On 23 Feb 2014, at 13:54, David Nyman wrote:
On 23 February 2014 09:22, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of
consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is
equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e.
per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can
expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come what
may, to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation
of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This expectation
is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some
particular continuation.
So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past?
This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed
digital, I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a
precursor. Does computational theory assume this, or can a mind
start from a blank state?
Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that
everyone seems to be on their first consciousness.
Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument
can be made for the QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an
infinite lifetime? Well, you have to start somewhere.)
Right. And I guess you'd expect me by now to invite you to consider
this with a Hoylean hat on. From Hoyle's perspective a momentary
experience can be *typical* only to the degree that equivalent
fungible experiences predominate in some underlying measure contest.
So, as an analogy, experiences in which "I" hold a losing ticket in
the UK lottery predominate hugely over those in which I hold a
winning ticket, and this continues to be the case even though from
Hoyle's perspective "I" am *all* the ticket holders. If this makes
any sense, we must assume (for the analogy to hold) that experiences
in which "I" appear to have a relatively recent origin in space and
time predominate in the measure battle with those in which my
apparent origin recedes towards some asymptotic limit. The former,
one might say, are more *typical* of the experience of the universal
observer than the latter.
For me this touches open problems (some made worst by explaining in
comp the possibility of the salvia experience).
All "memorized past" can only scratches the "futures". In a sense we
are always "young". From inside, it always look like a beginning, and
in a sense it is (I think).
Bruno
David
Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness,
I see no reason to assume that.
Hence the phraseology used above. If you say "given that X", that
means you're assuming it for the sake of argument. Sorry, maybe I
should have said "if we assume that..." to make it clearer.
does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that
"I am he as you are he as he is me", etc).
Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to
certain physical processes?
Since you can "see no reason to assume" the initial premise (see
above) it seems a bit odd that you are then trying to draw
conclusions from it!
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