On Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:27:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Feb 2014, at 15:25, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> > If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an   
> > illusion 
>
>
> Not at all. Your 1p-originality is preserved all the time.


I'm not thinking of 1p originality though, I'm talking about originality 
itself - absolute uniqueness. The idea that something can occur for the 
first, last, and only time, and perhaps, by extension that everything is in 
some sense utterly unique and irreplacable. 
 

> In the H-WM   
> duplication experience, the experiencers get all a unique experience   
> of the type 
>
> I am the H-guy 
> I am the H-guy-Washington guy 
> I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy 
> I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy 
> I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy   
> and again Moscow guy ... 
>
> He never feel the split, and keeps its originality all along. he get   
> doppelgangers who also keep up their originality and develop their   
> personality. 
>

I understand, but I think it is based on the assumption that "I am the 
H-guy" comes along for the ride when you reproduce a description of his 
body, or the blueprints for his behaviors. My point has been from the start 
that this is false. No lifetime or event within a lifetime can be 
reproduced wholly - there is no such thing. All that can be reproduced is a 
representation within some sensory context. Outside of that context, it is 
a facade.
 

>
> Of course in your theory that is an illusion, as they are all zombies,   
> and the H-guy is dead. 
>

Never zombies - always dolls. Zombies are supernatural fiction, dolls are 
ordinary. The consciousness of dolls is not at the level of the plastic 
figure - there is consciousness there but on the level which holds the 
plastic together, and perhaps which on the metaphenomenal level of 
synchronicity, poetry, etc.
 

>
>
>
> > and simulation is absolute. 
>
> Emulation is absolute by Church thesis, and a "correct" simulation is   
> what comp assumes the existence through the existence of the   
> substitution level. 
>

Yes, I am saying that C-t and CTM have only to do with representations of a 
particular kind of logic and measurement. It is measurement which provides 
the local appearance of substitution. In reality, theory can never 
substitute for consciousness, and consciousness can have no theories 
outside of consciousness.
 

>
>
>
> > Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can   
> > only be done once. 
>
> That is ambiguous. 


I don't think it is. Arithmetic is based on recursive enumeration. There is 
no one and only time that any number can appear. Every number can be 
arrived at by many different routes - every number is always repeatable and 
transferable. Numbers can't own anything, they are generic addresses in a 
theoretical schema that appears again and again.
 

> All "conscious present instant" are done once, in   
> arithmetic. 


Where do we find a conscious present instant in arithmetic? If you assume 
that, then you would be begging the question of consciousness.
 

> Trivially in the bloc mindscape of the numbers possible   
> extensional and intensional relations. 
>

What is making "relations" possible, other than sense?
 

>
>
>
>
> > Think of consciousness as not only that which can't be done more   
> > than once, it is that which cannot even be fully completed one time. 
>
>  From inside arithmetic that's necessarily the case. 
>

Then how can it be said to have a substitution level?
 

>
>
>
> > It doesn't begin or end, and it is neither finite nor infinite,   
> > progressing or static, but instead it is the fundamental ability for   
> > beginnings and endings to seem to exist and to relate to each other   
> > sensibly. 
>
> The UD, and arithmetic determines all effective endings and non   
> endings (by Church's thesis). Then the internal views put colors on   
> this. 
>

Why and how would internal views put anything non-arithmetic on it though? 

Why and how does the UD develop the idea of endings and non-endings? It is 
not clear that there can be any endings or beginnings within arithmetic.
 

>
>
>
>
>
> > Consciousness is orthogonal to all process and form, but it reflects   
> > itself in different sensible ways through every appreciation of form. 
>
> OK. 
>
>
>
> > 
> > The not-even-done-onceness of consciousness and the done-over-and- 
> > overness of its self reflection can be made to seem equivalent from   
> > any local perspective, since the very act of looking through a local   
> > perspective requires a comparison with prior perspectives, and   
> > therefore attention to the done-over-and-overness - the rigorously   
> > measured and recorded. In this way, the diagonalization of   
> > originality is preserved, but always behind our back. 
>
> OK. 
>
> By "OK" I mean that the correct LĂ´bian machines roughly agree with you   
> (stretching definitions enough ... 
>
>
>
> > Paradoxically, it is only when we suspend our rigid attention and   
> > unexamine the forms presented within consciousness and the world   
> > that we can become the understanding that we expect. 
>
> ... up to where the definitions broke. 
>

Not sure if I understand, but if so, I would say 'up to the limit of the 
range of sensitivity;.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno 
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
>
>

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