On Mon, Feb 3, 2014 at 3:37 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > On 02 Feb 2014, at 23:29, LizR wrote: > > On 3 February 2014 08:31, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> On 2/2/2014 5:37 AM, David Nyman wrote: >> >> Craig, nothing you have said so far diminishes by a single iota the >> significance of the paradox to your theory. It's not so easy to disarm it >> as insouciantly interpolating armfuls of non-sequiturs couched in an >> impenetrable private jargon. You quote Chalmers, but you consistently dodge >> (or perhaps don't really get) the point he is making. His analysis isn't >> merely that physics seems to make consciousness causally irrelevant, though >> that in itself would be daunting enough. The paradoxical entailment comes >> from confronting the stark realisation that, despite this, >> physically-instantiated bodies and brains (i.e. the appearances in terms of >> which we interact both with "ourselves" and with each other) continue to >> behave *as if* they were laying claim to such conscious phenomena. >> Furthermore, they apparently do so by means of a causally-closed mechanism >> that entails that they neither possess these phenomena nor could plausibly >> have any access to them. >> >> >> But the "apparently" in the above is not apparent at all. One could just >> as well conclude that consciousness is a nomologically necessary aspect >> of the causally-close physics; that it's no more separable than is >> temperature from molecular motion. >> > > Sounds like Max Tegmark's latest notion? > > But from my reading of "Consciousness from Matter" Tegmark concludes that matter (or physics) does not have enough bits (EG. 37 classical bits and even fewer quantum bits) to support human consciousness. Richard > > Then he should read Putnam or any philosophers of mind. The idea that that > mind is to the brain what temperature is for molecular notion is a well > known 3p/1p confusion (which by the way appears indeed in some of Tegmark > frog/bird metaphor (where 3p and 1p are often mixed). > > Bruno > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
