It's because you don't listen, and then project that quality onto me. It's very common I've found. Not everyone is that way though. I have many productive conversations with people also. That would be hard to explain if it was my fault.
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 10:28:38 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: > > Sorry Craig but I find you a simply impossible discussion partner. It > doesn't seem to matter how directly and specifically one tries to put a > point to you; you seem endlessly capable of deflecting, ignoring or just > changing the subject. It's a real pity too that you seem convinced that all > criticisms of your ideas stem from the most primitive misunderstandings - > it stops you from really evaluating the arguments. In fact I'm not > convinced you bring much that's novel to the party (which in itself is no > cause for shame in such a traditionally intractable subject) but your > reluctance to confront the real difficulties faced by your type of theory > makes further discussion too frustrating to sustain, at least for me. Sorry > if that seems harsh, but there it is. Over and out. > > David > On 2 Feb 2014 02:20, "Craig Weinberg" <whats...@gmail.com <javascript:>> > wrote: > >> >> >> On Saturday, February 1, 2014 7:56:29 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: >>> >>> On 1 February 2014 20:33, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:53:30 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 1 February 2014 16:55, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I get around that with perceptual relativity. When flying over a city, >>>>>> it doesn't look like there are millions of conscious entities - not >>>>>> because >>>>>> their behavior is limited to a set of rules, but because your vantage >>>>>> point >>>>>> amplifies the insensitivity of your perceptual frame. By modulating >>>>>> frequency and scale, perceptual histories diverge and alienate each >>>>>> other's >>>>>> presence. The more extreme the alienation, the more the quality of what >>>>>> is >>>>>> perceived appears mechanical. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I don't see that you make your point here. How does "your vantage >>>>> point amplifies the insensitivity of your perceptual frame" get around >>>>> anything? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Because it is not that consciousness follows rules, it is that rules >>>> are the result of one conscious experience modeling others. What we can >>>> know about the universe outside of our body is limited by our body. The >>>> mind has different limitations, but it is much more directly sensitive to >>>> physics than our body, and its view of other bodies. >>>> >>> >>> Right, so the mind transcends the limits of the brain in its ability to >>> make contact with physics? Is this supposed to mean that you are capable of >>> thoughts that are not minutely correlated with some behaviour of your >>> brain? If so, how do you explain how those thoughts acquire their >>> "sensitivity to physics" or any purchase on the universe outside the body? >>> >> >> You're framing it so that the brain appears as a viable thing on its own >> rather than as the knot of experience that I'm assuming it is. Physics, in >> my view, is nothing more or less than sense sensing itself. It's not that >> there is not minute correlation, it's that the brain activity correlates to >> nothing unless we import our own experience into the correlation. The >> brain is a character in the experience of those who can relate to having an >> animal's body. A neuron is a character in the experience of those who can >> relate to having a cell, or a group of cells for a body. To be clear, the >> body and brain (as we see them) are just as sensitive to physics as "we" >> are, but "our" view of that sensitivity is not direct. Our body filters, >> our brain filters, parts of ourselves are filtered, but part of us is >> unfiltered, and that is 'who' we are. Not a what, or a how, or a why, but >> irreducibly a personal experience of who. Who is the direct (if limited and >> privatized) experience of physics (sense). The what and how of public >> bodies is public physics (indirect sense). >> >> >> >>>> >>>>> ISTM rather that "the quality of what is perceived appears >>>>> mechanical" because when placed under examination at any scale it can be >>>>> observed to adhere to an unvarying and causally-closed set of rules (the >>>>> ones we group under the heading of "physical"). >>>>> >>>> >>>> That's because the variation is closed to our vantage point. If an >>>> alien astronomer looked at any individual or group of people, they would >>>> conclude a causally-closed set of rules as well, but that's only because >>>> they are looking at the behavior of our bodies. The behavior of bodies is >>>> not that interesting compared to the aesthetic content of experiences. You >>>> could have a life changing epiphany and the alien astronomer would see >>>> nothing very interesting. >>>> >>> >>> But that, my dear Craig, is my very point, don't you see? Because >>> amongst those "uninteresting" behaviours is the ability to lay claim to the >>> possession of those very aesthetic experiences and those selfsame >>> epiphanies. >>> >> >> I'm saying that there are no uninteresting behaviors at all. It is not >> accessible from the outside. If it were not for the fact that we can >> correlate our own conscious experience with exotic magnetic resonance >> distribution patterns in the brain, something like a brain would seem no >> more worthy of inspection than the small intestine. It is like looking for >> the meaning of Shakespeare only in the grammar and punctuation of the play. >> It's the wrong place to look. The meaning is not visible there. >> >> >>> >>>> >>>>> In effect, it appears to be a "mechanism" at all scales. