On 16 Jan 2014, at 09:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the
Intel
CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the
sense that a
computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost
certainly
correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather,
that a
computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body,
or
entire planet and all the people on it.
Jason
I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the brain
is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a
digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour of
any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),
including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie
using a computer. The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if
physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not computable.
Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely
figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if there
is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.
OK. But in a non standard sense of functionalism, as in the philosophy
of mind, functionalism is used for a subset of computationalism.
Functionalism is computationalism with some (unclear) susbtitution
level in mind (usually the neurons).
Now, I would like to see a precise definition of "your" functionalism.
If you take *all* functions, it becomes trivially true, I think. But
any restriction on the accepted functions, can perhaps lead to some
interesting thesis. For example, the functions computable with this or
that oracles, the continuous functions, etc.
Bruno
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
