On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:55, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/12/2014 3:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:40, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/11/2014 4:50 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical
realism in
the sense required for this argument. I think consciousness
depends of
consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about
Peano's
arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
"ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous. There are
obvious
physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be
ineffable. That's
why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of
arithmetic?)
are possible independent of any external world - or looked at
another way,
I think to make it work would require that the 'inert'
computation simulate
a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist
*relative* to
that world.
Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the
initial
assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!
I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the
actual
senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.
Exactly. One may still say yes to the doctor who give you an
artificial brain that functions within this world (and cannot be
the 'inert' brain of step 8).
?
I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.
If you accept AR *and* the identification of "unprovable
arithmetical truth"="qualia"
I have never identify qualia and "unprovable arithmetical truth".
Qualia are defined by possible semantics bearing on the logic of
certain unprovable arithmetical truth". That is very different.
technically, you confuse G* and Z*; Z1*, etc.
?? Don't know what that means.
Tell me if my preceding post (modal logic 4) did help, and I can
explain more tomorrow, as I will have to go.
Bruno
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