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Appears. What about feels? Why would mechanisms have an experience that >>>> feels like something? >>>> >>> >>> And there you have it! My point exactly - why indeed? But you would have >>> been more correct to say "why would mechanisms *claim* to have an >>> experience that feels like something". And, a fortiori, how? Don't look >>> away - this is the POPJ. >>> >> >> I'm not talking about the claim though. It doesn't make sense to claim >> something that cannot exist to begin with. I'm saying that experience >> cannot be invented in a mechanistic universe. It doesn't have a function. >> >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> The inexorable progress of this analysis of physical appearances has >>>>> so far trumped every historical attempt to interpolate novel "top-down" >>>>> rules operating at other levels (spiritualism, vitalism, holism, dualism >>>>> etc.). >>>>> >>>> >>>> Because it is looking for the head (temporary experiences) at the tail >>>> end (bodies in space). They are aesthetically orthogonal views. If you >>>> measure something with an instrument, you can only measure the outside of >>>> the instrument interacting with the outside of another body. The result is >>>> an inside out view of the universe. >>>> >>> >>> True, but that inside-out view must be intelligibly correlated - and in >>> astoundingly-precise detail at that - with the outside-in view. >>> >> >> It doesn't correlate directly, it correlates orthogonally. Think of how >> metaphor works. Literally "high" as in vertical distance is not >> mechanically related to figuratively "high" as in important, prestigious, >> etc. You have to live as a creature who experiences the nexus of >> overlapping conditions and experiences related to height over many >> lifetimes to reveal that underlying connection. If you look at the >> inside-out picture of ion channels or spike trains, you will not only be >> unable of finding the metaphor or the literal meaning, you'll find a >> completely other sensibility which relates to the human experience from an >> utterly impersonal and trivial perspective. It is to try to appreciate the >> paintings in the Louvre by counting the number of visitors who see it. >> >> >>> Else you are hard pressed to explain why they appear to co-vary in such >>> exquisite detail. >>> >> >> They co-vary because they are orthogonal presentations of the same >> underlying sense. >> >> I model it this >> way:<http://24.media.tumblr.com/bd10bf734b688a82a71112ba087f675e/tumblr_mxx20duols1qeenqko2_r1_1280.jpg> >> >> >> The emergence of the POPJ in both theories is a sign that neither a >>> purely outside-in, nor a purely inside-out theory, can do the job of >>> correlating consciousness with the appearance of mechanism. >>> >> >> I agree, we need to correlate them, but not mechanically because they are >> absolutely orthogonal. We have to meet our naive experience halfway and >> resist our conditioning to reduce it to the post-Enlightenment 3p view. >> Metaphor is the key. Etymology and semiotics help too. >> >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> Comp, as I've said, at the least confronts the problem and offers the >>>>> possible shape of a solution (but that alone, of course, doesn't >>>>> guarantee >>>>> its correctness). >>>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, Comp is almost correct, but at the absolute level, when it comes >>>> to putting the horse of sense before the cart of information, it gets it >>>> exactly wrong. >>>> >>> >>> Only if you impose your particular prejudices on it by fiat. >>> >> >> Not at all. There is no prejudice in my view. I don't care whether >> computation or sensation is primary, it just happens to be the case that it >> is not possible for computation to be primary. I arrive at this hypothesis >> by understanding, not judging or prejudging, and I submit it by proposal, >> not fiat. >> >> >>> >>>> >>>>> The value of any genuinely new insight (Relativity Theory, for >>>>> example) is not in ignoring the previous theory (Newtonian mechanics in >>>>> this case) but rather in providing a better explanation for the >>>>> predictions >>>>> of the old theory whilst simultaneously making new and surprising ones >>>>> that >>>>> turn out to match observation better. >>>>> >>>> >>>> This is not about making predictions, although someone could take it in >>>> that directions. This is about understanding the nature of consciousness >>>> and physics. >>>> >>> >>> Which as I've said must correlate the two whilst eliminating neither. >>> >> >> I agree, but they cannot be correlated directly because they relate to >> the opposite orientation. What must be correlated is that they can never be >> correlated, except in meaningless ways. >> >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Consequently, if your theory is to prevail, it must be able to explain >>>>> why appearance - and especially the appearance of "conscious" behaviour, >>>>> not excluding your own - conforms to "physical" causation as precisely as >>>>> we observe. