On 02 Feb 2014, at 19:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, February 2, 2014 4:36:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Feb 2014, at 21:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:16:43 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Feb 2014, at 13:13, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 4:54:47 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 Jan 2014, at 21:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Is there any instance in which a computation is employed in
which no
> program or data is input and from which no data is expected as
output?
The UD.
Isn't everything output from the UD?
No. The UD has no output. It is a non stopping program.
"everything physical and theological" appears through its
intensional activity.
"Appears" = output.
"Appears to me" appears more like input to me. Output of of some
universe?
Input/output, like hardware/software are important distinction, but
yet they are relative. My output to you is your input, for example.
They are indexicals too.
Sure, but they are absolute within a given frame of reference.
That's my point.
It seemed like the point you were making is that appearances were
inputs rather than outputs so it would agree with what you were
saying earlier about the UD not having any outputs. I was making the
point that in order for anything to have an input in a universe
where the UD is calling the shots, then the UD has to be outputting
computations to then non-UD (which receives them as inputs).
Why?
The larger point though is that input and output themselves (which I
see as the sensory motive primitive that information exists
*within*) is overlooked and taken for granted in comp.
The input output relations are simulated within the activity of the
UD. As I said the UD itself has no input and no outputs.
You cannot write a program which bypasses the need for inputs and
outputs by substituting them for a different kind of function. It
goes back to what I keep saying about not being able to substitute
software for a cell phone charger or a video monitor, or the
difference between playing a sport and playing a game which
simulates a sport.
But then you are the one making an absolute difference here, which
contradicts you point above.
The difference is absolute when we are talking about the primordial
case. The magnetic North pole of the compass actually points to the
South pole of Earth's magnetic field, but if we are talking about
the magnetic field, we do not say that the difference between North
and South pole is relative. That's all academic though, my point was
that Comp does not recognize its own North and South pole, which is
part of why it cannot see that it is only an object within sense
which reflects it rather than the source of sense.
That is far to vague.
In fact it uses an intensional Church thesis. Not only all
universal machines can compute all computable functions, but they
can all compute them in all the possible ways to compute them. The
intensional CT can be derived from the usual extensional CT.
Universal machines computes all functions, but also in all the
same and infinitely many ways.
How do we know they compute anything unless we input their output?
Oh! It is a bit perverse to input the output, but of course that's
what we do when we combine two machines to get a new one. Like
getting a NAND gate from a NOT and a AND gates.
We can also input to a machine its own input, which is even more
perverse, and usually this leads to interesting "fixed points",
many simple iterations leads to chaos. The Mandelbrot set
illustrates this.
But the point is that we don't have to feed the program at the
bottom level, if you can imagine that 17 is prime independently of
you, then arithmetic feeds all programs all by itself,
independently of you.
This is not entirely obvious, and rather tedious and long to prove
but follows from elementary computer science.
The arithmetic truth of 17 being prime doesn't do anything though.
That fact needs to be used in the context of some processing of an
input to produce an output.
So you refer to extrinsic processing, but that contradicts your
(correct) phenomenological account of sense,
I'm not talking about my view of sense, I'm talking about my
understanding of your view of the UD, arithmetic truth, and comp
(which are not a part of my view at all).
You can't criticize a theory by using another theory. That is called
begging a question.
and that jeopardize the possibility their primitiveness, or as David
shown, you are back to the POPJ.
In my view, all of arithmetic and processing is subordinate to the
sensory-motive primitive (the silhouette of which could be
translated as I/O in information-theoretic terms).
That is a reiteration of your view, not a critic of another view.
To me, everything is intrinsic, and extrinsicity is a perceptual
contraction.
You know that this is a consequence of comp, concerning the physical
reality. But we have still an extrinsic general conception of the
ontological reality (like arithmetic). Without it, your position is a
form of solipsism, and of abandon of the idea of searching an
explanation for sense.
