On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 7:45 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 1:39 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > >> Did the Helsinki Man see Washington and Moscow? Yes. >>> >> >> > In the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view. >> > > In who's "1-1 view"? You'll probably say in "The Helsinki Man's", but his > view is just of Helsinki. Perhaps you mean the future "1 view" of the > Helsinki Man. If so then anybody who can remember having the past "1 view" > of the Helsinki Man would fit that description; so the Helsinki Man will > see both Washington and Moscow. > > > I said that we have to interview all copies. >> > > Good, then I never want to hear you say again that the Washington Man > saying that he didn't see Moscow contradicts the claim that the Helsinki > man will see both Washington AND Moscow. > > >>>> I too have discovered a new sort of indeterminacy that involves >>>> math and it is very very similar to the sort you discovered; I add 2 to the >>>> number 3 and I add 8 to the number 3. The number 3 can't predict if it will >>>> end up as a 5 or as a 11. I believe my discovery is just as profound as >>>> yours. Not very. >>>> >>> >> > >>> So you accept that step 3 is a discovery? >>>> >>> >> >> I think my "discovery" is virtually identical to yours and is just as >>> profound. Not very. >>> >> >> > So that's it. You blow the candle of another because you are jealous he >> published it and exploit to get something >> > > What the hell!!? Did you really think I was serious? Did you really think > I believed the above pap was a major discovery?! > > Concerning FPI and step 3, yes its "just a step" but to me it is not trivial, especially when UDA is followed through to its concluding implications and problems in conjunction with steps 7 and 8. A non-trivial fundamental point here for yours truly, is that determinism in the mechanist setting of the protocol entails strong form of first-person subjective indeterminacy. P(Washington) = P(Tokio) =1/2 is just set out to fix the damn question to explore further implications of comp, eventually including the search of such distributions of probability bearing on observable physics given backdrop of a lot of redundant UD work. The objective probability asserted here at step 3 seems fundamental; applied to first person subjective outcomes in a deterministic UD setting providing a foundation for examining self-reference observation constraints of various types of reasoning machines arising from something as general as arithmetic/possible logics, and comparing this with our observable physics, appears as a valid, if overlooked move. This might be trivial pap to you, but then I'd like to know clearly: why would such a comparison be trivial or bogus? In other words: how do you know? Things are obviously not all unexplainable magic, when arithmetic is effectively applied, nor is everything computable. For now, I see no reason to not keep trying to grasp at both ends and keep comparing. If this is trivial to you then I'll grant you my low standards and taste for "pap". But then why further concern yourself with these questions; being patronizing and insulting? Waste of time by your own standards of pap it would seem. Go preach elsewhere whatever it is you want to preach with such furious ambition, maybe? PGC John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
