On 16 Jan 2014, at 04:19, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289
Daniel C. Dennett
Philosopher; Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, Co-
Director, Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University; Author,
Intuition Pumps
And again
Cheers
Niloc
<am done>
Dennet wrote (there):
<<
Is the Hard Problem an idea that demonstrates the need for a major
revolution in science if consciousness is ever to be explained, or an
idea that demonstrates the frailties of human imagination? That
question is not settled at this time, so scientists should consider
adopting the cautious course that postpones all accommodation with it.
That's how most neuroscientists handle ESP and psychokinesis—assuming,
defeasibly, that they are figments of imagination.
>>
The question has been settled, it seems to me, or at least reduce to
another more precise question.
And the answer is that if computationalism is true, as dennett
advocates, then consciousness is not a figment of imagination (which
makes no sense), but physicalism is refuted, and the new problem is to
compare the comp physics (the physics extracted from arithmetic, by
comp) and the facts.
Bruno
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