On 12 Feb 2014, at 04:12, LizR wrote:
On 12 February 2014 14:43, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 2/11/2014 4:56 PM, LizR wrote:
On 12 February 2014 13:50, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au>
wrote:
On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:
> On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
> > My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical
realism in
> > the sense required for this argument. I think consciousness
depends of
> > consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about
Peano's
> > arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
> > "ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous. There are
obvious
> > physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be
ineffable. That's
> > why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of
arithmetic?)
> > are possible independent of any external world - or looked at
another way,
> > I think to make it work would require that the 'inert'
computation simulate
> > a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist
*relative* to
> > that world.
> >
>
> Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the
initial
> assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!
>
I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual
senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.
I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.
Well, Brent seems to think it does (it was the AR bit he was
rejecting, or the Peano subset thereof I think?).
However, I agree that "I think consciousness depends of (sic)
consciousness *of* an external world" is simply an opinion,
Is it? Can you be conscious without being conscious of something?
Not without being conscious of something, no, but you specified an
external world. Dreaming is arguably a case where you aren't
conscious of an external world.
and the other related objections seem to be "arguing from
incredulity".
Yes, I am incredulous that "arithmetical provability" = "knowledge"
and "unprovable arithmetical truth" = "qualia". Are you credulous
on those two points?
I'm agnostic,
I am not. Brent attributes me things I have never said. AUDA would
gives classical logic for physics, if that was the case.
Brent evacuates all the modal nuances made in AUDA.
at least pending (a lot of) further investigation. But it sounded to
me as though you were incredulous that "dreams (of arithmetic?) are
possible independent of any external world". i.e. the whole "UDA
being able to exist in Platonia" thing.
I guess you mean the whole UD*.
Which I have to admit seems a fairly incredible idea to me most of
the time, especially when I stub my toe.
Yes, it incredible, indeed. But the points will be that qualia are
indeed non justifiable by the machine itself. Not because they belong
to G*, but to Z* or X* (or with comp, Z1* or X1*).
But I guess we have to progress on modal logic, and self-reference
logic before. OK. No rush.
Bruno
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