On Sunday, January 26, 2014 5:18:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 25 Jan 2014, at 15:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Saturday, January 25, 2014 1:41:30 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: >> >> On 25 January 2014 00:26, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> >> Tell me what you believe so we can be clear: >> >> >> >> My understanding is that you believe that if the parts of the Chinese >> >> Room don't understand Chinese, then the Chinese Room can't understand >> >> Chinese. Have I got this wrong? >> > >> > >> > The fact that the Chinese Room can't understand Chinese is not related >> to >> > its parts, but to the category error of the root assumption that forms >> and >> > functions can understand things. I see forms and functions as one of >> the >> > effects of experience, not as a cause of them. >> >> But that doesn't answer the question: do you think (or understand, or >> whatever you think the appropriate term is) that the Chinese Room >> COULD POSSIBLY be conscious or do you think that it COULD NOT POSSIBLY >> be conscious? > > > NO ROOM CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO BODY CAN BE CONSCIOUS. NO FORM CAN BE > CONSCIOUS.* > > > I agree. >
Cool. > > > > *Except within the fictional narrative of a conscious experience. Puppets > can seem conscious. Doors, door-knobs, and Chinese rooms can SEEM to be > conscious. > > > You do the Searle error. The fact that the room/body form is not conscious > does not entail that the narrative is fictional. If the room simulates the > person at its right level, it can manifest the real abstract person related > to the narrative. > That makes perfect sense to me, but it makes more sense that it is a mistake. It assumes the information-theoretic ground of being in which simulation is possible. My understanding is that this is not only precisely the opposite of the whole truth, which is that all awareness is grounded in the unprecedented, unrepeatable, and unique, but that the inverted assumption of comp is actually incapable of detecting its own error. This blindness is what is being reflected in its projections of first person machine denial of mechanism. There is no level of simulation, because simulation itself is a theory which mistakes local sensory approximation for universal interchangeability. It makes the mistake of imposing the specially blunted aesthetics of functionalism onto the aesthetic totality. > > With your body or form is a sort of zombie. It does no more think than a > car. But the owner of the body can think, and use his body to manifest his > thinking (which is really "done" in platonia) relatively to its most > probable continuations in Platonia. > I think that the owners of my body look like cells to me. I am a contributor to their experience, and other, greater owners of my lifetime likely contribute to my experience. > > > > > >> Or do you claim that the question is meaningless, a >> category error (which ironically is a term beloved of positivists)? If >> the latter, how is it that the question can be meaningfully asked >> about humans but not the Chinese Room? >> > > Because humans are not human bodies. > > > We agree on this. > > Ok > > We don't have to doubt that humans are conscious, as to do so would be to > admit that we humans are the ones choosing to do the doubting and therefore > are a priori certainly conscious. > > > OK. > > > Bodies do not deserve the benefit of the doubt, since they remain when we > are personally unconscious or dear. That does not mean, however, that our > body is not itself composed on lower and lower levels by microphenomenal > experiences which only seem to us at the macro level to be forms and > functions....they are forms and functions relative to our > perceptual-relativistic distance from their level of description. Since > there is no distance between our experience and ourselves, we experience > ourselves in every way that it can be experienced without being outside of > itself, and are therefore not limited to mathematical descriptions. The > sole purpose of mathematical descriptions are to generalize measurements - > to make phenomena distant and quantified. > > > No problem with this. > Ok > > > > >> > I like my examples better than the Chinese Room, because they are >> simpler: >> > >> > 1. I can type a password based on the keystrokes instead of the letters >> on >> > the keys. This way no part of the "system" needs to know the letters, >> > indeed, they could be removed altogether, thereby showing that data >> > processing does not require all of the qualia that can be associated >> with >> > it, and therefore it follows that data processing does not necessarily >> > produce any or all qualia. >> > >> > 2. The functional aspects of playing cards are unrelated to the suits, >> their >> > colors, the pictures of the royal cards, and the participation of the >> > players. No digital simulation of playing card games requires any >> aesthetic >> > qualities to simulate any card game. >> > >> > 3. The difference between a game like chess and a sport like basketball >> is >> > that in chess, the game has only to do with the difficulty for the >> human >> > intellect to compute all of the possibilities and prioritize them >> logically. >> > Sports have strategy as well, but they differ fundamentally in that the >> real >> > challenge of the game is the physical execution of the moves. A machine >> has >> > no feeling so it can never participate meaningfully in a sport. It >> doesn't >> > get tired or feel pain, it need