On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 3:57:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 03 Feb 2014, at 21:25, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Monday, February 3, 2014 3:17:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 02 Feb 2014, at 20:31, meekerdb wrote: >> >> On 2/2/2014 5:37 AM, David Nyman wrote: >> >> Craig, nothing you have said so far diminishes by a single iota the >> significance of the paradox to your theory. It's not so easy to disarm it >> as insouciantly interpolating armfuls of non-sequiturs couched in an >> impenetrable private jargon. You quote Chalmers, but you consistently dodge >> (or perhaps don't really get) the point he is making. His analysis isn't >> merely that physics seems to make consciousness causally irrelevant, though >> that in itself would be daunting enough. The paradoxical entailment comes >> from confronting the stark realisation that, despite this, >> physically-instantiated bodies and brains (i.e. the appearances in terms of >> which we interact both with "ourselves" and with each other) continue to >> behave *as if* they were laying claim to such conscious phenomena. >> Furthermore, they apparently do so by means of a causally-closed mechanism >> that entails that they neither possess these phenomena nor could plausibly >> have any access to them. >> >> >> But the "apparently" in the above is not apparent at all. One could just >> as well conclude that consciousness is a nomologically necessary aspect >> of the causally-close physics; that it's no more separable than is >> temperature from molecular motion. >> >> >> That analogy is limited. You can explain temperature from molecules >> cinetics by remaining entirely in the 3p account. The mind-body problem is >> that if you can explain the whole 3p of the 1p, then the mind seems having >> no role at all. >> Now with comp we take the mind seriously and can explain its necessity >> and role (like with the hypostases), but we lost any ontic place for >> matter, so we lost primitive physics, and we have to recover it by a >> statistics on the 1p brought by all computations. >> >> It is not a problem (except for Aristotelian fundamentalists) because >> nobody has ever provided evidences for primitive matter or physicalism. It >> is only a big assumption in metaphysics. >> > > Is there a good resource online which explains the eight hypostases and > their relevance to connecting consciousness to computation? > > > This one, often mentioned. To get the connection with consciousness, you > need to work IN the theory comp, and assume that your consciousness is > invariant for digital brain substitution (at some level). Then the > self-reference theory redo an abstract form of the UDA in arithmetic. > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >
Thanks, but I am looking at more of a Wikipedia-level explanation rather than a logician's diagram. No offense, it looks cool. Craig > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
