On 26 Feb 2014, at 07:44, chris peck wrote:
Hi Bruno
>> Of course, and my point is that comp aggravates that problem, as
only extends the indterminacy from a wave to arithmetic.
Personally, I don't think it makes a difference what the underlying
substrata of reality consists of,
So we might work on different subject. No problem. You are the one
saying that there was a mistake.
be it sums or some fundamental 'matter-esq' substance. What causes
the problem is just the fact that in any TofE all outcomes are
catered for. In such a theory genuine probabilities just vanish and
subjective uncertainty can only exist as an epistemic measure.
Very good. That is what happen in arithmetic with comp.
In versions of MWI it can exist when a person is unable to locate
himself in a particular branch. ie. in earlier versions of Deutsch
where infinite numbers of universes run in parallel one might not
know whether one is in a spin up or spin down universe. Or in your
step 3, subjective uncertainty can exist after duplication but
before opening the door.
Do you agree that if today, I can be certain that I will find myself
in front of something indeterminate, then I am now indeterminate about
that future outcome?
If you agree, then you are playing with words. If you disagree then
explain.
These people are unable to locate and that lack of knowledge
translates into subjective uncertainty.
Which was easily predictable (you just did), and so the guy in H can
understand what we are talking about, and in which sense "W v M" is
the best prediction, and "W and M" the worst. Even if correct in some
different views.
They can assign a probability value between 0 and 1 to possible
outcomes.
And the next step ask if a delay of reconstitution changes the
expectations.
But crucially, where all relevant facts are known, the only values
available must be 1 or 0.
Well, after the experience. But the question is asked before.
That just follows from the fact that all outcomes are catered for.
And it seems to me that H guy in step 3 has all these relevent facts.
Indeed, but that is the very reason he can be sure of one thing: he
cannot be sure where he will be in an iteration of self-duplication.
The epistemic probabilities gives a normal distribution, in that
protocols.
So, whilst the duplicates before opening the door would assign 0.5
to M or W, prior to duplication H guy would assign 1.
1 to what events?
No, that's the shift in the 3-1 again, using a non relevant principle,
see above.
This is why I have accused you in the past of smuggling
probabilities in from the future which strikes me as very fishy.
Insulting is not valid argumentation. Up to now, I see play word and
hand waving to avoid a simple consequence of logic and mechanism.
>> OK, I appreciate the work, but they don't address the mind-body
problem. Still less the computationalist form of that problem. But
they get the closer view of the physical possible with respect to
both comp, and the mathematical theory (comp+Theaetetus).
Im not arguing that these people have a complete or even coherent
theory. My guess is that they don't, I mean who does?
It is the object matter of this list.
It seems like everyone but me thinks they are in direct contact with
the one and only truth, but its all just hubris.
It might well be the case that your theory fairs better than theirs
on the mind-body problem and much else besides but so what? They do
far better when it comes to probability assignment and subjective
uncertainty, imho.
My point is that if we assume comp, we have to extend Everett to a
larger part, in arithmetic.
And by doing this from self-reference, we get the communicable quanta
and the non communicable qualia. I think. With their rich mathematics.
Bruno
All the best
Chris
From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:33:21 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
2014-02-26 7:31 GMT+01:00 chris peck <chris_peck...@hotmail.com>:
Hi Liz
>> I meant changed from our everyday definition, in which we
normally assume there is only one you, which is (or is at least
associated with) your physical structure. Which we generally assume
exists in one universe.
We lose that definition just by stepping into the realm of MWI don't
we? Its not as if we can have use of it in MWI until we want to
argue that we will always see 'spin up'.
MWI forces upon us either the complete abandonment of any notion of
personal identity over time, or the equal distribution of it through
all the branches in which 'we' appear.
That's where your wrong... that would mean all branches have equal
measure, where it must not, if MWI must be in accordance with QM.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#PRPO
All the best
Chris.
From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:28:53 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
2014-02-26 7:21 GMT+01:00 chris peck <chris_peck...@hotmail.com>:
Hi Bruno
>> Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views.
There is no such confusion. I haven't seen anyone confusing these.
>>She should have said: "whatever she knows she will see, she should
expect (with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite".
But, If she had of said that you'd both be wrong!
>> And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome".
You need to stop confusing what is seen with what can be expected to
be seen. I think that's the source of many of your mistakes. She can
expect to see each outcome without being committed to the view that
either future self sees both. All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a
rubbishy smoke screen to divert attention from the simple error you
make here, isn't it?
She can make a probabilistic prediction as you can make in MWI...
you're the one wanting to say probability are wrong, but only the
interpretation of what is probability change in MWI (and duplication
settings)... not the prediction... if you say it is totally useless,
then you're ready to make a bet with me (as everything for your has
equal probability of happening...)
Quentin
All the best
Chris.
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100
On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and
spin down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where,
in discussion of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's
step 3, he argues:
"What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following
premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with
certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see
spin-up, and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down."
That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact.
Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. She should
have said:
"whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with
certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite". And in the 1p it is obvious
she will never see both outcome".
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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