to an
integer. I
think 10^10^10 + 1 may well equal 10^10^10 in most contexts.
I don't see the relevance of this to the fact that even a highly doubtful person (such
as Descartes or yourself :-) ), can reason that his possible experiences are constrained
by mathematical possibility (even if all his (or your) perceptions are created by an
evil demon, a dream, or the matrix).
Descartes gave up too quickly.
Indeed, all he should have concluded is "This is a thought.". "I" and "am thinking" are
inferences.
Instead of concluding only that the only thing he could prove is that "he exists", he
might have reasoned further that mathematical laws exist,
Only by adopting the mathematicians idea of "exists" = "satisfies some
predicate".
and from there he could have proven the existence of the rest of the universe
around him.
In that sense, arithmetic would in-part control possible experiences, and
is harder
to doubt than the possibility that physics is constrains experiences.
Indeed,
computationalism suggests this is true. An appropriately programmed
computer can
generate any experience that can be possibly experienced in any universe:
our own
"laws of physics" do not constrain our possible experience whatsoever,
?? They seem to constrain my experience of breathing under water and flying
to Mars.
Those represent constraints on physical possibilities, not experiences.
More than that, since I have not had the experiences there is no way to know when a
simulation would have succeeded in creating them.
With the right computer simulation you could experience breathing under water, or flying
to mars, even flying there faster than light. Nothing in the laws of the physics of our
universe prevents someone from having such an experience here in this universe. Of
course, that experience would have no correspondence to reality, but the experience is
still possible and can be implemented here. Just look at all the impossible scenarios
that take place in our dreams.
so long as a Turing machine can be built within the laws of some physical
universe.
I know. That's your story and you're sticking to it.
Now you doubt that computers can be made in this universe?
I doubt everything, except "This is a doubt".
Brent
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