On 30 Jan 2014, at 02:06, David Nyman wrote:
On 29 January 2014 22:15, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
wrote:
The problem that concerns me about this way of looking at things is
that any and all behaviour associated with consciousness -
including, crucially, the articulation of our very thoughts and
beliefs about conscious phenomena - can at least in principle be
exhausted by an extrinsic account. But if this be so, it is very
difficult indeed to understand how such extrinsic behaviours could
possibly make reference to any "intrinsic" remainder, even were its
existence granted. It isn't merely that any postulated remainder
would be redundant in the explanation of such behaviour, but that it
is hardly possible to see how an inner dual could even be accessible
in principle to a complete (i.e. causally closed) extrinsic system
of reference in the first place.
Right, because the extrinsic perspective is blind to the limits of
causal closure.
But I'm afraid the problem is precisely that it behaves as if it is
NOT in fact blind to such limits. As Bruno points out in a recent
response to John Clark, if we rely on the causal closure of the
extrinsic account (and which of us does not?) then we commit
ourselves to the view that there must be such an account, at some
level, of any behaviour to which we might otherwise wish to impute a
conscious origin. However, my point above is that the problem is in
fact even worse than this. In fact, it amounts to a paradox.
The existence of a causally closed extrinsic account forces us to
the view that the very thoughts and utterances - even our own - that
purport to refer to irreducibly conscious phenomena must also be
fully explicable extrinsically.
Yes. The solution will be that "explicable" is a notion depending on
level, and that eventually the scientist (played by Bp) cannot put
itself at the (Bp & p) place.
Precisely, we can explain the reason of the paradox from the first
point of view of the machine (the concrete (but immaterial person)
owning that machine).
But how then could any such sequence of extrinsic events possibly be
linked to anything outside its causally-closed circle of
explanation? To put this baldly, even whilst asserting with absolute
certainty "the fact that I am conscious" I am forced nonetheless to
accept that this very assertion need have nothing to do (and, more
strongly, cannot have anything to do) with the fact that I am
conscious!
Not really. Somehow, you conflate levels and points of view. It is a
sin of reductionism :)
You do the "mistake" of those who deny compatibilistic free-will.
Of course we are at the crux of the mind-body problem.
I take no credit for being the originator of this insight, although
it isn't IMO acknowledged as often as it should be, perhaps because
of its very intractability. It's sometimes referred to as the
Paradox of Phenomenal Judgement. David Chalmers, for example,
acknowledges it in passing in The Conscious Mind, fails to offer any
solution and then proceeds to ignore it.
In my mind thats the mind-body problem. I often called it the "hard
problem of consciousness".
I show that any comp solutions of this is lead to a "hard problem of
matter".
Gregg Rosenberg - who if you haven't read perhaps you should - deals
with it a little more explicitly in A Place for Consciousness, but
IMO ultimately also fails to square this particular circle. In fact
I know of no mind-body theory, other than comp, that confronts it
head-on and suggests at least the shape of a possible solution. That
said, do you see what the paradox is and if you do, how specifically
does your theory deal with it?
I think that Craig is aware of this problem, so much that he used its
apparent non tractability to make consciousness into a primitive.
Others do that, but Craig is coherent by accepting the no-comp
consequences.
Of course taking consciousness as primitive is like abandoning the
project to solve, or put light, on this problem. It leads to some form
of solipsism, notably with respect to person owning only silicon
computers (after losing their carbonic skull computer in some
accident, say).
I will have opportunity to say more, but Theaetetus is close to the
solution, and it will work in arithmetic.
In the comp solution, your consciousness has indeed nothing to do with
the physical computation, nor even the arithmetical computation. It is
more a universal knowledge, that brain and universal numbers can
relatively particularize.
That universal knowledge exist because numbers are not stupid. Simply.
But the particularization, and the local universal neighbors can
handicap the remembrance in many histories.
The only remaining mystery will be our 1p faith in arithmetic. But
this, the theory will explain that without it, we lost the ability to
even ask the question. It re-explains in a second sight why we have to
assume arithmetic (or Turing equivalent).
Bruno
David
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