On 12/17/2013 1:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Dec 2013, at 22:14, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/16/2013 12:40 PM, LizR wrote:
On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum worlds, although
Everett didn't write about multiple worlds. Everett only considered one
world and
wrote about the "relative state" of the observer and the observed system.
In some
ways this is more fundamental because in principle the "different worlds"
of MWI
can interfere with one another. That they usually don't is a statistical
result.
("Many worlds" is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description, like Big Bang
(better than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better than Very Faintly Glowing Region of
Infinite Gravity :)
I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen. Deterministic theories
just
push the problem back in time. Ultimately there is either an uncaused
event or an
infinite past. So there is not great intellectual virtue in rejecting
uncaused
events. Quantum mechanics is an interesting intermediate case. It has
randomness, but randomness that is strictly limited and limited in such a
way that
it produces the classical world at a statistical level.
The problem is pushed back onto whatever is considered fundamental. If there is an
original event, it is only uncaused if it doesn't emerge naturally from (for example)
the equations that are believed to describe the universe. One can say the same about
an infinite past.
Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the computations of
a
universal dovetailer. The whole idea of "everythingism" was inspired by
QM, but
QM itself doesn't entail that everything happens. If you measure a variable
you
only get eigenvalues of that variable - not every possible value. If you
measure
it again you get the same eigenvalue again - not any value.
I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren't events, and that they
simply exist within arithmetic as a logically necessary consequence of its existence.
Did I get that wrong?
I wouldn't say "wrong". It depends on whether you think "There exists a successor of
2." implies that 3 exists.
3 *is* the successor of 2.
Personally I think it is a confusion to say that a logical formula is satisfied by X is
the same as saying X exists in the ontological sense.
Existence is always theoretical, and is treated by satisfaction of a formula beginning
by Ex.
What I would expect a logician to say. But "Bruno Marchal" exists because we can point to
him and say, "That's Bruno Marchal". If *everything* is theoretical then "theoretical"
loses it's meaning. I realize that makes everythingists happy, but I'm dubious.
On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of such
indeterminacy,
without adding any further assumptions.
Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a further
assumption.
Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-duplication) arises from the
equations? So one has self-duplication as a consequence, to the same extent that one
has it within ones own personal past? Or have I misunderstood that too?
(Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have to make all the time
anyway?)
Occam favors it. Your belief in "3)" substitutes a very simple explanation
by a
call to a form of built-in-non-explainable magic.
No more magic than a UD.
Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?)
It's hypothetically generating all possible worlds, but where is it? It's in
Platonia.
Platonia = Arithmetic. You need just to believe that 2+2=4 is true. You need this
Platonia to just define what is a computation.
But I don't have to believe true=exists.
It's "the word made flesh." Sounds a lot more magical
Once you believe in "flesh", but in comp, there is only appearance of flesh, and we
explain where that appearance comes from (completely).
No, you don't. You explain that "it *must* come from computation" (given your
assumptions) but that is very different from showing that it *does* come from computation.
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