not attempt to accomplish something >> that it >> > cannot accomplish, etc. If chess were a sport, completing each move >> would be >> > subject to the possibility of failure and surprise, and the end can >> never >> > result in checkmate, since there is always the chance of weaker pieces >> > getting lucky and overpowering the strong. There is no Cinderella Story >> in >> > real chess, the winning strategy always wins because there can be no >> > difference between theory and reality in an information-theoretic >> universe. >> >> How can you start a sentence "a machine has no feeling so..." and >> purport to discuss the question of whether a machine can have feeling? >> >> > So no, I do not "believe" this, I understand it. I do not think that >> the >> > Chinese Room is valid because wholes must be identical to their parts. >> The >> > Chinese Room is valid because it can (if you let it) illustrate that >> the >> > difference between understanding and processing is a difference in kind >> > rather than a difference in degree. Technically, it is a difference in >> kind >> > going one way (from the quantitative to the qualitative) and a >> difference in >> > degree going the other way. You can reduce a sport to a game (as in >> computer >> > basketball) but you can't turn a video game into a sport unless you >> bring in >> > hardware that is physical/aesthetic rather than programmatic. Which >> leads me >> > to: >> >> The Chinese Room argument is valid if it follows that if the parts of >> the system have no understanding then the system can have no >> understanding. > > > You aren't listening to me - which may not be your fault. Your > psychological specialization may not permit you to see any other > possibility than the mereological argument that you keep turning to. > > > > I don't argue for comp. I just invalidate your argument against comp. It > is circular. > But my argument against comp is that if consciousness/sense is primordial, then only circular arguments can reveal the truth about it. Comp, being the near-perfect impostor of sense, is the one case where we have to look through the logic of argument to the sense of feeling. The only true Voight-Kampff/Turing test/Gom Jabbar is free from all argument and rationality. It is entirely aesthetic and intuitive. > You always use your primitive notion of sense, which makes no sense to me, > except in segregating among the possible creatures. > Why wouldn't I use the primitive notion of sense if it is true? > > > > > Of course the whole can have properties that the parts do not have, that > is not what I am denying at all. I am saying that there is no explanation > of the Chinese Room which requires that it understands anything except one > in which understanding itself is smuggled in from the real world and > attached to it arbitrarily on blind faith. > > > OK. That is why it is nice that incompleteness provides a bridge (the Bp > ==> Bp & p definition of Theaetetus) between the machine and the real world > (arithmetic). machines quickly realize that the arithmetical reality kick > back. > I haven't known machines to realize anything. > > > > > >> It is pointed out (correctly) by Searle that the person >> in the room does not understand Chinese, from which he CONCLUDES that >> the room does not understand Chinese, > > > Rooms don't understand anything. Rooms are walls with a roof. Walls and > roofs are planed matter. Matter is bonded molecules. Molecules are sensory > experiences frozen in some externalized perceptual gap. > > >> and uses this conclusion to >> support the idea that the difference between understanding and >> processing is a difference in kind, so no matter how clever the >> computer or how convincing its behaviour it will never have >> understanding. >> > > The conclusion is just the same if you use the room as a whole instead of > the person. You could have the book be a simulation of John Wayne talking > instead. No matter how great the collection of John Wayne quotes, and how > great a job the book does at imitating what John Wayne would say, the > room/computer/simulation cannot ever become John Wayne. > > > Then there is something magical in John Wayne's body. What? Not a first > person soul, as machines have them too. It has to be something noin Turing > emulable, and not FPI recoverable, so what is it, and wy postulating this > for carbon based creature, and not silicon creature? > It's not his body, it's the totality of the unique sense of his life and its relation to all life, order, and history of the universe. It's not emulable or reproducible, its the opposite. Emulation and reproduction are expectations within awareness, which cannot be emulated or reproduced at all. Emulation is a theory about theory being reality. It cannot be disproved theoretically, but in reality, it doesn't work because theory is always less than the reality which inspires it. Craig > > Bruno > > > > >> >> I don't think your example with the typing is as good as the Chinese >> Room, because by changing the keys around a bit it would be obvious >> that there is no real understanding, while with the Chinese Room would >> be able to pass any test that a Chinese speaker could pass. >> > > Tests are irrelevant, since the pass/fail standard can only be subjective. > There can never be a Turing test or a Voigh-Kampff test which is objective, > but there will always be tests which designers of AI can use to identify > the signature of their design. > > Craig > > >> >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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