Dear Bruno,

  Why do you not consider an isomorphism between the Category of
computer/universal-numbers
and physical realities? That way we can avoid a lot of problems!
   I think that it is because of your insistence of the Platonic view that
the material/physical realm is somehow lesser in ontological status and the
assumption that a timeless totality = the appearance of change (and its
measures) is illusory. I would like to be wrong in this presumption!


On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 29 Dec 2013, at 20:30, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 12/29/2013 5:59 AM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>>> Liz,
>>>
>>> Reality doesn't seem to have any difficulty computing the results of
>>> random choices.
>>>
>>
>
> If reality computes, then reality is a computer/universal-number. If
> reality is physical reality, then this is the digital physics thesis, which
> is self-contradictory (due to the UDA).
> Also, computing and obtaining a random result is contradictory by itself,
> as computing is determinated. It can make sense with a quantum computer, or
> with self-duplication, (or both like in Everett), so you might clarify
> here. Are you (Edgar, Brent) assuming a quantum computer? With comp this is
> a sort of treachery, as far as we are concerned with the fundamental
> reality.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>  That's how practically all computations occur. If we assume, or define,
>>> reality as computational then reality is computing random results by
>>> definition. It's obviously something that reality math does quite well.
>>>
>>
>> It's not Church-Turing, but it might be the way the world works.
>>
>> Brent
>>
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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