I don't get why POPJ would apply to MSR at all, it seems to me just
a criticism (and a valid one) of functionalism and dualism. I use
PIP which is a Tesselated or Ouroboran Monism.
It does no work if your theory can justify the appearance of the
extrinsic. But you are unclear about this, and I'm afraid you have to
be unclear, because by starting from sense, you start from something
which is notoriously unclear. Then in some posts you continue to talk
like if a physical universe exists. What is PIP? Comp is OK with
Ouroboran Monism. After Gödel arithmetic instantiates clearly many
form of such type of monism.
Bruno
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
> This would suggest that computation can only be defined as a
> meaningful product in a non-comp environment, otherwise there
would
> be no inputting and outputting, only instantaneous results
within a
> Platonic ocean of arithmetic truth.
A computation of a program without input can simulate different
programs having many inputs relative to other programs or divine
(non-
machines) things living in arithmetic
How does the program itself get to be a program without being
input?
OK. Good question.
The answer is that the TOE has to choose an initial universal
system. I use arithmetic (RA).
Then all programs or number are natural inputs of the (tiny)
arithmetical truth which emulates them.
You need to understand that a tiny part of arithmetic defines all
partial computable relations. The quintessence of this is already
in Gödel 1931.
> Where do we find input and output within arithmetic though?
It is not obvious, but the sigma_1 arithmetical relation emulates
all
computations, with all sort of relative inputs.
It seems to me though, and this is why I posted this thread, that
i/o is taken for granted and has no real explanation of what it
is in mathematical terms.
It is the argument of the functions in the functional relations.
If phi_i(j) = k then RA can prove that there is a number i which
applied to j will give k, relatively to some universal u, (and
this "trivially" relatively to arithmetic).
> What makes it happen without invoking a physical or experiential
> context?
Truth. The necessary one, and the contingent one.
Does truth make things happen?
Yes. truth('p') -> p.
If "Obama is president" is true, then Obama is president.
>
> As an aside, its interesting to play with the idea of building a
> view of computation from a sensory-motive perspective. When we
use a
> computer to automate mental tasks it could be said that we are
> 'unputting' the effort that would have been required otherwise.
When
> we use a machine to emulate our own presence in our absence,
such as
> a Facebook profile, we are "onputting" ourselves in some digital
> context.
The brain does that a lot. Nature does that a lot. Ah! The natural
numbers does that I lot.
There doesn't seem to be a clear sense of what it means for
numbers to exert effort.
Of course I was speaking loosely, to avoid too much long
sentences. It is not the number which makes the effort, but the
person emulated by the number relations which makes the effort.
Think about the number relation which emulates the Milky way (by
computing the evolution of its Heisenberg matrix, with 10^1000
exact decimal, at the subplack level. Of course that is already a
toy mulit-galaxies. It owns a Craig doing the effort to read this
post, and omp prevents that you can distinguish your self from
that one. the effort are the same. (Of course with non-comp, you
can made him into a zombie).
If, as you say, truth itself makes things happen, then it would
seem that effort is an incoherent concept.
My poor car followed the schroedinger equation without effort, but
at a higher level, it tooks her a lot of effort to climb some
steep roads. Well, she died through such effort, actually.
Numbers have no reason to make other numbers do their work, as
they don't seem to have any basis to distinguish work from play.
Sigma_1 arithmetic, alias the UD, emulates all possible
interactions between all possible universal machines. All sorts of
interactions are emulated, but with different relative
probabilities, and that depends locally partially on them.
Computers will evolve in two ways: users' self extensions, like a
neo-
neo-cortex (+GSM, GPS, glasses, etc), which is a semi-delegation,
and
the total delegation (the friendly, and not friendly, AIs).
Those are ways that our use of computers will evolve. I don't see
that computers have any desire to extend themselves or to
delegate their work.
All universal machine are incomplete. Of course "desire" is a high
level feature which requires probably deep computations, but that
desire is a logical consequence of the basic frustration of any
machine when she grasps the difference between what she can
obtained, and what she can dream about.
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the
Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
