On 23 February 2014 00:27, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > On Saturday, February 22, 2014 4:06:39 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: > >> On 22 February 2014 15:09, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:34:08 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: >>> >>>> On 22 February 2014 14:25, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an >>>>> illusion >>>>> >>>> >>>> Not an illusion, an invariant. >>>> >>> >>> If it is invariant then it can't be original. Invariant means that it >>> remains fixed across a multiplicity of variations. To be original means >>> that it undergoes no variation. It is uncopied and uncopyable. >>> >> >> But I think that any serious (i.e. non-eliminitavist) theory of >> consciousness must find it to be original and indeed uncopyable in the >> sense that you stipulate. >> > > That is the opposite of what CTM does though. In order to say yes to the > doctor, we must believe that we are justified in expecting to be copied > into an identical conscious personhood. > No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some particular continuation. > >> Sense is never copied; rather it is encountered wherever there is a >> sensible context. >> > > Encountered by what? Nonsense? What is a non-sensible context? > There is no precisely apposite vocabulary here. I simply meant the sufficient conditions for the self-relative actualisation of a who, a where, a when, a history and so forth. In short-hand: a sensible context. > >> One might say that it is encountered wherever what is obscuring it has >> been sufficiently clarified. It originates perpetually at the centre of a >> circle whose limits are not discoverable. One shouldn't therefore think of >> sense as what is copied in the protocol; rather what is copiable is only >> that which is capable of differentiating one sensible context from another. >> > > What else could be capable of differentiating one sensible context from > another besides sense? You are saying that sense is not copied, only > sense-making is copied. I am saying that nothing is copied except for the > ratios of distance between experiences. > I am only saying, or trying to say, what follows from the assumptions and explicit rules of derivation of a particular theory. I can do no other and no more. Under CTM, what might look like arithmetic, computation and logic from the bird perspective transforms, in terms of those very rules of derivation, into an inter-subjective Multiverse in the frog perspective. In so doing it relies implicitly, as I have suggested, on a notion of consciousness as a transcendent observational invariant. > >> I think that consciousness, transcendently, is a necessary, original and >> invariant assumption of any theory of itself. >> > > We agree then, but how does that allow for CTM? > Because if we are on the track of a theory of everything (vainglorious though that may be) we need more than just a transcendent assumption. We need a robust framework that shows at least some early promise of being able to address the formidable conceptual and technical challenges that infest the world-problem, hopefully without sweeping any of them "under the rug". > >> As such it is perpetually capable of self-manifestation, given the >> sufficient conditions of a sensible context. Always in terms of some >> theory, of course. >> > > Theory is always in terms of a deeper sense-making substrate. > I would say rather that theory must be capable of situating the required notions of sense both transcendently and contextually. And theory mustn't cheat by assuming a priori that its postulates are real (as opposed to the point of departure of an argument). David >>>> >>>>> and simulation is absolute. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Not absolute, but hopefully sufficient (i.e. the idea of a level of >>>> substitution). >>>> >>>> Hope that helps. >>>> >>> >>> I'm saying that the idea of a level of substitution is absolute. >>> >>> I wish I could hope that helps, but I expect that it will only be >>> twisted around, dismissed, and diluted. >>> >>> Craig >>> >>> >>>> >>>> David >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can >>>>> only be done once. Think of consciousness as not only that which can't be >>>>> done more than once, it is that which cannot even be fully completed one >>>>> time. It doesn't begin or end, and it is neither finite nor infinite, >>>>> progressing or static, but instead it is the fundamental ability for >>>>> beginnings and endings to seem to exist and to relate to each other >>>>> sensibly. Consciousness is orthogonal to all process and form, but it >>>>> reflects itself in different sensible ways through every appreciation of >>>>> form. >>>>> >>>>> The not-even-done-onceness of consciousness and the >>>>> done-over-and-overness of its self reflection can be made to seem >>>>> equivalent from any local perspective, since the very act of looking >>>>> through a local perspective requires a comparison with prior perspectives, >>>>> and therefore attention to the done-over-and-overness - the rigorously >>>>> measured and recorded. In this way, the diagonalization of originality is >>>>> preserved, but always behind our back. Paradoxically, it is only when we >>>>> suspend our rigid attention and unexamine the forms presented within >>>>> consciousness and the world that we can become the understanding that we >>>>> expect. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Friday, February 21, 2014 8:39:47 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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