On 11 Feb 2014, at 14:55, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/11/2014 12:42 AM, LizR wrote:
On 11 February 2014 17:21, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au>
wrote:
On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 04:57:50PM +1300, LizR wrote:
>
> You wouldn't need to say that if you could show what's wrong with
it! :-)
>
> (Sorry!)
>
> I think the chances are a TOE will have to go a looong way before
it's
> likely to make predictions rather than retrodictions. Didn't
string theory
> retrodict the graviton or something, and everyone said that was a
positive
> result? Well, Bruno's got qualia, apparently...
>
I don't see how he does. He does have the existence of incommunicable
facts (the G*\G thing), but that's not the same as qualia ISTM.
I said "apparently" because I have no idea how he does it.
I think a simpler form of the argument is that it must be possible
to simulate consciousness because (we think) any physical process
can be simulated and consciousness necessarily accompanies the
physical processes of one's brain. This is the bet of "saying yes to
the doctor".
With comp, I don't think we can simulate matter, nor consciousness. We
can only simulate the relevant part of the brain so that consciousness
is preserved. The price to pay is that matter becomes something
emergent in the 1p views (1p plural) and cannot be simulated or
emulated.
But there's a catch. When we simulate an aircraft flying or a
weather system those have a reference in the 'real' world and that's
why they are simulations. But if we simulate a conscious brain the
consciousness will be 'real' consciousness. So simulating conscious
is in a sense impossible; we may be able to produce it but we can't
simulate it. Consciousness must be consciousness of something, but
it need not be anything physical;
It needs to be physical, at least in the FPI sense of physical.
it could just be consciousness of arithmetical truths. This
explains why aspects of consciousness are ineffable. It's because
conscious processes can prove Goedel's theorem and so know that some
truths are unprovable. Bruno takes "qualia are ineffable" and "some
arithmetical truths are unprovable" and postulates
"ineffable=unprovable".
Not really.
I guess people progress, as this is the new common error in fashion,
but some logician did it too, and is a confusion between hypostases.
Qualia are related to non communicable, but only *indirectly* through
G*. It happens through Z1* and X1* (and S4Grz1), which translates the
UDA. the Gödel provability cannot be used for the UD measure, due to
the cul-de-sac worlds. That is why we need []p & p, or []p & Dt, or
[]p & Dt & p.
This allows him to identify specifically what makes some computer
program conscious: it's the ability to do induction and
diagnoalization and prove Goedel's theorems.
OK. But it is not a computable identification. We cannot recognize,
neither from code, nor from computational activity, is an entity is
Löbian or not. We can just prove non constructively that such programs
and computations exists in a non computable distribution.
My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism
in the sense required for this argument.
Then you have to find me two numbers a and b contradicting the axioms
of RA.
I think consciousness depends of consciousness *of* an external
world and thoughts just about Peano's arithmetic is not enough to
realize consciousness and the "ineffable=unprovable" identification
is gratuitous.
This lowers the level only, unless you add something non computable in
the local environment.
There are obvious physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia
would be ineffable. That's why I think step 8 is invalid because it
assumes dreams (of arithmetic?)
Once you accept comp, it is standard computer science to show that
*all* dreams are emulated in Arithmetic.
are possible independent of any external world - or looked at
another way, I think to make it work would require that the 'inert'
computation simulate a whole world in which the consciousness would
then exist *relative* to that world.
I guess we will need to come back on step 8, soon or later. Not sure
what you mean by "inert computation"? re you alluding to the "inert"
device in Maudlin and MGA, or to the static computations which exist
in arithmetic. In that case it is the usual argument against block-
time or block-universe, and this has been debunked repeatedly. Time
and activity are indexicals (indeed translated into *variants* of G*).
Bruno
Brent
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