On 02 Feb 2014, at 20:31, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/2/2014 5:37 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Craig, nothing you have said so far diminishes by a single iota the
significance of the paradox to your theory. It's not so easy to
disarm it as insouciantly interpolating armfuls of non-sequiturs
couched in an impenetrable private jargon. You quote Chalmers, but
you consistently dodge (or perhaps don't really get) the point he
is making. His analysis isn't merely that physics seems to make
consciousness causally irrelevant, though that in itself would be
daunting enough. The paradoxical entailment comes from confronting
the stark realisation that, despite this, physically-instantiated
bodies and brains (i.e. the appearances in terms of which we
interact both with "ourselves" and with each other) continue to
behave *as if* they were laying claim to such conscious phenomena.
Furthermore, they apparently do so by means of a causally-closed
mechanism that entails that they neither possess these phenomena
nor could plausibly have any access to them.
But the "apparently" in the above is not apparent at all. One could
just as well conclude that consciousness is a nomologically
necessary aspect of the causally-close physics; that it's no more
separable than is temperature from molecular motion.
That analogy is limited. You can explain temperature from molecules
cinetics by remaining entirely in the 3p account. The mind-body
problem is that if you can explain the whole 3p of the 1p, then the
mind seems having no role at all.
Now with comp we take the mind seriously and can explain its necessity
and role (like with the hypostases), but we lost any ontic place for
matter, so we lost primitive physics, and we have to recover it by a
statistics on the 1p brought by all computations.
It is not a problem (except for Aristotelian fundamentalists) because
nobody has ever provided evidences for primitive matter or
physicalism. It is only a big assumption in metaphysics.
Bruno
Brent
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