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Because observation is a narrow constraint on sense which is invariably >>>> reflected in the result of the observation. Why do the Blind Men each >>>> conclude that the elephant is a different thing? You are underestimating >>>> the depth of the pansensitivity that I'm proposing - which is what I have >>>> come to expect. Turning your model of the universe inside out takes some >>>> practice. When I say that sense is Absolutely Primordial, I mean that >>>> nothing - not appearances, not realism, not sanity or logic - nothing >>>> whatsoever is anything except a local feature within it. >>>> >>> >>> I'm not surprised that you have come to expect incomprehension if the >>> best you can do is complain that people "underestimate the depth" of your >>> theory. >>> >> >> You misinterpret my comment. It is not my theory that you are >> underestimating, it is the phenomena itself that my hypothesis tries to >> define which you are trying to fit into an all-too-traditional framework. >> I'm not complaining, I'm informing you that you are criticizing a straw >> man, not my actual view. >> >> >>> It might help if you could actually point out what specifically is to be >>> found in the hidden depths of pansensitivity >>> >> >> It's not that they are hidden, it is that they have no exterior. Deep, >> shallow, opposite, same, everything, nothing...they are all 100% dependent >> on sense. >> >> >>> that is an adequate response to the specific points I've been making. >>> Poetry is not science and a metaphorical aside about Blind Men is not a >>> reasoned argument. >>> >> >> Reasoned arguments cannot bring someone back from the dead. I'm talking >> about what consciousness actually is. You either want to understand it, or >> you want to make a pretty theory and impress yourself. >> >> >>> >>>> This physical conformity of appearance is the reason that the theory >>>> cannot avoid the POPJ - in essence that we don't need, or seem even be >>>> able >>>> to apply, the notion of consciousness or sense to explain why the >>>> creatures >>>> that appear to us - including ourselves - make the claims to those >>>> phenomena that they do. What you say above doesn't suffice to address this >>>> formidable issue at all. >>>> >>> >>> It's not formidable if you bite the bullet and actually consider the >>> sense primitive without equivocating. Once you see that logic is a kind of >>> sense but sense is not a kind of logic, then everything falls into place >>> nicely. As long as you try to force the concrete presence of sensation and >>> sense-making into an abstract theory, the hard problem will always be >>> formidable. >>> >> >>> I will be more than happy to see that sense is not a kind of logic if >> you can explain *with accompanying details* how this answers my arguments. >> >> Phenomenal judgment is not a paradox in MSR because reference is not >> taken literally. Nothing literally represents anything, it can only be seem >> to represent something else figuratively. Thoughts are experiences. The >> contents of thoughts are not other experiences, they are still just >> thoughts. Nobody lives in them. That's not the reason that sense is not a >> kind of logic though - there's other reasons for that. >> >> I would also thank you to point out in exactly what points you think >> I've been equivocating. Trouble is, I fear you'll just say that since sense >> isn't a kind of logic there's no logical account that can be given of it. >> Well, I guess that means that those of us unwilling to pluck out the eyes >> of our reason will have to resign ourselves to remaining outside your state >> of grace in this regard. >> >> We can give logical accounts of sense because we are directly familiar >> with it. We don't need to give a sensible account of logic because logic >> already rests on the faculties of sense. We don't have to learn what pain >> means. We don't have to give a logical account of it, or understand >> logically how it controls our behavior rather than merely informs it. >> >> There is no substitute for experience David. All that I am doing is >> factoring that into the equation and realizing that it means that all forms >> of logic are incomplete and supervene on sense, while sense itself cannot >> supervene on anything. There can be no Ur-pain which teaches us how to find >> pain painful, because it would require an Ur-ur-pain to teach us that. >> Sooner or later something has to make sense of something, and it doesn't >> matter what level it occurs, because logic doesn't need it. >> >> What you are equivocating on is actually considering the sense primitive: >> "I will be more than happy to see that sense is not a kind of logic if..." >> >> There is no if. Understanding the hypothesis requires that you accept it >> hypothetically from the start, not folding your arms and saying "show me >> the result". >> >> Craig >> >> >> David >> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> >> . >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
