On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 12:37:59 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > > On 4 February 2014 11:19, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com <javascript:>> > wrote: > > >> It's because you're stuck on the idea that consciousness is something > >> extra and optional. If you could see that it was logically entailed by > >> certain physical phenomena or computations you wouldn't have a > >> problem. It would be like agonising over why an object in which every > >> point on its perimeter is equidistant from the centre has the quality > >> of roundness rather than squareness or nothingness; and how it could > >> be that roundness has no separate causal efficacy over and above what > >> can be explained in terms of the physicality of the object possessing > >> this property. > > > > > > What computation or physical phenomena could logically entail anything > other > > than computation or physical phenomena though? Why does a computation > > logically begin to itch or turn orange, if the potential to itch or turn > > orange did not already exist? > > As per my answer to David: if you could show that a physical > phenomenon of a particular type necessarily leads to consciousness, > then anything further you have to say, such as remarks about how weird > it sounds, will not negate it. >
That's the same as saying "If I were proved right, then I couldn't have been wrong." The fact though that we cannot show a physical phenomena which necessarily leads to consciousness and there is no reason to suppose that one could ever be shown (especially since 'showing' only happens within consciousness, or else consciousness would be redundant). Craig > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
